

# **The Strategic Thinking of Major General Sir Howard Kippenberger**

**Emmet McElhatton**



**Discussion  
Paper**

**Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand  
Victoria University of Wellington**

**No. 06/08**

**CENTRE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES  
NEW ZEALAND**

**Discussion Papers**

The Centre for Strategic Studies Discussion Paper series is designed to give a forum for scholars and specialists working on issues related directly to New Zealand's security, broadly defined, in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond.

The opinions expressed and conclusions drawn in the Discussion Papers are solely those of the writer. They do not necessarily represent the views of the Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand or any other organisation with which the writer may be affiliated.

For further information or additional copies of the Discussion Papers please contact:

The Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand  
Victoria University of Wellington  
PO Box 600  
Wellington  
New Zealand.

Tel: 64 4 463 5434  
Fax: 64 4 463 5737  
Email: [css@vuw.ac.nz](mailto:css@vuw.ac.nz)  
<http://www.vuw.ac.nz/css/>

Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand  
Victoria University of Wellington

2008

© Emmet McElhatton

ISSN 1175-1347

The writer and the publisher gratefully acknowledge the permissions from the Kippenberger Military Archive and Research Library, Army Museum, Waiouru and The Trustees of the Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, London to quote Major General Sir Howard Kippenberger annotations in this Paper; and the Secretary to the Delegates of Oxford University Press for permission to quote the sales figures for the book *Infantry Brigadier* authored by Major General Sir Howard Kippenberger.

*Cover design and desktop publishing: Synonne Rajanayagam*

*Printed by: Milne Print Limited*

# The Strategic Thinking of Major General Sir Howard Kippenberger

Emmet McElhatton

## Discussion Paper 06/08

### Abstract

In March 2006, Victoria University of Wellington announced the creation of the Sir Howard Kippenberger Chair in Strategic Studies “to perpetuate the name and deeds of...a great soldier, strategist, scholar and New Zealander”.<sup>1</sup> Biographers have alluded to the civilian Kippenberger’s strategic foresight in the 1920s and 1930s and commentators have noted his advocacy for strong defence capability in the early Cold War period, yet the two biographies<sup>2</sup> of this New Zealand hero and other biographical texts<sup>3</sup> concentrate on Kippenberger’s 1939-1944 war service and his abilities as an infantry commander, tactician and leader of men. A question remains under-examined: was Sir Howard Karl Kippenberger, KBE, CB, DSO and Bar, ED a strategic thinker? The inauguration of the Sir Howard Kippenberger Chair in Strategic Studies and the imminent appointment of its first occupant, a scholar of international renown, make it timely to ask this question.

Former Chief of General Staff of the New Zealand Defence Force, Major General Piers Reid CBE has noted that prior to the publication of Glyn Harper’s 1997 biography, little had been written to illuminate the background, beliefs and experiences, which had shaped Kippenberger the battlefield commander.<sup>4</sup> While Harper has undoubtedly given us a much clearer insight into Kippenberger’s pre-WWII command genesis and has shown the post-war public figure’s contribution to New Zealand social life he has also raised some further questions about Sir Howard’s life that still remain to be fully explored.

### About the author

Emmet McElhatton is a Wellington based public servant working in the education sector. He has had a varied career in journalism, publishing, education, hospitality and construction. He has recently been published in *Small Wars Journal*, *New Zealand Journal for Defence Studies* and *New Zealand International Review*, and has a Master of Strategic Studies (Dist.) from Victoria University of Wellington where he is currently a PhD candidate in the School of Government.

### Comment from the director, CSS:NZ

The subject of strategy is the defining element of human existence and successful future. All humans practice strategy individually even if only subliminally in order to survive and progress. The quest for food, shelter, security and satisfaction of desires is a constant pre-occupation of humans the world over. “No man is an Island, entire of itself ...” wrote John Donne the English clergyman in the 16<sup>th</sup> Century. He was right to observe that humans depend on one another for

---

<sup>1</sup> NZRSA National President John Campbell in Victoria University press release “Kippenberger Honoured at Victoria”, 6<sup>th</sup> March 2006.

<sup>2</sup> Howard Kippenberger, *Infantry Brigadier*, London, 1949 and Glyn Harper, *Kippenberger: An Inspired Commander*, Auckland, 2005

<sup>3</sup> e.g. in *Oxford Companion to New Zealand Military History*.

<sup>4</sup> Piers Reed, “Foreword”, in Harper, *Kippenberger*, pp.7-8.

mutual support, wellbeing and security. Unfortunately and apart from natural hazards, groups of humans are constantly challenged by their peers for control of their freedom, property and happiness and this raises the topic of security. The matter of security however, is an extremely broad canvas and to understand its complexities requires great dexterity of mind but above all a deep education in the humanities and especially of history. The stimulus to read and understand history passionately and even more so than his contemporaries, in the case of Sir Howard Kippenberger, must surely have been honed by his experiences in the First World War. Embarking on his project of self-education illustrates a remarkable prescience of mind and a selfless commitment to an excellence of understanding and knowledge of strategy.

This study by Emmet McElhatton is an extremely timely examination of Sir Howard's fascination and grasp of military history and how he applied that learning to the subject of strategic thinking and war. It is written in a lively conversational style and with perspicacious insights that deepen understanding of the General's knowledge of the deadly craft and art of war. The instructive nature of this research paper underscores Kip's conviction that even in times of comparative peace there is always a need to be prepared for the prospect of lethal conflict to determine political outcomes in human affairs. The demand for the ability to think and act strategically of a very high calibre is therefore constant in our own contemporary circumstances. Emmet McElhatton is to be warmly congratulated and thanked for his tenacious and thorough scholarship – we are indeed indebted to him for sharing his masterly understanding of one of New Zealand's greatest military strategists.

*Peter Cozens,  
Director  
Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand*

## Acknowledgements

My first encounter with Major General Sir Howard Karl Kippenberger was, appropriately, in the building that bears his name in Waiouru. A few years ago, on my first visit to the Army Museum, I stopped to examine a strategically placed display case at the museum's entrance. While admiring the uniform and assorted memorabilia of some oddly named and, to my ignorant eyes, obscure, general therein, I became aware of a large and ominous green presence. I looked up and found myself under the steely gaze of a uniformed Teuton, rippling silent power, vaguely menacing. The khaki giant raised his hand and an index finger, thicker than my arm, jabbed gently into my shoulder. The behemoth bent lower and in a low deep whisper said, "Kip...the best bastard ever". Pride and reverence reverberated from him, his whole presence telling me that indeed, the man who had worn the uniform displayed was no mere soldier but, to him, and all his colleagues no doubt, a very great man indeed. My gaze shifted back to the case and the photo of the slightly built man inside. I needed to know more about this 'Kip'. I turned to pose the giant a question but he had vanished silently into the air about me. Since my encounter with that modern day New Zealand warrior I have learned much about Major General Sir Howard Kippenberger and now realise that, not only is he one of the most revered leaders the New Zealand Armed Services has produced, but that this reverence is eminently justified.

My 'Kip considerations' have been assisted by the kind assistance of a number of people and institutions. Firstly Dolores Ho and the staff at the Army Museum, Waiouru have provided invaluable help and advice. The staff at the Liddell Hart Centre for Military Studies, King's College London, made distance research effortless and responded most promptly, with great warmth, to all my far-off enquiries. Dr Martin Maw from Oxford University Press in that hallowed college town went the extra mile to assist in my *Infantry Brigadier* enquiries. As always, the staff at Archives New Zealand in Wellington were most helpful. Many thanks to all at the School of Government, Victoria University of Wellington. I spent a most illuminating afternoon in the company of writer and historian Denis McLean who gave me a peek at his collection of Kippenberger's papers and shared some thoughts on our mutual subject, which have helped clarify my thoughts on the great man. I eagerly await the publication of Denis McLean's biography of Kippenberger and know it will be a milestone work on New Zealand in that dark yet optimistic time. I called on a lot of people over the past year and acknowledge input to my research from Dr Peter Foot, Dr Leonard Wong, Commander Peter Kelly, Colonel Jan Wessels, Lim Seng Hock, Dr Piers Reid and Dr Stephen Clarke of the RNZRSA.

My wife and children have had an extra lodger in their house for some years now, and, while they admire the old General, will, I suspect, be quite glad when he moves out. Their patience and understanding has been vital in this and all my studies.

Portions of this research, primarily Chapter Nine, have been published in Issue II of *The New Zealand Journal of Defence Studies* under the title *Liddell Hart's Fantasy: A Clash of Official Historians and a Historical Strategist*. I would like to thank the Centre for Defence Studies at Massey University for their interest in my research and a special acknowledgement to Centre Director, Dr Glyn Harper, for all the groundbreaking work he has conducted in Kippenberger research. His biography of the great man has been one of two constant companion books during my research, and a very fine guide it has been too.

The Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand is an important locus for defence debate in New Zealand. My thanks to Commander Peter Cozens RNZN (Ret'd), Dr Harshan Kumarasingham and Mrs Synonne Rajanayagam.

Finally I reserve special mention for my supervisor Dr Lance Beath, Convenor of the Strategic Studies Programme at the School of Government, Victoria University of Wellington. After five years of encouragement and mentoring I am, for once, stuck for words. Let me just say then, thank you.

## A Note on Methodology

The primary focus of this research has centred on Major General Sir Howard Kippenberger's annotation of military related books and texts he collected over his lifetime, purchased after his death by the New Zealand Army and, eventually, housed in the *Kippenberger Military Archives and Research Library* in the Queen Elizabeth II Army Museum, Waiouru. This research has involved;

- Surveying the collection for 'key text' highlights and gaps and scoping the extent, form and quality of Kippenberger annotation. This also involved determining which texts in the current collection were books he bought and studied in his lifetime, and, therefore, especially if annotated, primary texts for the purposes of this research. Other texts in the collection, whether gifts to Kip or books added after his death, have been ignored.
- Selecting what, based on key literature review, could be considered key strategic and tactical texts from the collection to concentrate on and other texts in the collection that potentially revealed interests of Kippenberger's previously under-explored by other writers.
- Recording annotation and the textual context it occurs in.
- Deciphering annotation and ascertaining meaning.

Kippenberger annotated his books in four ways which I have termed Personalising, Kip Note [KN], Underline [UL], Highlight [HL] and Tick. Kippenberger's personalising habits are the key to determining the provenance of the books in the collection, his other forms of annotation and marginalia a (sometimes oblique) guide to his ideas on strategy.

Where a word, passage, phrase etc. has been annotated by Kip and later used by the author in the narrative, it is referenced by the work it came from, page number or other location and type of the annotation. Therefore a frequently referenced work like W.D. Bird's would be cited:

W.D. Bird, *The Direction of War: A Study and Illustration of Strategy*,  
Cambridge, 1925, HL p.7, Kippenberger Collection.

This indicates the passage quoted has been *highlighted* by Kippenberger in, W.D. Bird, *The Direction of War*. For a fuller description of the methodology behind this study, and a directory of the Kippenberger Collection works consulted, readers are directed to the original research essay in the library, Victoria University of Wellington.


Figure 0.1: Kippenberger Quotes Churchill's *World in Crisis*<sup>5</sup>

Hand. Walter Churchill 1911-1914. P. 11.

'But nothing dented the valiant heart of man. Son of the Iron Age, vanquisher of nature with all her trials. Unconquerable he met the awful self-inflicted agony with new resources of fortitude. Freed in the main by his intelligence from medieval fears he marched to death with soldier's dignity. This nervous system was found in the 20th Century to be capable of enduring physical and mental stresses before which the simpler natures of former times would have collapsed. Again again to the hideous bombardments, again again from the hospital to the front, again again to the hungry submarines, he stood unflinching. And without, as an individual, perceived through these torments, the glories of a reasonable and compassionate mind.'

<sup>5</sup> Picture by Emmet McElhatton, 2007, of photocopy from Douglas Jerrold's pamphlet *The Lie About the War* in The Kippenberger Collection, Queen Elizabeth II Army Museum, Waiorou (Henceforth KC, QEIIAM); see 'Conclusion' for context.

Figure 0.2: A Typical Example of Kippenberger Annotation<sup>6</sup>



<sup>6</sup> Picture by Emmet McElhatton, 2007, of photocopy from Douglas Jerrold's pamphlet *The Lie About the War* in KC, QEIIAM.

## Opening Quotes

“By the very nature of things, skill in the profession of arms has to be learned mostly in theory by studying the science of war – since the opportunity of practice in the art does not come often to the general. For this reason the great captains have always been serious students of military history...T.E. Lawrence rightly said that we of the twentieth century have two thousand years of experience behind us, and, if we still must fight, we have no excuse for not fighting well. My reading over the years has convinced me that nobody in this twentieth century can become a great commander, a supreme practitioner of the art of war, unless he has first studied and pondered its science”.

**Viscount Montgomery of Alamein<sup>7</sup>**

“No commander who wishes to win ignores terrain or weather. No commander who wishes to win ignores the military capabilities of his enemies. Better commanders understand the confluence of terrain, weather, and enemy capabilities in formulating a course of action. But the best commanders in history used the cultural dimension as an integral part of warfare”.

**Lieutenant Colonel Thomas P. Odom, U.S. Army<sup>8</sup>**

“There is nothing more fearful than ignorance in action”.

**Johann Wolfgang von Goethe<sup>9</sup>**

---

<sup>7</sup>Viscount Montgomery of Alamein, *A History of Warfare*, London, 1968, p.21.

<sup>8</sup> Thomas P. Odom, ‘America’s Cultural First Battles: Understanding the Influence of Culture on War’, *Small Wars Journal*, Vol. 9, September 2007, p.29; available from <http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/swjvol9.pdf>; accessed 1<sup>st</sup> October 2007.

<sup>9</sup> Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, *Proverbs in Prose*, London, 1819.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

<b>Abstract</b> .....	1
About the Author .....	1
Comment from the director CSS:NZ .....	1
<b>Acknowledgements</b> .....	3
<b>A Note on Methodology</b> .....	5
<b>Opening Quotes</b> .....	8
<b>Table of Contents</b> .....	9
<b><i>Introduction: “Teaching Them to Play and Then Regularly Beating Them”</i></b> .....	11
<b><i>Chapter One: “Grete wrong is done to the ordre of knighthood”</i></b> .....	13
Great Captains .....	13
Thinking dynamically in space and time .....	14
Space .....	16
Time .....	17
<b><i>Chapter Two: “Fine, Hardened, Smooth Running Machines”</i></b> .....	19
Militarism and chivalry .....	19
Germany and future war .....	21
<b><i>Chapter Three: “The Character of the Colonist”</i></b> .....	25
National Character .....	25
New Zealand’s place in the world .....	27
<b><i>Chapter Four: “War Should Be Taken More Seriously”</i></b> .....	28
The Kippenberger Collection .....	28
The missing Clausewitz .....	29
<b><i>Chapter Five: “Things are Never as Bad, or as Good as They Seem”</i></b> .....	35
Authoring <i>Infantry Brigadier</i> .....	35
<i>Infantry Brigadier</i> in modern staff college use .....	37
<b><i>Chapter Six: “My Hobby of Soldiering”</i></b> .....	40
Kippenberger the historian .....	40
The enduring lesson of the Crusades .....	41
<b><i>Chapter Seven: “He Shot Them All with His Revolver in a Most Efficient Fashion”</i></b> .....	43
Grand strategy .....	43
Morale .....	45
<b><i>Chapter Eight: “Odd Things Always Go Wrong in the Preparation for a Battle”</i></b> .....	48
The geography of battle .....	48
Major Generals Kippenberger and Bird .....	49
Space and obstacles .....	50
Strategy and future war .....	55

<b>Chapter Nine: “Liddell Hart’s Fantasy”</b> .....	57
Kip the Scholar .....	61
<b>Conclusion: “Three Fierce Thunderous Cheers”</b> .....	64
<b>Appendix</b> .....	67
<b>Bibliography</b> .....	68
<b>List of Illustrations and Tables</b>	
Figure 0.1: Kippenberger Quotes Churchill’s <i>World in Crisis</i> .....	6
Figure 0.2: A Typical Example of Kippenberger Annotation .....	7
Figure 8.1: Space .....	51
Figure 8.2: The Influence of Obstacles .....	52
Figure A.1: Ray Grover’s Kippenberger Collection Subject Guide .....	67
Figure A.2: Infantry Brigadier Sales 1950-1969 .....	67

## Introduction

### “Teaching Them to Play and Then Regularly Beating Them”<sup>10</sup>

"In one phase men seem to have been right, in another they seem to have been wrong. Then again, a few years later, when the perspective of time has lengthened, all stands in a different setting. There is a new proportion. There is another scale of values. History with its flickering lamp stumbles along the trail of the past, trying to reconstruct its scenes, to revive its echoes, and kindle with pale gleams the passion of former days".

Winston Churchill, *A Speech to The House of Commons*, November 12, 1940<sup>11</sup>

The Times of London published its obituary of Sir Howard K. Kippenberger on the 6 May 1957 under the title *The Gift For Leadership*.<sup>12</sup> Written in that economically worded, considered style that marks great British journalism, the short piece is a fine tribute to a great New Zealander. The writer notes that Kippenberger's "gift for leadership and tactical skill" brought him rapid promotion during campaigns marked by "bitter fighting" and "gruelling soldiering", his powers of command only halted by "cruel misfortune" in the guise of a mine at Cassino. The writer notes two complementary sides to Howard Kippenberger; the first a soldier his men, his superiors and his nation knew was "a splendid man of arms". This Kippenberger is there for our free consideration. He lives, splendidly self-animated, in the pages of *Infantry Brigadier*, the 1949 classic account of man and command that is Kippenberger's prime legacy to soldiering. He fixes us in his gaze from the cover of Glyn Harper's 1997 *Kippenberger: An Inspired New Zealand Commander*, challenging us to stand up and be counted like those men, now ghosts, of 'the greatest generation', who came up from a small nation when the world trembled, and fought as a "grown up nation"<sup>13</sup> when it counted most. This man of arms also lives on in the Kippenberger Scheme, the NZ Army scholarship programme for young officer training,<sup>14</sup> inspiring future leadership through training and edification.

And then there is that other side the obituary noted, the "reflective" man, the man of quiet contemplation and study. This Kippenberger is altogether more elusive. He lends his name to the *Kippenberger Military Archives and Research Library*, yet is hard to find within, preferring to camouflage his thoughts within other people's words. He chooses not to show himself in *Infantry Brigadier*, leaving the man of arms to steal the show. He's not so clearly evident in the campaigner for Compulsory Military Training, in the NZRSA president, nor in the toiling historian marshalling the history of his nation's struggle to fruition. These Kippenbergers are still men of action and strong words. No, the reflective Kippenberger remains to be fully revealed, the man of arms rounded out to the man of thought and deed he surely was. I will attempt in this paper to put a little more flesh on the reflective bones of Major General Sir Howard Karl Kippenberger and see if we can catch a glimpse of 'Kip' the New Zealand nationalist, the romantic realist, the strategic thinker.

---

<sup>10</sup> Kippenberger, *Infantry Brigadier*, p.193.

<sup>11</sup> Winston Churchill, 'Tribute to Neville Chamberlain: A Speech to The House of Commons, November 12, 1940', in Charles Eade (ed.), *The War Speeches of Winston S. Churchill*, Vol. 1, London, 1969, p.299.

<sup>12</sup> *Sir Howard K. Kippenberger: The Gift for Leadership*, in The Times, 6 May 1957, LH 15/6/5/11, Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, Kings College London (Henceforth LHCMA).

<sup>13</sup> H.K. Kippenberger, "Where is New Zealand to be Defended?" in *To Preserve Our Security: The Case for Compulsory Military Training*, Joint Defence Action Committee, Wellington, April 1949, p.3. Pamphlet in The KC, QEIIAM.

<sup>14</sup> Website of the New Zealand Army, <http://www.army.mil.nz/careers/become-an-officer/schemes/kippenberger-scheme/default.htm>. 1 August 2007.



## Chapter One

### “Grete wrong is done to the ordre of knighthood”<sup>15</sup>

“The history of war is the history of warriors; few in number, mighty in influence. Alexander, not Macedonia conquered the world. Scipio, not Rome destroyed Carthage. Marlborough, not the allies defeated France. Cromwell, not the roundheads dethroned Charles”.<sup>16</sup>

General George Patton

### Great Captains

Patton, numerous faults notwithstanding, was a great and innovative general,<sup>17</sup> mightily feared by his opponents. He subscribed fully to the ‘great man’ theory of history, a belief that events were primarily shaped by the “vitalising spark of the soul of a leader”<sup>18</sup> or, to quote the romantic anti-liberal Thomas Carlyle, that “universal history...is at bottom the history of the great men who have worked here”.<sup>19</sup> The ‘great captain’ idea intrigued Howard Kippenberger too as he noted when reading Marshal Foch’s 1903, *The Principles of War*. The idea of the “power of the individual”, the singular “will to conquer” was a captivating one. Foch concurred with Patton: “Gaul was not conquered by legions but by Caesar”.<sup>20</sup> Kip nodded, if only in partial agreement.

A core sociological question long debated is whether history is made, so to speak, by particular individuals through the force of their nature or whether, on the contrary, an individual’s actions are shaped by his or her environment.<sup>21</sup> These antithetical approaches, the ‘hero in history’ versus the notion of ‘social determinism’ have both been discredited post-1945, particularly the hero thesis, due to their use as foundation philosophies by the great authoritarian regimes of the twentieth century.<sup>22</sup>

The first approach to history would look at, say, World War II through a study of a Hitler, Churchill, Roosevelt or Stalin, or view the Peninsular War as a duel between Wellington and the Marshals of France. Much popular history is still seen through this *übermenschen* lens. There is the ‘heroic age’ of Homer’s Odysseus, Achilles or Hector. Closer to our time the ‘Napoleonic era’ is straddled by a Pitt, Nelson or Bonaparte. Through Shakespeare we see Agincourt won by Henry V, not Welsh longbows; Imperial Rome a drama of Caesar, Brutus or Anthony; history a stage trod by Richards, Lears or Macbeths. This view contrasts, for example, with the Marxian view where the ideas and institutions of men at any point in time are shaped by the independently operating material conditions of that time.<sup>23</sup> Thus, history is propelled by the struggle between classes of men rather than by the actions of great individuals.

Students of history can now read the past through these prisms of polar opposite. Through one lens lies the enduring appeal of a great man’s *bon mots*, as exemplified by new packages like

---

<sup>15</sup> Edgar Prestage, *Chivalry: A Series of Studies to Illustrate its Historical Significance and Civilising Influence*, London, 1928, HL p.186. KC, QEIIAM.

<sup>16</sup> George S. Patton, quoted in “George S. Patton Jr.”, Chapter VIII in Owen Connelly, *On War and Leadership: The Words of Combat Commanders from Frederick the Great to Norman Schwarzkopf*, Princeton, 2002, p.116.

<sup>17</sup> Tommy Franks, *American Soldier*, New York, 2004, p.400.

<sup>18</sup> Connelly, *On War and Leadership*, p.132.

<sup>19</sup> Thomas Carlyle, *On Heroes, Hero-worship and the Heroic in History*, London, 1889, p.1.

<sup>20</sup> Though originally published in France in 1903 as *Des Principes de la Guerre*, Kippenberger read the English translation published in 1918. Ferdinand Foch, *The Principles of War*, Hilaire Belloc (trans.), London, 1918, HL & UL p.287. KC, QEIIAM

<sup>21</sup> Though, as, particularly, *people’s history* theorists point out, ‘her’ is usually absent from both great man and social determinist views of history.

<sup>22</sup> Betty Brand Burch, (ed.), *Dictatorship and Totalitarianism: Selected Readings*, New Jersey, 1964, p. 43.

<sup>23</sup> Burch, (ed.), *Dictatorship and Totalitarianism: Selected Readings*, p. 43.

Owen Connelly's *On War and Leadership* or blockbuster biographies by Generals Franks, Schwarzkopf or Cosgrove. Through another the *people's histories* await, focusing on the common man, the 'oppressed', minorities, women and children. Through this lens, the Vietnam War for example, is less about Johnson, Westmoreland or Giap and more about the Viet Cong, draftees, journalists and peaceniks. Both approaches, in isolation, invite reproach. The elevation of Adolf Hitler into some malevolent demigod detracts our attention from an objective study of the social and cultural conditions in Germany which helped this repellent man gain power. Whereas Hitler himself believed that the destiny of a nation rested with "the man endowed",<sup>24</sup> we know from the great volumes of scholarship on the fascist states that factors like the role of intellectuals, faltering liberal order, industrial transition and "nationalisation of the masses" had as much a part to play in the emergence of 'great men' as any superhuman talent of those men themselves.<sup>25</sup> By the same token, an exclusive focus on 'the people' will fog our appreciation of the decisive role the "element of personality" does play at points in time.<sup>26</sup> Would the revolution of 1917 have morphed the way it did without the paramount agency of Lenin? Can Cuba be separated from Castro?

In between these two extreme views of history lies some middle ground where, depending on the particular issue at hand, varying weight can be given to both approaches. General Patton was wrong to give Gaul to Caesar only for surely his Legions and their quartermasters secured him his triumph. The social historians are also wrong for surely the man fighting on the beaches needs the stirring words of Churchill to sustain him there. Howard Kippenberger studied war and leadership through both lens, his fragmentary written legacy a testament to his balance.

In March 2006, Victoria University, Wellington announced the creation of the Sir Howard Kippenberger Chair in Strategic Studies "to perpetuate the name and deeds of...a great soldier, strategist, scholar and New Zealander".<sup>27</sup> Biographers have alluded to the civilian Kippenberger's strategic foresight in the 1920s and 1930s and commentators have noted his advocacy for strong defence capability in the early Cold War period, yet the two biographies<sup>28</sup> of this New Zealand hero and other biographical texts<sup>29</sup> concentrate on Kippenberger's 1939-1944 war service and his abilities as an infantry commander, tactician and leader of men. A question remains under-examined: was Howard Karl Kippenberger a strategic thinker?

Former Chief of General Staff of the New Zealand Defence Force, Major General Piers Reid CBE has noted that prior to the publication of Glyn Harper's 1997 biography, little had been written to illuminate the background, beliefs and experiences, which had shaped Kippenberger the battlefield commander.<sup>30</sup> While Harper has undoubtedly given us a much clearer insight into Kippenberger's pre-WWII command genesis and has shown the post-war public figure's contribution to New Zealand social life, particularly his contribution to historical research, he has also raised some further questions about Sir Howard's life that still remain under-explored.

## Thinking dynamically in space and time

As has been mentioned, Sir Howard Kippenberger has been called a "great soldier, strategist, [and] scholar". That he was the first is evident from his war record. The latter would be evident if

---

<sup>24</sup> Adolf Hitler, "Mein Kampf", excerpt in Burch, (ed.), *Dictatorship and Totalitarianism: Selected Readings*, p.61.

<sup>25</sup> Robert O. Paxton, *The Anatomy of Fascism*, London, 2004, pp.76-86.

<sup>26</sup> For a study of the balance between the two themes of the hero and social determinism see Sydney Hook, *The Hero in History*, in Burch, (ed.), *Dictatorship and Totalitarianism: Selected Readings*, pp.51-58.

<sup>27</sup> NZRSA National President John Campbell in Victoria University press release "Kippenberger Honoured at Victoria", 6<sup>th</sup> March 2006.

<sup>28</sup> Kippenberger, *Infantry Brigadier*, and Harper, *Kippenberger*.

<sup>29</sup> E.g. in, McGibbon, *Oxford Companion to New Zealand Military History*.

<sup>30</sup> Reed, "Foreword", in Harper, *Kippenberger*, pp.7-8.

all we considered was his editorship of the New Zealand Official Histories. However, “Kippenberger the strategist” is not so apparent. As a divisional and later brigade commander during WWII, Kippenberger would have been actively engaged in tactical concerns, but strategic deliberations in this context were and still are the preserve of other figures higher up the decision tree.

To better consider the quality or nature of Kippenberger’s strategic thinking, his *capacity to think dynamically in space and time*,<sup>31</sup> it may be more illuminating to approach him freed from the constraints of service, chiefly in the period up to 1939 when he was building his collection of military studies and during his post-war activities when his official histories role and his activities as a non-governmental organisation (NGO) defence spokesman gave him time to reflect on the strategic thoughts and deeds of other political and martial figures and gave him the opportunity to develop his own concept of strategy and its practical application.

Strategic thinking, being a human faculty, has been practiced, if somewhat unconsciously, since antiquity. It has also been a highly valued gift, strategic thinking being an inherently “difficult” endeavour.<sup>32</sup> The value placed on strategic thinking can be seen in the way King David structured the army of ancient Israel and the importance he gave to the strategists over the tacticians. Fleeing from King Saul’s enmity, David attracts to him a mighty army from the various tribes of Israel. In *Chronicles* these various bands, many thousand strong, are described as “mighty men of valour”, “expert in war”, skilled with “all manner of instruments of war”.<sup>33</sup> Among these thousands a small tribal group is singled out for its strategic thinking capabilities. “And of the children of Issachar, which were men who had understanding of the times, to know what Israel ought to do; the heads of them were two hundred and all their brethren were at their command”.<sup>34</sup> The Chinese military masters, recognizing the complexity of strategy, emphasized the development of strategic thinking capabilities. “Warfare is the greatest affair of state, the basis of life and death, the Tao to survival or extinction. It must be thoroughly pondered and analyzed”.<sup>35</sup> Plato in *The Republic* fostered the idea of the philosopher ruler asking, “If philosophers have the capacity to grasp the eternal and immutable, while those who have no such capacity...are lost in multiplicity and change, which of the two should be in charge of a state?”<sup>36</sup> Strategic thinking as the ability to grasp the eternal and immutable is surely not far from the truth of it.

Strategic thinking deals with the “complexity and volatility of the strategic environment and the changes and continuities, issues, opportunities and threats inherent to it”.<sup>37</sup> For most of us these variables and discontinuities create “fog”, an obscuring and disorienting mental vapour that blinds us to the unravelling of events, the fog only partially lifting when viewed through hindsight. Masterful strategic thinking cuts through fog, creating “the rapid discovery of a truth which to the ordinary mind is either not visible at all or only becomes so after long examination

---

<sup>31</sup> My definition of strategic thinking was developed from a maxim of Napoleon and an extrapolation of the ideas of William Duggan, Harry R. Yarger and Bryan Magee. Unwrapping the definition, strategic thinking is the ability to observe and conceive material and metaphysical objects in motion simultaneously through space and time. It is the ability to make abstract deductions about the likely behaviour of objects and forces as they relate to self over time in a manner more prescient than the human average. It is contemplative but is *in time* rather than *in hindsight*. The mark of strategic thinking is that it works when it is most needed, it is singularly adaptive. For a fuller treatment of my definition please refer to the original of this paper in the library, Victoria University of Wellington.

<sup>32</sup> Harry R. Yarger, *Strategic Theory for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century: The Little Book on Big Strategy*, Carlisle, February 2006, p.2.

<sup>33</sup> King James Bible, I Chronicles 12, 1-40.

<sup>34</sup> King James Bible, I Chronicles 12, 32.

<sup>35</sup> Quote from Sun Tzu’s *The Art of War* in, Ralph D. Sawyer, *The Essence of War: Leadership and Strategy from the Chinese Military Classics*, Boulder, 2004, p.75.

<sup>36</sup> Plato, *The Republic*, Desmond Lee (trans.), London, 1974., p.276.

<sup>37</sup> Yarger, *Strategic Theory for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century: The Little Book on Big Strategy*, p.2.

and reflection”.<sup>38</sup> Philosopher of war Carl von Clausewitz believed that for strategy to be carried on with any “degree of virtuosity” the commander or strategic actor must possess special gifts of mind and temperament which in combination “constitute the essence of military genius”.<sup>39</sup> Such gifts are rare in history – Clausewitz was writing in the era of Napoleon after all – and, with the quantum amplification in the extension of time, space and phenomenal dynamics, the strategic environment may be getting ever more complex for any one person – even a genius – to comprehend.<sup>40</sup>

Recognising this, the U.S. Army War College has created three roles for strategists, each role requiring a distinct set of competencies and skills.

*Strategist as Leader* – The strategist as leader “provides the vision, inspiration, organisational skills, direction and personal impetus necessary to enable others to act in a focused and coherent manner”.

*Strategist as Practitioner* – The strategist as practitioner “thoroughly comprehends the levels of strategy and their relationships and develops strategy. He translates broad policy guidance into integrated strategies that lead to policy success”.

*Strategist as Theorist* – The strategist as theorist “develops theoretical concepts through study and thought and teaches and mentors others”.<sup>41</sup>

The strategist who mastered all three of these roles would be approaching the genius level as laid out by Clausewitz.

It will not be claimed here that the subject was a master strategist, but what this study will reveal is that Sir Howard Kippenberger was *able*, though not necessarily *masterful*, in these three roles and that he satisfies the definition of a strategic thinker; one capable of *thinking dynamically in time and space*. These latter two concepts need more elaboration.

## Space

Space is defined in both its physical and metaphysical senses; the outer space of the corporeal realms man can range in and the inner space, the psychological clefts and ramparts man must daily surmount.

Until the end of the 19th Century this outer, tangible space was an anchored thing, limited to the land and surface water that man could profitably traverse. At the polar extremities and under the surface waters, ‘here be monsters’; earth’s less hospitable place’s, the Himalayan Siachin Glacier for example, does not appear on the strategic atlas until the oropolitical<sup>42</sup> era, spurred by technological advances, begun in the late 1950s. In contrast the open cloth of Belgium has afforded free range to arms since early times. Leuven saw the Franks battle Vikings in 891 and Belgians battle Germans in 1940. Straddling the boundary between Germanic and Latin Europe Belgium is both blessed and cursed by its traversable land. Today our terrestrial shackles are broken and man can range both under the sea and in sub and supra-atmospheric space. The battlespace expands.

---

<sup>38</sup> Clausewitz quoted in William Duggan, *Coup D’Œil: Strategic Intuition in Army Planning*, Carlisle, November 2005, p.2.

<sup>39</sup> Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, Michael Howard and Peter Paret (trans.), New Jersey, 1984, p.100.

<sup>40</sup> Yarger, *Strategic Theory for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century: The Little Book on Big Strategy*, pp.2-3.

<sup>41</sup> Yarger, *Strategic Theory for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century: The Little Book on Big Strategy*, p.3.

<sup>42</sup> The use of mountaineering for political purposes usually related to territorial claims/grabs. Examples abound in the China/Pakistan/India border regions but the Austrian/Italian experience in the Tyrol is a European example.

Inner space, the psychological dimension, has long been a place the great captain needs to map and subdue. Sun Tzu said; “Know the other and know yourself: one hundred challenges without danger; know not the other and yet know yourself: one triumph for one defeat; know not the other and know not yourself: every challenge is certain peril”.<sup>43</sup> Over twenty-one centuries later French Colonel Ardant du Picq would concur; “Battle is the final objective of armies and man is the fundamental instrument in battle. Nothing can be wisely prescribed in an army...without exact knowledge of the fundamental instrument, man, and his state of mind, his morale, at the instant of combat”.<sup>44</sup> Notions of morale, élan, resolve, fortitude and, of course, fear are the stuff of man’s dramas and are in many ways the meat of war, technology the confection. The latest Intel systems may help modern armies win their wars, but a lack of resolve will surely lose a war nonetheless. The terrain of inner space barely changes and learning to read its map is simple, though, the simplest thing is never easy.<sup>45</sup> Fear, one of the strongest of emotions and a constant of war, is the eternal weapon *and* foe of the commander who must use all his powers to keep fear in balance in his army. We can illustrate this idea by remembering what Lord Freyberg referred to as “one of the greatest efforts in the defence of Crete”.<sup>46</sup> During the defence of Galatos Kippenberger stemmed a rout by moving among a stream of retreating men, many on the “verge of panic”, and shouting “Stand for New Zealand!” The effect was to rally disorientated men and restore order,<sup>47</sup> a prime mark of effective command in war.

Inner and outer space converge in the new information dimension. Information is both real and ethereal, cyberspace simultaneously a construct and a bona fide realm. Warfare in cyberspace can hurt; witness the economic and psychological effect of the, probably, Russian cyber-attack on Estonian institutions in May 2007.<sup>48</sup>

## Time

“In a dark time the eye begins to see”.

U.S. poet Theodore Roethke, “In a Dark Time”, 1966<sup>49</sup>

As has already been acknowledged, our definition of strategic thinking owes much to the master strategist, the greatest ever possibly, Napoleon Bonaparte. Let us reflect on his words. “Strategy is the art of making use of time and space. I am less chary of the latter than of the former. Space we can recover, lost time never”.<sup>50</sup> This is one view of time in strategy – time as objects or energy in motion. Events move forward and circumstances are never quite the same from one point in time to the next. When the point of optimum utility for a commander has passed the benefits to be gained from employing a particular course of action will have passed. This is not to say that at another point in time another set of comparably favourable opportunities will present themselves, it is just that they would not confer exactly the same outcome, *that* time has passed. Here time has a linear trajectory with people and circumstances randomly crossing and clashing at points in the course of the movement of time. When parties are on a course to clash at points in

<sup>43</sup> R. L. Wing, *The Art of Strategy: A Translation of The Art of War*, London, 1997, p.51.

<sup>44</sup> Charles Ardant du Picq, “Battle Studies: Ancient and Modern Battle”, John Greely and Robert Cotton (trans.), 1921, pp.9-300 in *Roots of Strategy: Book Two*, Pennsylvania, 1987, p.65.

<sup>45</sup> Paret and Howard translate Clausewitz’ dictum as “*Everything in war is very simple, but the simplest thing is difficult*”. Clausewitz, *On War*, Howard and Paret (trans.), p.119.

<sup>46</sup> Peter Singleton-Gates, *General Lord Freyberg VC*, London, 1963, p.172.

<sup>47</sup> Kippenberger, *Infantry Brigadier*, pp.64-5.

<sup>48</sup> Ian Traynor, *Russia accused of unleashing cyberwar to disable Estonia*, in *The Guardian*, 17<sup>th</sup> May 2007, [online] <http://www.guardian.co.uk/russia/article/0,,2081438,00.html>; accessed 1<sup>st</sup> August 2007.

<sup>49</sup> Theodore Roethke quoted in Robert Jay Lifton and Nicholas Humphrey (eds.), *In a Dark Time: Images for Survival*, Cambridge, Mass., 1984, p.140.

<sup>50</sup> Napoleon Bonaparte, *Collection of Napoleon’s Maxims*, J.A. Manning (trans.), London, 1903.

time, battles say, the more time passes the more other objects or variables are able to intercede to create a less favourable outcome to one or more of the parties concerned.

The belief that time is a thing to optimize, to seize, has long been a feature of military thought. In 1914 the German Army attempted to repeat the success of their rapid deployments against both Austria in 1866 and France in 1870 by pursuing a rapid offensive attack on France. By the time the decision was made to attack the British on the Aisne on 20<sup>th</sup> September the initial German advantage was dissipating, the optimum moment had been lost. "The beginning of the attack on too broad a front, necessitated as it was by a shortage of time, was just as much to blame for this (setback) as the condition of the troops".<sup>51</sup> By September 1914, General von Falkenhayn had noted that "the intention of forcing a speedy decision which had hitherto been the foundation of the German plan of campaign had come to nought".<sup>52</sup> Time had moved on, never to be regained. "How true it is, that in all military operations time is everything".<sup>53</sup>

Time is, of course, not a purely linear thing, starting at one point and moving forward never to return. It has cyclical qualities too. As Marcus Aurelius would have it, "Time is like a river made up of the events which happen and its current is strong; no sooner does anything appear than it is swept away, and another comes in its place, and will be swept away too".<sup>54</sup> This said time still carries enough silt from before to allow the student of history to see sufficient analogy in the events of the past to give guidance to the endeavours of the present. General Patton's ardent study of military history gave him flashes of insight to guide his strategy reputedly so intense that he felt it akin at times to some effect of reincarnation.<sup>55</sup>

Time and space together have a complex relationship for the strategist. Space can be traded for time. As Mao famously noted of occasions during his insurgency campaign, his forces had "retreated in space but advanced in time".<sup>56</sup> Space shapes strategic time; compare Singapore's strategic depth for example to New Zealand's. Both are island nations, but one is isolated from predators surrounded by a huge exclusive zone of ocean sovereignty, while the other is surrounded by the watchful with little strategic space to call its own. In a crisis strategic time moves quicker in Singapore than in New Zealand.

The preceding pages have sought to explore further the notions of time and space and how they relate to the definition of strategic thinking developed to measure our subject. Now that the parameters of this survey are set, it is high time Sir Howard Kippenberger is considered in more detail.

---

<sup>51</sup> Erich von Falkenhayn, *General Headquarters 1914-1916 and Its Critical Decisions*, London, 1920, HL & KN p.11. KC, QEIIAM.

<sup>52</sup> Falkenhayn, *General Headquarters 1914-1916 and Its Critical Decisions*, London, 1920, HL p. 23, KC, QEIIAM

<sup>53</sup> Duke of Wellington quoted in W.D. Bird, *The Direction of War: A Study and Illustration of Strategy*, Cambridge, 1925., p. 304. KC, QEIIAM.

<sup>54</sup> Marcus Aurelius Antoninus, *Meditations*, IV. 43. 2<sup>nd</sup> C. C.E.

<sup>55</sup> Duggan, *Coup D'Œil: Strategic Intuition in Army Planning*, p.5.

<sup>56</sup> Quoted in James D. Kiras, "Terrorism and Irregular Warfare", chapter nine, pp.208-232 in John Baylis, James Wirtz, Eliot Cohen and Colin S. Gray (eds.), *Strategy in the Contemporary World: An Introduction to Strategic Studies*, Oxford, 2002, p.213.

## Chapter Two

### “Fine, Hardened, Smooth Running Machines”<sup>57</sup>

New Zealand has long had an ambivalent relationship with its military. As Laurie Barber has noted, they have “sometimes been applauded as heroes and sometimes contemptuously dismissed as parasites by their fellow citizens”.<sup>58</sup> The attitude of those on the left of New Zealand political life, unionists and Christian groups for one, was summed up by W.B. Sutch. “This grouping...regarded... military training as an attempt to create a military caste to strengthen the ruling class, build a permanent force to be used against the workers in New Zealand and overseas, and by so doing destroy moral values and human brotherhood”.<sup>59</sup> The attitude on the right might be paraphrased as, ‘fine as long as some other bugger is paying for it’. While it would be a rare and radical bird today who would not deign to show our servicemen and women, both current and past, respectful due, it would probably not be unfair to say that, as a society, New Zealand is quite removed from its military and that anything resembling a dispassionate or considered discussion of war as an enduring human phenomenon is regarded with suspicion, even hostility. The further we as a citizenry move away from a common experience of war, the more hostile we become to the idea of war and what it entails. Today, a retired combat general, preaching national service, rearmament and preparation for war, would be seen as a most marginal figure, a fringe dweller, a reactionary, a militarist even. It was not always so.

### Militarism and chivalry

Viewed from the distance of time Howard Kippenberger could be tagged a ‘militarist’. His life was thoroughly wrapped up with the business of war. In the period between the two wars he voluntarily served in, he read military history, played war games on a sand table in his office and gave his spare hours and weekends to the Territorial Army. After his second war, he held a job editing military history, was president of an ex-serviceman’s association, wrote a bestselling military biography and campaigned for Compulsory Military Training. A militarist by any other name surely?

Kippenberger’s collection of military works, now housed in the Queen Elizabeth II Army Museum in Waiouru, certainly contains the musings of bona fide militarists, men like German General Erich Ludendorff, for whom war and military caste is the alpha and omega of human existence. But Kippenberger studied such men, to *know* them, not emulate them. He himself noted the words of 1914 British Foreign Minister Sir Edward Grey who defined a militarist as “one whose outlook covers only purely military matters, taking into no account, and being incapable of taking into account, the soul which exists in nations”.<sup>60</sup> For Kippenberger the physical man was a shell without regard to the soul, both inner and communal. Unlike the militarist, he did not only measure force through armour. “Chivalry as a *moral force* survives because in every age there are men who love courtesy, faithfulness, courage, truth and moderation”.<sup>61</sup>

<sup>57</sup> Kippenberger, *Infantry Brigadier*, p.248.

<sup>58</sup> Laurie Barber, *Red Coat to Jungle Green: New Zealand’s Army in Peace and War*, Lower Hutt, 1984, p. 9.

<sup>59</sup> W.B. Sutch, *The Quest for Security in New Zealand 1840 to 1966*, London, 1966, pp.350-1.

<sup>60</sup> Sir George Aston, *The Study of War for Statesmen and Citizens*, London, 1927, HL p.7. KC, QEIIAM.

<sup>61</sup> A.T. Byles, “Medieval Courtesy Books and the Prose Romances of Chivalry”, pp.183-206, in Edgar Prestage, (ed.), *Chivalry: A Series of Studies to Illustrate Its Historical Significance and Civilising Influence*, London, 1928, HL & UL p.205. KC, QEIIAM.

For Kip there were, "Guiding principles...measure, restraint, taste and the education of the willpower rather than of the intellect".<sup>62</sup> He ascribed to the notion of chivalry, that mediaeval institution revived as a concept in nearer times by romantic writers like Sir Walter Scott. While Scott and many of the other romantics were idealists, Kippenberger, still a romantic, was most certainly a realist. He believed that world affairs was characterised by an ongoing "struggle for power"<sup>63</sup> and that inter-state relations should be considered with an understanding of how human affairs *is*, not how it *should be*. "War is perhaps the most searching test of national worthiness, and as yet no nation has attained greatness until the right to hold high position has been vindicated by force, nor has any nation kept its place when martial spirit has died away".<sup>64</sup> Such sentiments may be an anathema to modern liberal democrats, but can we truthfully nonetheless deny the veracity of the statement?

His chivalry was something great to aspire to but he recognised that the world did not always share these aspirations and the chivalrous man of arms should be mindful of this fact. He believed chivalry to be a human institution, though recognised that the chivalrous man in ideal and action might seem contradictory things in themselves. "To say that there was, and that there always remained, a great gulf between the ecclesiastical ideal of Christian knighthood and the militant reality is merely to say that chivalry was a human institution".<sup>65</sup> He certainly fretted about the man of arms' place in the tapestry of life, his place in society when war was over. This particularly struck him in the late 1940s when civil life in New Zealand, as elsewhere was getting back to normal, the soldiers job done, for the time being at least. He highlighted a passage in F.J.C. Hearnshaw's essay, *Chivalry and its Place in History* scribbling in the passage the remark, "Read 1948".<sup>66</sup>

"He was not an attractive individual. No one loved him. It is difficult, indeed, to say by whom he was most detested...by the king and the officials of the nascent nation state; by the Pope and the clergy or by the commonality of...citizens, burgesses, peasants. The king found him an intolerable nuisance; he was useless and inefficient in war, turbulent and rebellious in peace, and an insuperable obstacle to tranquillity and good government...to the commonality he was an unmitigated terror, a mere bandit, unrestrained by any consideration of mercy or of honour".

During the same period in a report, as RNZRSA Dominion President to local branches, he echoed these sentiments quoting a little piece of rhyme.

"In time of danger, not before,  
God and the soldier all adore.  
When war is over and all things righted,  
God is forgot, the soldier slighted".<sup>67</sup>

---

<sup>62</sup>A.R. Pastor, "The Chivalry and Military Orders of Spain", pp.11-140, in Edgar Prestage (ed.), *Chivalry: A Series of Studies to Illustrate Its Historical Significance and Civilising Influence*, London, 1928, HL p.140.

<sup>63</sup>Theodore A. Coulombis, and James H. Wolfe, *Introduction to International Relations: Power and Justice*, Fourth Edition, New Jersey, 1990, p.6.

<sup>64</sup>Bird, *The Direction of War: A Study and Illustration of Strategy*, p.8.

<sup>65</sup>This passage of Prestage's has in the original the phrase "mediaeval institution". Kip has crossed out mediaeval and inserted "human". Edgar Prestage (ed.), *Chivalry: A Series of Studies to Illustrate Its Historical Significance and Civilising Influence*, London, 1928, KN p.11.

<sup>66</sup>F.J.C. Hearnshaw, "Chivalry and its Place in History", pp.1-36, in Prestage (ed.), *Chivalry: A Series of Studies to Illustrate Its Historical Significance and Civilising Influence*, HL & KN p.4. KC, QEIIAM.

<sup>67</sup>IA77, Box 6, *Communist Party 1948-1950*, Archives New Zealand.

For the man of arms, the knight, chivalry was all the more important in the age of modern war, the horrible spindles of conflict touching all mankind. "War, in these days, no longer resembles a gladiatorial combat witnessed by crowds seated in safety around a blood stained arena. The march of science has brought the whole human race into such close relationship that the life of every man, woman and child is intimately affected by the conflict".<sup>68</sup> In an era when the full scale of the horrors visited on women and children in the war just past was being digested, Kip felt it all the more important for the promotion of chivalry, honourable conduct, as a human virtue. "Courtesy, especially in the relations of men towards women, although it had been anticipated in the Christian Church, was a new thing in the hard and general world".<sup>69</sup> When he noted this and other passages in *Chivalry: Its Historical Significance and Civilising Influence* in 1948, he looked at society around him and was not sure he liked what he saw. On reading the passage, "the cultured and Christian society of this later age", he felt strongly enough to ask himself, "1948?"<sup>70</sup>

He certainly felt in agreement with A.J.P. Taylor that "the basis of our modern liberal democracies is that men do not mean what they say".<sup>71</sup> This notion of meaning what you say (and, conversely, saying what you mean) appealed to Kippenberger. A contemporary example of conflicting political ideals struck him worthy of consideration. "Most of our present troubles with the Russians spring from the conviction of Roosevelt and his advisers that the Communist leaders did not mean what they had been saying for thirty years – at least no more than Roosevelt meant what he said at election time. Unfortunately Communists are old fashioned".<sup>72</sup> In other words they mean what they say. Kippenberger had been noting exactly what they had been saying since before the war and, while he might have respected the fact that they had principles, the fact that those principles were not benign ones worried him.

## Germany and future war

The German side of Kippenberger's make-up has been discussed by Harper. He mentions a Kippenberger family legend that the family patriarch, George Peter Kippenberger, left Bavaria in 1862 to escape Prussian militarism.<sup>73</sup> While Harper correctly dismisses this tale as fanciful, 1862 being too early for any but the most prescient for predicting German unification and domination by Prussia, the legend does show the mental connection the family retained with the 'Fatherland'. Though he was three generations removed from Germany and, of course, fought the German army in two wars, Kippenberger, while being wary of Prussian militarism, did seem to have a high regard for the Germans as people, certainly as fighters.

The contrasting way he refers to differing peoples in *Infantry Brigadier* is interesting. Despite ranging throughout the Middle East, North Africa and Italy, civilians are largely absent from his tableau. This is understandable in the desert, the 'purity' of its warfare largely due to the absence of civilians to get in the way of the fighting. When we do see locals, they are generally "wretched looking"<sup>74</sup> souls, reflecting the hard toll war has on the people on whose land war is passing through. Locals aside, Kip gives us a clear impression of the men he is facing. He generally shows a poor regard for the Italians. For a start they are dirty. He talks of the "filth that marks every

---

<sup>68</sup> Aston, *The Study of War for Statesmen and Citizens*, HL p.5. KC, QEIIAM.

<sup>69</sup> Hearnshaw, "Chivalry and its Place in History", pp.1-36, in Prestage (ed.), *Chivalry: A Series of Studies to Illustrate Its Historical Significance and Civilising Influence*, HL p.32. KC, QEIIAM.

<sup>70</sup> Hearnshaw, "Chivalry and its Place in History", pp.1-36, in Prestage (ed.), *Chivalry: A Series of Studies to Illustrate Its Historical Significance and Civilising Influence*, HL & KN p.32. KC, QEIIAM.

<sup>71</sup> A.J.P Taylor, *Rumours of Wars*, London, 1952, UL p.45. KC, QEIIAM.

<sup>72</sup> Taylor, *Rumours of Wars*, HL p.45. KC, QEIIAM.

<sup>73</sup> Harper, *Kippenberger*, p.22.

<sup>74</sup> Kippenberger, *Infantry Brigadier*, p.326.

Italian position”,<sup>75</sup> no surprise when we hear that they come from “exceptionally filthy”<sup>76</sup> towns. While he marks out some individual units for grudging praise, Kip also is dismissive of the Italian soldier’s ability as a fighting man. “The number of German tanks was always a vital question. The number of Italian tanks might be a matter of interest but hardly affected plans”.<sup>77</sup> Both Kip and Freyberg laugh at the motto of a quick-to-surrender Italian division – “I am valiant unto death”.<sup>78</sup>

In contrast, Kip speaks highly of the Germans who always ‘fight well’.<sup>79</sup> The tale Kip tells of one of his officers captured by Germans is in pointed contrast to the treatment an enemy combatant could expect from the Wehrmacht on the Eastern Front. “His captors had got fed up with carting him around eating their rations and had set him loose”.<sup>80</sup> While possibly meant in jest, his account of a Polish General in the forward area at the Orsogna front is interesting. “General Duck was apparently not at all pro-German, his delight when he understood that all the raiders had been killed, not wounded or captured but killed, was almost alarming”.<sup>81</sup> While there is a certain tongue-in-cheek quality to the tale, is it surely not an understandable feeling for a Pole to have towards German soldiers? I suspect it is an example of Kip’s chivalry showing through, the delight in killing being somewhat unseemly to a man like him.

This chivalry also accounts for the obvious disdain he holds for the Italians. Personal hygiene aside (and the British Army learned well from the Crimean campaign that good hygiene reduced attrition through disease), at heart Kippenberger felt disdain for the Italians because he thought them dishonourable. Allies in the previous war, the Italians had opportunistically entered the war on the German side, but only in 1940 when France was falling and allied defeat looked likely to get them most spoils with least effort. He recounts an episode in *Infantry Brigadier* when an Italian commander offers his surrender to Kip and Freyberg. “He started by saying that he had served with the British in the last war, to which the General replied that Italy had behaved very badly this time. He then said sadly that his fine division...had been destroyed, but there was no offer of sympathy. He was then escorted away...much distressed that no notice was taken of his offer to shake hands...Freyberg took the war seriously and disapproved highly of the Italian Army”.<sup>82</sup> The attitude is ascribed to Freyberg but the sentiment is wholeheartedly shared by Kippenberger – the Italians had behaved dishonourably.

Of course states can not behave dishonourably, only its leaders can, and Italy’s leaders in the first half of the twentieth century were no more duplicitous, conniving or hypocritical than any of the other leaders of European nations. Italy had behaved as opportunistically in 1915 when it entered the Great War on behalf of the Triple Entente, betraying its previous alliance with Austria. Like it did twenty-five years later, it did so because one side offered it more opportunity than the other,<sup>83</sup> or at least, so it seemed at the time. That was of no consequence. Italy was seen to behave disgracefully in Abyssinia, Spain, France and Yugoslavia against weaker or weakened foes and the perceived cowardice of her troops when facing hardened professionals like the New Zealand Division. German troops fought ferociously and her aggression was never in doubt so while she may have been hated, Germans were not held in low esteem.

---

<sup>75</sup> Kippenberger, *Infantry Brigadier*, p.79.

<sup>76</sup> Kippenberger, *Infantry Brigadier*, p.348.

<sup>77</sup> Kippenberger, *Infantry Brigadier*, p.205.

<sup>78</sup> Kippenberger, *Infantry Brigadier*, p.244.

<sup>79</sup> For example see Kippenberger, *Infantry Brigadier*, p.103.

<sup>80</sup> Kippenberger, *Infantry Brigadier*, p.240.

<sup>81</sup> Kippenberger, *Infantry Brigadier*, p.346.

<sup>82</sup> Kippenberger, *Infantry Brigadier*, p.240.

<sup>83</sup> Hew Strachan, *The First World War*, New York, 2004, pp.51-6.

Harper frequently asserts that the prime motive for Kippenberger's military training in the 1920s was a deeply held conviction that "the struggle with Germany was far from over and that he needed to prepare for the inevitable next round of the conflict".<sup>84</sup> Despite this assertion, Harper gives us little indication for the basis of Kip's foresight. How could this provincial Kiwi lawyer predict WWII so early on when the same notion seems to have escaped the best informed minds in both Britain and the Dominions? Quite simply because it was plain so see for anyone who took the time to look.

One of the more racier reads in the Kippenberger Collection is a translation of Ernst Jünger's 1920 bestseller *In Stahlgewittern* or *Storm of Steel*. In contrast to that other German Great War bestseller, Erich Maria Remarque's 1929 *Im Westen Nichts Neues*, or *All Quiet on the Western Front*, Jünger's work is in many ways a *celebration* of war rather than an invocation of its horrors. Truly one of the most colourful and accomplished figures in German literature, Jünger is still regarded by some as a Nazi "intellectual fellow traveller",<sup>85</sup> and, while it is true that he indulged in the "aesthetics of violence",<sup>86</sup> and definitely expounded anti-Semitic opinions in the 1920s, he was not well regarded by the Nazis and even banned for a time from writing by them (as he was in the immediate post-war period by the Allies).

One of the key reasons he gets confused for a Nazi is that Jünger was a prominent proponent of one of the non-Nazi forms of fascism, collectively called the "Conservative Revolution" that flourished in Weimar Germany in the 1920s. Famously stating that he "hated democracy like the plague", Jünger and his fellow "National Bolsheviks" strove to protect the special nature of the German soul, its *Volk*-ishness, from what they saw as the corrupting influence of American mass consumerism and populism.<sup>87</sup> Wholeheartedly believing in the "ennobling effects of combat"<sup>88</sup> as a great and transformative "inner experience",<sup>89</sup> he overwhelmingly enjoyed the war he had served throughout. This fourteen times wounded storm trooper finished the war a company commander, served again in World War II and, despite his high profile literary, often avant-garde, career, remained true to his "martial mistress"<sup>90</sup> to the end of his long life (he died just shy of his 103<sup>rd</sup> birthday in 1998). He was not a Nazi though, something that needs to be understood when regarding the inter-war German political scene.

Put simply, while all the major Nazis were militarists, not all inter-war German militarists were Nazis. Also German militarism came in a kaleidoscopic variety of flavours. Militarists like Jünger certainly paved the way for Hitler's accession of power, but that is not to say they shared all his ideals. Way before the appearance of the Nazis, militarism was in full voice in Germany loudly proclaiming its intention to reclaim its place in the sun after its shaming in 1918 and 1919. As Kippenberger read in *Storm of Steel*, "Though force without and barbarity within conglomerate in sombre clouds, yet so long as the blade of a sword will strike a spark in the night it may be said: Germany lives and Germany shall never go under!"<sup>91</sup> These passionate sentiments from idealists like Jünger coupled with the coldly scientific militarism of men like Ludendorff and Baron von Freytag-Loringhoven were a warning to realists like Kippenberger that the cogs had not stopped turning in the German war machine.

---

<sup>84</sup> Harper, *Kippenberger*, p.47.

<sup>85</sup> Robert O. Paxton, *The Anatomy of Fascism*, London, 2004, p.263.

<sup>86</sup> Paxton, *The Anatomy of Fascism*, p.85.

<sup>87</sup> Martin Lee, *The Beast Reawakens: The Chilling Story of the Rise of the Neo-Nazi Movement*, London, 1997, pp.79 & 380.

<sup>88</sup> Paxton, *The Anatomy of Fascism*, p.263.

<sup>89</sup> Lee, *The Beast Reawakens*, pp.380.

<sup>90</sup> Robert B. Asprey, *The German High Command at War: Hindenburg and Ludendorff and the First World War*, London, 1991, p.316.

<sup>91</sup> Ernst Jünger, *Storm of Steel*, London, 1929, p.319. KC, QEIIAM.

Lieutenant-General Baron Hugo Friedrich von Freytag-Loringhoven was one of Imperial Germany's most prolific military writers and one of the major historians of the *Grosser Generalstab*. A member and defender of the old, aristocratic German order, Freytag-Loringhoven was a deeply conservative military thinker and vigorous defender of the aggressive pre-war planning of Count Alfred von Schlieffen,<sup>92</sup> architect of the notorious Western invasion plan that was put into, modified, effect in 1914. In December 1917, nearly a full year before the end of hostilities, he published *Deductions From the World War*, described by its translator as "instructive as a denunciation of international ideals and as a warning of the plans which are being made in Berlin for the cold and reasoned application of the lessons of the war and a still more scientific military system...[built] upon an indestructible economic foundation". Written for circulation within Germany the book's chapter headings are telling in themselves.

I – The Political and Economic Situation of the Central Powers

II – The Psychology of National and Massed Warfare

III – The Influence of Technical Science

IV – Leadership

V – The Army in the Future

VI – Still Ready for War

Young Kippenberger bought the book on the 6<sup>th</sup> August 1918, just two days before the great Australian and Canadian push at Amiens would create what Ludendorff famously termed "the black day of the German Army".<sup>93</sup> His reading of *Deductions* at this time combined with his familiarity with German militarism through his reading of Falkenhayn, Ludendorff and Jünger left Kip convinced of the likelihood of future war with Germany over a decade before the perceptible rise of the Nazi Party.<sup>94</sup>

---

<sup>92</sup> Antulio J. Echevarria, "General Staff Historian Hugo Freiherr von Freytag-Loringhoven and the Dialectics of German Military Thought", pp.471-494 in *The Journal of Military History*, Vol. 60, no. 3, July 1996, p.471.

<sup>93</sup> Martin Marix Evans, *1918: The Year of Victories*, Leicester, 2003, pp.156-170.

<sup>94</sup> In the back of Kip's copy of Falkenhayn's *General Headquarters* is a list of similar books published at the time by Hutchinson & Co. One listed is *My Memoirs* by Grand Admiral von Tirpitz which is accompanied by the wonderful quote from *The Evening News*; "Von Tirpitz is one of the few Germans who understand England although he disliked us".

## Chapter Three

### “The Character of the Colonist”<sup>95</sup>

“Lesson...is the danger of disgraceful failure to men who have neglected to keep themselves prepared, not only in knowledge of their profession, but in the sentiment of what war requires”.<sup>96</sup>

It becomes apparent after long consideration of Howard Kippenberger that his most animating ideal was a very benign, mature sense of New Zealand national identity, an interest in a nationalism that stood for New Zealand as an active, independent participant in world affairs, seeking to uphold its interests, in line with national values and in concert with the democratic and friendly nations of the world. He certainly recognised and seemingly encouraged the bicultural character of the nation; on one hand a nation of New Zealanders, a new race bred in a new land from hardy European, not merely British, stock; on the other hand a nation where Maori peoples were an important element in the national mix, their coming of age needing a paternal hand up, their martial spirit and communal ways as much a part of the national character as any other.

### National Character

His nationalism came to the fore after the Second World War and can be seen in his writings throughout the 1949 Compulsory Military Training campaign. While he loved his country, he thought it a rather spoiled and selfish child who had had it good while the best of her men went off to war. Reading André Siegfried’s 1914 *Democracy in New Zealand*, he noted the critical comments of William Downie Stewart; “The real weakness of New Zealand is the absence of any well-informed and coercive public opinion on external problems. At the present time, New Zealand does not consciously stand for any systematic policy as regards Imperial affairs and it is difficult for her public men to arouse much public interest in matters in regard to which the people feel that they have no definite responsibility”.<sup>97</sup> Stewart, former Mayor of Dunedin, Reform Party M.P. and Minister of Internal Affairs and later, Finance in the 1920s and 1930s had, like Kip volunteered for service in 1916, attaining the rank of Captain. His service in France was cut short when he developed the crippling rheumatoid arthritis that was to plague him all his life.<sup>98</sup> Stewart had campaigned for conscription in 1939 and, such was his regard in the South Island, a reprint of his article, *Conscription or Confusion – Which?* of October that year was distributed as part of the 1949 campaign.<sup>99</sup> The year before he bought his copy of Siegfried, Kip expressed similar sentiments to Stewart in his CMT publications.

“Having regard to our small population and the tremendous pressures of increasing population all over the world, we cannot expect long to be left in exclusive occupation of these favoured lands without help and self-help...It may be a good thing to continue doing nothing as at present and trust in the mercy of God to a people too selfish and lazy to help themselves. We can say, truly, that New Zealand cannot alone defend herself...so, perhaps, we had better leave it to others, or deny that there

<sup>95</sup> Alfred Thayer Mahan, *The Influence of Seapower Upon History, 1660-1783*, Boston, 1890, HL p.51. KC, QEIIAM.

<sup>96</sup> Mahan, *The Influence of Seapower Upon History, 1660-1783*, HL p.267. KC, QEIIAM.

<sup>97</sup> William Downie Stewart, “Introduction”, in André Siegfried, *Democracy in New Zealand*, E.V. Burns (trans.), London, 1914, HL p.xxii. KC, QEIIAM.

<sup>98</sup> R.M. Burdon, *The New Dominion: A Social and Political History of New Zealand Between the Wars*, Wellington, 1965, p.61.

<sup>99</sup> Stewart, *War Service – Dominion Man-Power: Conscription or Confusion – Which?*, Otago Daily Times, 3<sup>rd</sup> October 1939, Archives New Zealand.

is any danger and get on with our amusements and the rapid erosion of our land. Or we can pull ourselves together and act as a grown up Nation".<sup>100</sup>

Stern paternal words for the young nation, but ones heartfelt. It has been oft remarked, bordering on cliché, that New Zealand as a nation was born in Gallipoli and on the Somme. Clearly after nearly three and a half decades of national consciousness, Kip felt there was still much growing to do. As Stewart had noted in the years before Gallipoli, "This colony is, in fact, a spoilt child which never suffers for its sins, for a helping hand is always there to redeem its faults".<sup>101</sup> Of course he keenly recognised that much fault was with the elected national leadership as opposed to any great flaw in the people themselves. As early as 1914, the young Kippenberger was pondering the difficulties democratic societies had preparing themselves for war. "Whether a democratic government will have the foresight, the keen sensitivity to the national position...to ensure its prosperity by adequate outpouring of money in times of peace, all of which are necessary for military preparation, is yet an open question".<sup>102</sup> He noted at the time that democratic Britain had done so, with her Navy at any rate, but then the character of her government, dominated by the upper classes, both worldly and martial, was very different to New Zealand's.

Siegfried noted that, unlike in Europe, power in NZ was held not by the rich but by "people", commoners to use an English term.<sup>103</sup> "The real leaders of the country, those who hold the substance, as well as the appearance of power, are at the present time men of no wealth, while the rich, with very few exceptions have been thrown into opposition, where their opinion counts for very little in the councils of government".<sup>104</sup> Kippenberger was aware that both the working classes and the middle classes in New Zealand, the rulers of the country, were insular and more interested in the enjoying the fruits of their toil now rather than investing in preparedness for some future calamity that might never come. "The character of a great people breaks through or shapes the character of its government"<sup>105</sup> was true of the island nations of Britain and Japan. These very different, but in Kip's day very powerful nations, had in common a growth to great power status based on a relatively meagre resource base, but an innate propensity for trade. Kip recognised that Mahan's dictum, "the character of the colonist, not the care of the home government is the principle of the colony's growth"<sup>106</sup> applied aptly to New Zealand. While we were certainly a trading nation, we had no way of independently protecting that trade, surely the characteristic of an independent nation. The lesson of the decline, even downfall of nations who were militarily too weak to protect their shipping and manufactures from attack could be seen time and again through history, Mahan providing the prime example in Spain.<sup>107</sup> Added to this was the fact that New Zealand was an island nation, and an isolated one at that, making local defence all the more important. Because invasion of an island comes over the sea, as opposed to across fixed lines like roads or railways, "an island is apparently...open to attack from all quarters".<sup>108</sup>

---

<sup>100</sup> Sir Howard Kippenberger, "Where is New Zealand to be Defended?", *To Preserve our Security: The Case for Compulsory Universal Military Training*, Joint Defence Action Committee, Wellington, April 1949, pp.3-4.

<sup>101</sup> Non-highlighted passage in André Siegfried, *Democracy in New Zealand*, E.V. Burns (trans.), London, 1914, p.xxii.

<sup>102</sup> Mahan, *The Influence of Seapower Upon History, 1660-1783*, HL p.67. KC, QEIIAM.

<sup>103</sup> Not in the pejorative sense, but hierarchal as can be seen in The House of Commons as supposed to the upper House of Lords.

<sup>104</sup> Siegfried, *Democracy in New Zealand*, HL p.50. KC, QEIIAM

<sup>105</sup> Mahan, *The Influence of Seapower Upon History, 1660-1783*, p.51.

<sup>106</sup> Mahan, *The Influence of Seapower Upon History, 1660-1783*, p.56.

<sup>107</sup> Mahan, *The Influence of Seapower Upon History, 1660-1783*, HL p.41. KC, QEIIAM.

<sup>108</sup> Bird, *The Direction of War: A Study and Illustration of Strategy.*, UL p. 28.

For Kip the answer was clear. “We must build up our population and our armed services. Then...we can take our share as a partner in the British Commonwealth...and we will be an ally of value to the United States and not an unwelcome liability”.<sup>109</sup> Ultimately he recognised that peace, more properly understood as the peaceful enjoyment of ones possessions, came with a price. “Peaceful possession has in the past not usually fallen to the lot of those who had valuables to lose, unless they were in a position not merely to fight for them, but to fight with more than a reasonable chance of success”.<sup>110</sup>

## **New Zealand’s place in the world**

Kippenberger looked at New Zealand’s national interest through a geopolitical lens and, as we’ll see later in his regard of the Middle East, saw her defence not in local terms but through a sense of the great sea routes to her markets and the strategic land that bordered them. It was sea power, his first military interest, that Kip felt New Zealand should foster, either through her allies or her own, less likely, devices. He noted the parallel between Mahan’s dictum about Britain’s strategic character and his own country. “When the sea not only borders or surrounds but also separates a country into two or more parts, the control of it becomes not only desirable but vitally necessary”.<sup>111</sup> When Mahan was writing *The Influence of Seapower Upon History* he believed that there was a great future potential for a new, non-European power to incline the balance of power at sea and therefore affect the economic development and political future of a region or, in fact, the whole planet. Mahan thought the US would not be the one to do this because, at the time of writing, it did not seem interested.<sup>112</sup> Of course history has a wonderful way of proving all great theorists wrong, and ironically, it was a reading of Mahan’s work by, among others, Teddy Roosevelt, that led to the building and maintenance of the U.S. Navy,<sup>113</sup> the legendary ‘White Fleet’ of the 1900s. Kip, aware of the American rise, may well have been looking closer to home when he noted in Mahan, “hence in its youth and still existing financial weakness it is seen to put forth such vigorous and intelligent efforts to create a navy”.<sup>114</sup> Mahan was referring to seventeenth century England. Kip, not delusional about his own country’s defence procurement habits, must surely have been thinking of Australia.

---

<sup>109</sup> Kippenberger, ‘Where is New Zealand to be Defended?’, pp.3-4 in *To Preserve Our Security: The Case for Compulsory Military Training*, p.4. Pamphlet in KC, QEIIAM.

<sup>110</sup> Bird, *The Direction of War: A Study and Illustration of Strategy*, HL p. 7.

<sup>111</sup> Mahan, *The Influence of Seapower Upon History, 1660-1783*, HL p.40. KC, QEIIAM.

<sup>112</sup> Mahan, *The Influence of Seapower Upon History, 1660-1783*, HL p.326. KC, QEIIAM.

<sup>113</sup> Louis M. Hacker, “Introduction” in Alfred Thayer Mahan, *The Influence of Seapower Upon History 1660-1783*, New York, 1957, p.vi.

<sup>114</sup> Mahan, *The Influence of Seapower Upon History, 1660-1783*, HL p.40. KC, QEIIAM.

## Chapter Four

### “War Should Be Taken More Seriously”<sup>115</sup>

As “history’s most studied and quoted book on the art of war”,<sup>116</sup> Prussian General Carl von Clausewitz’s *On War*, along with Sun Tzu’s *The Art of War* and Thucydides’ *History of the Peloponnesian War*, is the indispensable text in the modern strategist’s library. While languishing somewhat in Clausewitz’s shadow these days, the writings of Swiss strategist Antoine Henri Jomini, particularly his *Summary of the Art of War*, have probably been even more influential over the years than even his Prussian contemporary.<sup>117</sup> A visitor to Waiouru might be forgiven then for a curious surprise at the absence of all four volumes *ex libris* Kippenberger. Whatever of the Oriental and the Greek, the apparent absence of the great Prussian and Swiss strategists is most puzzling to the modern student. When former New Zealand Chief Archivist Ray Grover analysed the collection in 1994 he mused, “It should be noted some books which might have been there originally are no longer to be seen. Perhaps that is the reason for there being no copy of Clausewitz or Jomini”.<sup>118</sup> Before we consider this further, the Kippenberger Collection warrants some discussion.

### The Kippenberger Collection

Howard Kippenberger was an avid reader and book collector. During his lifetime he amassed an impressive collection of classic works on general and specifically military history. The Army Museum website notes that on his death, “the collection was purchased from the estate in 1957 by the New Zealand Army and gifted to the Army Museum”.<sup>119</sup>

The collection as is currently housed in Waiouru is a bit of an odd jumble.<sup>120</sup> For a start I was most puzzled on my initial examination to find books in the collection which were published after his death! On realising that they had been added after his death it struck me as a somewhat confusing and pointless exercise. Great works though they are, they surely sit as well on the open shelves of the magnificent wider library collection, with the locked cases reserved for the books that Sir Howard owned and read and loved in his lifetime. As archivist Ray Grover has noted, once we disregard these posthumous additions, the core collection can be divided into three further areas;

1. The books he bought himself
2. The books which were given to him by friends and associates
3. The books which he received as a consequence of his being editor of the New Zealand War Histories.<sup>121</sup>

---

<sup>115</sup> Kippenberger, *Infantry Brigadier*, p.115.

<sup>116</sup> Michael Lee Lanning, *The Giant Book of Military Leaders: The 100 Most Influential Leaders of All Time*, Sydney, 1996, p.85.

<sup>117</sup> Martin van Creveld, *The Art of War: War and Military Thought*, London, 2000, p.105.

<sup>118</sup> Ray Grover, *Kippenberger Collection: Analysis and Policy*, 15 December 1994, unpublished study for Army Museum Archivists.

<sup>119</sup> <http://www.armymuseum.co.nz/research/library.html>; accessed 20th September 2007. This is a highly simplified version of events, the fuller story accounting for some of the questions surrounding the collection today. Firstly, the Army Museum and its research library did not exist in 1957, the big drive, Operation Heritage, to establish a national army museum not getting underway until 1977, some twenty years after Kippenberger’s death. Even then it was some further years before the library was added to the initial museum building, thus providing a final home for the collection.

<sup>120</sup> In between the Army purchasing the collection and it arriving in Waiouru, it formed part of the Army Headquarters Library in Wellington and, it would appear, was treated like a library, as opposed to a heritage, collection. The absence of any readily available catalogue of the original purchases causes some difficulty when regarding the apparent gaps in the collection.

<sup>121</sup> Grover, *Kippenberger Collection: Analysis and Policy*, p.1.

The books he bought himself are of most interest, these being identifiable largely through his signature, often a purchase date, sometimes a purchase price and often peppered with annotation of various sorts.

Before we look closer at the collection there is another puzzle worth teasing. The volumes in the collection are, by and large, military related and, when we take category two and three books (as above) out of the equation, would fill a couple of sizeable bookcases in the family home and still leave some room for the family to move around in. This is interesting because the impression one gets from reading Kip related material is of a greatly larger collection of books in his lifetime than the one presented to at Waiouru. This notion is emphasised by the very one dimensional nature of the collection – there are only *military* books there. While there are monomaniacs no doubt who follow a single path all their reading life without deviation from their singular theme, I think they are rare, and Howard Kippenberger certainly does not strike one as a mono anything, maniac or otherwise. It's certainly possible that Kippenberger reserved his shillings for his meat and potato reading, and got his shots of poetry, fiction, fishing,<sup>122</sup> sport or culture from Rangiora Library, but I doubt it. A more likely explanation is that the New Zealand Army only bought part of his collection, those books identified by either the Army or the Kippenberger family as having a military historical flavour. I have no basis to prove this theory other than gut instinct, which, while a distinctly un-academic approach, strikes me as a rather apt way to regard anything so esoteric as another man's book collection. If correct though, it might show us that the gaps today are not necessarily the gaps of yesterday and thus, worth pursuing further.

Ray Grover conducted a 'head count' of subjects covered by the signed portion of the collection and, on the surface, indicate some weighting of Kippenberger's interest towards some military topics as against some others. The figures, all approximate, are worth reproducing (see Appendix).

## The missing Clausewitz

Despite the gaps in the collection, Kippenberger was familiar with both Clausewitz and Jomini and their prime theories. For example, an early purchase, in 1918, was *Deductions from the World War* by Lieutenant General Baron von Freytag-Loringhoven. Published the previous year it refers to Clausewitz frequently. In 1926, H.K. Kippenberger acquired a copy of Marshal Foch's *The Principles of War*. On page 289 of this treasured work the young historian heavily highlights a direct quotation from *On War*, one that certainly appealed to his moral constitution. "A morally strong personality must be understood to mean not one who is only possessed of strong emotions but one whose balance is not upset by the strongest possible emotions".<sup>123</sup> Crucially, Kip recognised that, "war being undertaken to promote or maintain national interests, the general direction must remain in the hands of the rulers of the nation".<sup>124</sup> A neater paraphrase of Clausewitz's best known dictum we are unlikely to find.

An interesting book in the collection is Lieutenant Colonel Alfred H. Burne's *The Art of War on Land* bought by Kip while he was convalescing in London after his Cassino injuries. Though unannotated, the work is well read<sup>125</sup> and contained much of interest to Kippenberger focusing as it does on four strands of thought; the commander, the troops, morale and resources. *On War* is well covered by Burne, the British theorist correcting the controverson by staff officers like Von

---

<sup>122</sup> Kip was a keen fisherman in the post-war years regularly taking parties of friends proper fishing in the Marlborough Sounds. They would base themselves on D'Urville Island and, when not fishing, stage boxing matches for their entertainment. Don Grady, "Top soldier among proper fanatics", p. 9 in *The Nelson Mail*, 10 March 1998.

<sup>123</sup> Clausewitz quoted in Foch, *The Principles of War*, HL p.289. KC, QEIIAM.

<sup>124</sup> Bird, *The Direction of War: A Study and Illustration of Strategy*, UL p.10. KC, QEIIAM.

<sup>125</sup> Though, admittedly, not necessarily by Kippenberger and, potentially, by later users. In light of our research indicators are that the likelihood of Kip *not* having digested Burne's work is slight.

Moltke (elder) of Clausewitz's principle on the primacy of political control over the direction of war. In the Michaelmas term of 1914, just at the outbreak of war, Chichele Professor of Military History Spenser Wilkinson delivered a series of lectures on the French Army to students of Oxford University. These were collected into *The French Army Before Napoleon* and released by Kip's future publisher Oxford University Press (OUP) in 1915. Kip bought, and we can assume, read the book in early 1929. Chapter One, *The History of the Study of Napoleon*, is an excellent primer on both Clausewitz and Jomini.

This makes the omission all the more curious; a seminal work, referenced frequently by writers Kippenberger reads and respects and available in the English language since the later part of the previous century should be expected to have sat on Kippenberger's book shelves. It does not and, I believe, did not, for two overlooked reasons.

Grover hints at the first when, after highlighting Clausewitz's absence, notes, "...though it should be noted that neither the 1874 nor 1943 translations of Clausewitz have been highly regarded".<sup>126</sup> The (mis)translating of *Vom Kreige* from the German, the shallow and amateur critique of his thesis in those translations' introductory essays and the subsequent misunderstanding of the author's theories are the key to the master strategist's marginalisation in the English speaking world for the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century and for much of the opprobrium heaped on him then and since.

Montgomery of Alamein gives a frank account of his failure to get to grips with Clausewitz. In his *A History of Warfare*, he notes that in his early years as a young officer in India he was a keen student of military history and, as "well-known military writers", he attempted to read both Clausewitz and Jomini. While respecting both men, he found Clausewitz "exceedingly difficult to understand"<sup>127</sup> and when he "couldn't take them in...turned to historians of my own nation and language".<sup>128</sup> Much has been written about the interpretation, misinterpretation and misrepresentation of Clausewitz since his widow Marie first published *Vom Krieg* in 1837 after her husband's premature death. Though it sold poorly initially it was still widely digested by the Prussian general staff. On the centenary of that first publication in 1937 it had gone through sufficient reprints to have a fifteenth German edition released with a foreword from German Minister of War, General von Blomberg. He wrote, "In spite of all the changes of military organisation and technique, Clausewitz book 'On War' remains for all times the basis for any meaningful development of the art of war".<sup>129</sup> Michael Howard has also noted the great influence Clausewitz had on the French military particularly after the Franco-Prussian war, when a whole generation of officers, notably Foch, came to study French translations of *On War*.<sup>130</sup>

While Clausewitz permeated German and French military thought, his influence in the English speaking world has been more erratic. Though parts of his work were first translated into English as early as 1843,<sup>131</sup> it was not fully translated until Colonel J.J. Graham's version came out in 1874 and that went quickly out of print. Until the advent of the Great War, Clausewitz was largely ignored, regarded contemptuously even, by the British Army. Howard notes that one of the most influential Camberley Staff College tutors of the era, Colonel G.F.R. Henderson summed up the

---

<sup>126</sup> Grover, *Kippenberger Collection: Analysis and Policy*, p.1.

<sup>127</sup> Montgomery of Alamein, *A History of Warfare*, p.415.

<sup>128</sup> Montgomery of Alamein, *A History of Warfare*, p.20.

<sup>129</sup> Hans W.Gatzke, "Introduction" to Carl von Clausewitz, "Principles of War", pp. 301-388 in *Roots of Strategy: Book Two*, Pennsylvania, 1987, pp.312-313.

<sup>130</sup> Michael Howard, "The Influence of Clausewitz", pp. 27-44 in Clausewitz, Carl Von, *On War*, Howard and Paret, p.37.

<sup>131</sup> Gatzke, "Introduction" to Carl von Clausewitz, "Principles of War", pp. 301-388 in *Roots of Strategy: Book Two*, p.312.

British antipathy of the period in an 1894 lecture when he sarcastically referenced the Prussian thus: "Clausewitz, the most profound of all writers on war, says that everyone understands what moral force is and how it is applied. But Clausewitz was a genius, and geniuses and clever men have a distressing habit of assuming that everyone understands what is perfectly clear to themselves".<sup>132</sup> Kip has three Henderson studies in the Collection and it was to he that Montgomery turned to study after being baffled by the European writers.<sup>133</sup>

The apparent anti-intellectualist streak which runs through the British Army has been noted by many commentators. Norman Dixon caused a great stir when he published *On The Psychology of Military Incompetence* in 1976. One of the chief causes and characteristics of incompetence Dixon pointed to was an aversion to any pursuit that smacked of intellectualism.<sup>134</sup> As Kippenberger himself noted, "Lesson...is the danger of disgraceful failure to men who have neglected to keep themselves prepared, not only in knowledge of their profession, but in the sentiment of what war requires".<sup>135</sup> Kippenberger, reading 'enemy' authors as well as 'friendly' understood the need to have an all encompassing knowledge of war through both practical exercise and study.

When elements within the British Army did finally wake up in the years prior to 1914 and begin to read the Prussian philosopher, tutor to the German High Command, then a parallel reactionary movement against Clausewitz and his interpreters, Von Der Goltz for one, grew up within British ranks. This denouncement of 'Prussianism' or German militarism, grew stronger in the years after the war, fuelled notably by one of Clausewitz's most fervent, "uncompromising" and influential critics, Basil Liddell Hart.<sup>136</sup>

Liddell Hart's ubiquitous presence in any discussion of, particularly, British military thinking in the twentieth century owes as much to his tireless self-promotion as to the veracity and originality of his strategic thinking. One of his least admirable achievements was to sideline the study of Clausewitz for a whole generation of students of military thought in Britain and America, such was the power of his influence. Typical of the laudatory treatment of Liddell Hart is a comment from Montgomery, who, despite earlier comments, should have known better. "Where Liddell Hart stands high above all other military writers is that not only is he an historian, able to analyse and comment, but he is also a theorist, and has produced from his vast knowledge a philosophy or doctrine of war, as did Clausewitz and Jomini. But whereas they were often wrong, Liddell Hart has proved to be generally right".<sup>137</sup>

An inherently complex man, Liddell Hart's ideas and opinions were driven on various psychological levels by his experience of the Great War. His overt thesis, first codified in his 1925 paper *The Napoleonic Fallacy*, was that the Great War had shown up the inadequacy of the belief that victory can only be gained through the defeat of the enemy in battle. He believed that this concept was enshrined in the none-too-bright minds of the European General Staff, all weaned on Clausewitz, all misreading and misinterpreting the Prussian's wilfully obscure train of thought.<sup>138</sup> As Michael Howard has pointed out in his and Peter Paret's great 1975 translation of Clausewitz, while the General Staff over the years certainly did misread Clausewitz, so too did Liddell Hart, many of the ideas he claimed as his own, sitting already formed in the pages of *On War*,<sup>139</sup> many of his interpretations of Clausewitz's theories quite wrong. Interestingly, Gordon Corrigan sees

<sup>132</sup> Howard, "The Influence of Clausewitz", pp. 27-44 in Clausewitz, *On War*, Howard and Paret, p.38.

<sup>133</sup> Montgomery of Alamein, *A History of Warfare*, p.20.

<sup>134</sup> Norman F. Dixon, *On The Psychology of Military Incompetence*, London, 1979.

<sup>135</sup> Mahan, *The Influence of Seapower Upon History, 1660-1783*, HL p.267. KC, QEIIAM.

<sup>136</sup> David Lord, "Liddell Hart and the Napoleonic Fallacy", pp. 57-63 in *RUSI Journal*, April 1997, p.58.

<sup>137</sup> Montgomery of Alamein, *A History of Warfare*, p.20.

<sup>138</sup> Lord, "Liddell Hart and the Napoleonic Fallacy", pp. 57-63 and pp.58-59.

<sup>139</sup> Howard, "The Influence of Clausewitz", pp. 27-44 in Clausewitz, *On War*, Howard and Paret, pp.38-40.

Liddell Hart's deep antipathy to Clausewitz not as some theoretical, academic aversion but as a purely emotional one. He believes that the Briton's undistinguished war service left him questioning his own physical courage and led him to seek ways to explain that it was intellect not courage that won wars. "The generals were clearly men of courage; therefore they must be made to appear without intellect, and all the mistakes and failures could be laid at their door".<sup>140</sup> Whatever his motivation, Liddell Hart, among others, gave the wrong impression about *On War*, hinted at irrelevancy, misdirected inquiry. This was most unfortunate for, not only was Clausewitz studied by the Germans but by communist forces as well, Engels, Marx and Lenin all admirers of his work.<sup>141</sup>

As stated earlier, Kip certainly shared none of Liddell Hart's aversion to the Prussian. And, despite the Briton's efforts, neither did some of the prominent British military practitioners of the inter-war years either. This we can see through Kip's purchase and annotation of a key work in the collection, Sir George Aston's *The Study of War for Statesmen and Citizens*.

Aston was a prolific author and military correspondent for *The Times*. He came from a military family, reached the rank of Major General, saw combat in Britain's imperial wars (Sudan 1884 and South Africa 1899) and was invalided in the Great War. He was commissioned in the Royal Marine Artillery in 1879, but branched out into intelligence and staff work, founding the Naval Intelligence Department of the Admiralty in 1887. After a period as intelligence officer with the Mediterranean Fleet he became Professor of Fortifications at the Royal Naval College in 1896 and taught at the Staff College from 1904 to 1907. Serving on the Admiralty War Staff when the war broke out, he was chosen for the command of the Royal Marine Brigade, commanding them during the landings at Ostend and Dunkirk. Tragically for this career soldier, three weeks after his appointment to divisional command in September 1914 he was invalided home. He held no further commands in the field.<sup>142</sup>

In his memoirs Liddell Hart speaks highly of Aston, a friend. "He wore himself out in the effort to continue year after year what was an exhausting job, to help in supporting a large family of young children, in addition to writing books and developing war studies in the University of London".<sup>143</sup> Two of his labours are in the collection; his 1930 work on *The Secret Service* and a fascinating collection of lectures delivered by Aston and others to the University of London between 1925 and 1926. *The Study of War for Statesmen and Citizens* not only gives an insight into the strategic debate in Britain in the mid-1920s but also shows how difficult it is for anyone, let alone experienced military practitioners, to accurately predict all the potentialities and facets of continuous strategic change. An example in the text that interested Kippenberger was Sir Edmund Ironside's belief that "the next great war will be won by the nation which knows best how to preserve its manpower by the use of machines. The odds seem to have turned very definitely in the favour of the small, highly trained army and against the half-trained horde".<sup>144</sup> While this was a common belief among inter-war theorists (J.F.C. Fuller for one), the Soviet defence of the Motherland in WWII and the Chinese intervention in the Korean War showed just what a horde of half-trained citizen soldiers could still do. The possibilities of the tank and plane had obscured the lesson of the French Revolution; engaged in an existential war, a committed

---

<sup>140</sup> Gordon Corrigan, *Mud, Blood and Poppycock: Britain and the First World War*, London, 2003, p.14.

<sup>141</sup> Howard, "The Influence of Clausewitz", pp. 27-44 in Clausewitz, *On War*, Howard and Paret, pp.43-44..

<sup>142</sup> John Bourne, *Sir George Grey Aston*, in "Lions Led by Donkeys" website, Centre for First World War Studies, University of Birmingham, [online] <http://www.firstworldwar.bham.ac.uk/donkey/aston.htm>; accessed 1 July 2007.

<sup>143</sup> Basil Liddell Hart, *Memoirs: Volume One*, London, 1965, p.73.

<sup>144</sup> Sir Edmund Ironside, "Land Warfare II", in Sir George Aston (ed.), *The Study of War for Statesmen and Citizens*, London, 1927, HL p.140. KC, QEIIAM.

citizenry risen *en masse* can overpower professional standing armies whose own national existence is not at stake.<sup>145</sup>

The work also teems with Clausewitzian thought. Air Vice-Marshal H.R.M. Brooke-Popham in his essay *Air Warfare* states; “Provided our requirement is of sufficient importance we resort to compulsion when we cannot get what we want by persuasion. A nation may have to use force if it cannot get what it wants by diplomacy. In fact war is an act of violence whereby one nation seeks to impose its will upon another, in other words to break its opponents willpower”.<sup>146</sup> While not directly referencing Clausewitz we can safely assume Brooke-Popham did not come to this dictum independently. The sentiment is echoed by Vice-Admiral Sir H.W. Richmond in his lecture on *Sea Warfare*. “The operations of the whole fighting forces are themselves a course of action to attain a national object – that object is to compel the enemy to compliance, to force them to accept a solution of some difference against their will”.<sup>147</sup> Finally, representing the land forces, Ironside adds; “War is the ultimate resource of policy, and every nation must be ready in the last instance to protect its vital interests by force of arms unless it is prepared to surrender them to an enemy without a blow”.<sup>148</sup> Clausewitzian concepts one and all, and evidence that the concepts in *On War* were being absorbed, if not necessarily effected, by the British military establishment in the inter-war period.<sup>149</sup>

In the absence of any *definitive* reading list, and I suspect there was/is one somewhere, Kip being very much a lists man, we will have to make a provisional call on both Clausewitz and Jomini based on the scant information at our disposal currently, the one guide in Kip’s own hand I have actually seen. At the beginning of W.D. Bird’s *The Direction of War* is a “List of Books Consulted”, a bibliography of works the old warrior based his work on.<sup>150</sup> The list is divided into three sections, “strategy and general principles”, “campaigns” and “miscellaneous”, and lists 115 separate works published prior to 1925. Many of the works listed are classics while others are unknown to me and possibly works of their time, long since superseded. Beside many of the books listed, in a familiar hand are ticks. Of those ticked, a great many like Falkenhayn’s *General Headquarters 1914-1918*, G.F.R. Henderson’s *Stonewall Jackson* or William Siborne’s *The Waterloo Campaign* sit comfortably on the shelves of the Kippenberger Collection today. This indicated to me that a tick at the very least equals having read, and may even indicate onetime possession. Near the top of the initial “strategy” list, just below some key works on Napoleon, are listed *On War* (Col. Maude translation) and *Précis de l’art de la guerre* by Jomini. Neither is ticked.

No indication of when the list was ticked is apparent. No indication leaps out as to whether Kip revisited or updated this list in the nearly thirty years between purchasing Bird and his death. The list is therefore not definitive. However, it is indicative. Both Clausewitz and Jomini were key theorists of war. Kippenberger was well aware of them, (it would be impossible for any half-serious student of military history then or now not to be), and certainly in Clausewitz’s case, accepted many of his theories or principles. I can only conclude that neither H.K. Kippenberger of Rangiora or the later Major General of the same name ever owned or read Clausewitz (or for that matter Jomini) in the original. This was due to a combination of poor translations being available at the time and the contemporary misunderstanding of, even hostility to, the great Prussian strategist among “British” readers, much of this generated by Liddell-Hart and his

---

<sup>145</sup> See John A. Lynn, *Battle: A History of Combat and Culture*, Cambridge, MA, 2003, pp.182-190.

<sup>146</sup> H.R.M Brooke-Popham, “Air Warfare”, in Aston, *The Study of War for Statesmen and Citizens*, HL p.152.

<sup>147</sup> Sir H.W. Richmond, “Sea Warfare”, in Aston, *The Study of War for Statesmen and Citizens*, HL p.49. KC, QEIIAM.

<sup>148</sup> Ironside, *Land Warfare I*, in Aston, *The Study of War for Statesmen and Citizens*, HL p.127. KC, QEIIAM.

<sup>149</sup> Interestingly, both Ironside and Brooke-Popham feature as incompetents in Dixon, *On The Psychology of Military Incompetence*. The case Dixon makes against Ironside is, tellingly, largely based on evidence from Basil Liddell Hart.

<sup>150</sup> Bird, *The Direction of War: A Study and Illustration of Strategy*, pp.x-xii. KC, QEIIAM.

acolytes. That said, Clausewitzian thought permeates much of Kippenberger's most intense readings, with Clausewitzian ideas drawing much of the New Zealanders attention, making him a student of the Prussian, if only by default. Jomini, not so different in his ideas from Clausewitz as is sometimes made out, lives too in the great body of knowledge stored in the collection, though his presence, running so deep through military thinking as to be almost indivisible, is not so evident.

## Chapter Five

“Things are Never as Bad, or as Good as They Seem”<sup>151</sup>

### Authoring *Infantry Brigadier*

Dedicated “to my wife”, Kippenberger finished writing *Infantry Brigadier* in 1946 after his convalescence and a long voyage back home.<sup>152</sup> The conversion of Kip’s draft into a final manuscript was a manic affair, giving Kip much editorial experience for his upcoming position as official historian. In a July 1947 letter to his publishers he apologised for the manuscript’s punctuation. “This is the fourth typing, done by a mad typist who charged me £20 and punctuated according to her own system. She also decided on her own division into chapters and I have tried to correct according to my own ideas”.<sup>153</sup> The book was eventually delivered and published by Oxford University Press on 23 June 1949.

Kippenberger brought the book to OUP through his New Zealand friend Dan Davin, one of the executives of OUP in the 1940s. Davin was one of a number of New Zealanders including John Mulgan and Kenneth Sisam who played key roles in the publisher in the 1940s and 1950s. OUP had appointed a permanent representative in New Zealand in 1947 and *Infantry Brigadier* was one of the early fruits of this presence. Kip’s stature in New Zealand ensured a lot of local interest, OUP’s records showing a magazine *The Auckland Weekly* wanting to serialise the work at once.<sup>154</sup>

*Infantry Brigadier* hit the bookstores in the same year America’s most decorated WWII veteran Audie Murphy published *To Hell and Back*,<sup>155</sup> General Eisenhower released *Crusade in Europe*, Winston Churchill brought out the second volume of his Second World War series, *Their Finest Hour*, J.F.C. Fuller gave us *The Second World War 1939-1945* and Basil Liddell Hart unleashed his (still) controversial *The German Generals Talk*. The great canon of Cold War strategic literature was beginning to build in this period and 1949 saw the release of Stefan Possony’s *Strategic Airpower: The Pattern of Dynamic Security*, Sherman Kents’s *Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy* and CIA operative Kermit Roosevelt’s *Arabs, Oil and History: The Story of the Middle East*.<sup>156</sup>

*Infantry Brigadier* was enthusiastically received on its release. In a review in the Autumn 1949 edition of U.S. journal *Military Affairs*, Sidney T. Matthews,<sup>157</sup> himself an ‘official’ war historian, greets this “authentic and very readable narrative” by a soldier “trained in the hard school of experience” who throughout a work characterised by “high drama...humour...desperate tragedy and devotion to duty” displays a keen understanding of military tactics and a critical and cogent analysis of the failures and successes of the Allied campaigns. Matthews is particularly struck by Kip’s “acid[ic]” and persuasive critique of the command system of the U.S. Army, noting that the Americans would profit by studying the New Zealand command approach where brigade or

---

<sup>151</sup> Earl Haig quoted in, Kippenberger, *Infantry Brigadier*, p.136.

<sup>152</sup> Harper, *Kippenberger*, p. 273.

<sup>153</sup> Howard Kippenberger to Oxford University Press, 3 July 1947 in, *Infantry Brigadier* file, OP1301/9591, Oxford University Press Archives.

<sup>154</sup> Information from author’s personal correspondence with Oxford University Press Chief Archivist, Dr. Martin Maw, 27 March 2007.

<sup>155</sup> Both Kip and Murphy were veterans of the Italian campaigns. Kip initially thought age might go against him in his desire to serve, Murphy struggled, due to his frail frame and boyish looks, to initially get accepted for active service. Both men saw rapid promotion due to their actions, both are buried prominently in their nation’s respective national cemeteries.

<sup>156</sup> Roosevelt, grandson of President Teddy Roosevelt, was the CIA station chief in charge of Operation Ajax, the American orchestrated coup in which Iranian Prime Minister Mossadegh was overthrown in favour of the oil company friendly Shah. The ‘blowback’ from that coup is still being felt in U.S.-Iran relations.

<sup>157</sup> Sidney T. Matthews, “Infantry Brigadier by Major General Sir Howard Kippenberger”, in *Military Affairs*, Vol. 13, no. 3, Fall 1949, Washington D.C., pp.182-183.

regimental commanders understanding of the immediate combat situation and their penchant for initiative is effectively utilised. This, he concurs, is in marked contrast to the American style where commanders of similar rank are used in a more constrained manner, battle plans and the means of their execution tending to be served up wholly realised, "requiring the exercise of less initiative and judgement" on their part.

Matthews highlights Kippenberger's disdain for the commanders he observed leading from the rear and neglecting the condition of their troops and the effect on the outcome of battle this approach has. Glyn Harper believes that Kip's command philosophy, based on his pre-war study and through his experience of battle, centred around the importance of the commander's presence and the direct application of his will to the decisive outcome of a battle.<sup>158</sup>

The sales' figures show that Kippenberger's book was remarkably successful. The first edition of 3,000 copies sold out quickly in 1949, and a second impression of 2,000 copies followed the next year.<sup>159</sup> OUP's sales figures break the world into the United Kingdom, USA and all the rest, only showing sales figures for Australia and Canada (though sadly not New Zealand) from the 1960s on. With nearly 7,000 sales in its first two years of publication, the book was a resounding success and continued to sell steadily throughout the 1950s, the hardback eventually selling some 8859 copies worldwide. R.C. Gooderidge, the OUP representative in Wellington gave a summary of the title's sales in March 1957, just two months before Kip's untimely death, which indicate that the majority of the rest-of-world sales were indeed here in New Zealand. "The last 2,000 ...have taken some time to sell ...I don't think it is worth while reprinting the present edition in view of the price it would have to be, and in view of the slow sales now. I could not promise to clear more than a thousand in five years ... However in its present form the book will continue to sell as long as 'Kip' is alive, at the rate of about 200pa, just so long as it is shown to the trade here every year".<sup>160</sup> In reply, Oxford's publisher noted the title had "sold over 8,000, so we (you) have done pretty well".<sup>161</sup>

Despite Gooderidge's comments and Kip's death, a paperback edition was released in 1961. Less successful than its hardback predecessor, it still managed to sell in healthy numbers in the rest-of-the-world, which we can presume to mean New Zealand since OUP had by this time separated Australian and Canadian sales figures out. The title was not remaindered until 1971, when 695 copies were still warehoused, unsold, in London. The U.S. sales figures for the whole life of the book are interesting. Despite the positive reviews in prominent U.S. publications like *Military Affairs* and Kip having been awarded the U.S. Legion of Merit, the book never made much of a mark in the United States. It has been noted by many commentators that the U.S. 'version' of WWII is largely uncluttered by the presence of allies. While it would be unfair and untruthful to suggest that the post-war generation of American readers did not fully recognise the contribution other nations made to the defeat of Germany and Japan, it might be that the desert war, largely fought by the British Empire on its own, exerts less interest in America than campaigns where G.I.s were wholeheartedly involved.

Kippenberger did relatively well from the book, earning over £875 from the book in his lifetime, something of between thirty-eight and fifty-four thousand New Zealand dollars in today's

---

<sup>158</sup> Harper, *Kippenberger*, p. 234.

<sup>159</sup> Author's personal e-mail correspondence with Oxford University Press Chief Archivist, Dr. Martin Haw, 27 March 2007.

<sup>160</sup> R.C. Gooderidge letter to Oxford University Press, 3 March 1957 in, *Infantry Brigadier* file, OP1301/9591, Oxford University Press Archives.

<sup>161</sup> Oxford University Press letter to R.C. Gooderidge, 13 March 1957 in, *Infantry Brigadier* file, OP1301/9591, Oxford University Press Archives.

money.<sup>162</sup> This, plus the relatively generous salary of NZ£2,000 per annum and use of a Crown car through his role of editor-in-chief of the official histories,<sup>163</sup> must have given Kippenberger some comfort in his later years.

As a historical reference *Infantry Brigadier* has an impeccable pedigree. Corelli Barnett's 1960s best-seller *The Desert Generals* references it frequently (and controversially)<sup>164</sup> while Antony Beevor's 1991 *Crete: The Battle and the Resistance* uses Kip's biography in a most complementary manner. Liddell Hart's swansong *The History of the Second World War* in 1970 gives a collegial nod to a work he was long familiar with. "In reading (and re-reading) your own book...I came to feel that I knew you quite well. I got a copy when it was published in 1949 and have recommended it widely – and also quoted it several times in my Tank History".<sup>165</sup> In fact it has been said that in some ways the very success of *Infantry Brigadier* has cast an historical shadow over the rest of Kippenberger's life and particularly, as Piers Reid has asserted, over "the experiences and background which shaped him as a commander".<sup>166</sup> So its value to historians is clear. What of its value as an instruction to today's soldiers?

### ***Infantry Brigadier* in modern staff college use**

*Infantry Brigadier* was used in staff colleges around the time of its initial release. Kippenberger himself mentioned in 1956 that, "I am informed that it is required or recommended reading at Camberley, Leavenworth, the Irish Staff College and at Duntroon".<sup>167</sup> Sadly, despite being referred to as a "minor classic...used by the Israeli Army as a staff college text" in a recent edition of the Australian Defence Force Journal,<sup>168</sup> two generations on, this "universally acknowledged classic"<sup>169</sup> appears to have slipped from the world's defence college reading lists. The U.S. Army War College library has three copies of Harper's biography but no copies of *Infantry Brigadier*, the only copy of Kippenberger's original at Carlisle sitting in the Army Heritage Research collection – of historical interest only in other words! The U.S. Command and General Staff College has one copy in the Combined Arms Research Library,<sup>170</sup> not a sign of required or recommended reading. The Infantry Training School at Fort Benning, Georgia yields no sign of Kippenberger's book but then, no surprise, as one of their colleagues at Carlisle doubts whether the Infantry Instructors "know much about the past".<sup>171</sup>

---

<sup>162</sup> Figures from Oxford University Press publication file, *Kippenberger Infantry Brigadier*, LOCA001815. Reproduced with permission of Secretary to the Delegates OUP and should not be reprinted without permission. £875 6s 10d was the royalty total between 1950 and 1958. The largest payment is from March 1950 when Kippenberger is paid £574 13s 4d. Using the retail price index this 1950 sum is £13,605.02 in today's money. Calculated using tools on [www.measuringworth.com](http://www.measuringworth.com) 10 July 2007 and converted using the official exchange rate at the time of 2.71 NZ\$ to the pound Sterling. See Appendix 1 for sales figures.

<sup>163</sup> Michael Bassett and Michael King, *Tomorrow Comes The Song: A Life of Peter Fraser*, Auckland, 2000, p.300.

<sup>164</sup> Glyn Harper notes that Barnett uses "dexterous sleight of hand" to enforce his thesis by part-quoting Kip to defend the brigade group system of deployment. The full quote from *Infantry Brigadier* in fact is much more qualified in its support; see Harper, *Kippenberger*, pp.134-5.

<sup>165</sup> Basil Liddell Hart letter to Howard Kippenberger, 31 Dec 1956 in, LH 4/38, LHCMA.

<sup>166</sup> Piers Reid, "Foreword", pp.7-8 in Harper, *Kippenberger*.

<sup>167</sup> Howard Kippenberger letter to Basil Liddell Hart, 19 December 1956, LH 4/38, LHCMA.

<sup>168</sup> P.K. Ebery, "Kippenberger: An Inspired New Zealand Commander", book review in, *Australian Defence Force Journal*, Issue 169, 2005, pp.82-3. <http://www.defence.gov.au/publications/dfj/adfj169.pdf>. 1st April 2007.

<sup>169</sup> Reid, "Foreword", pp.7-8 in Harper, *Kippenberger*, p.7.

<sup>170</sup> Searches of U.S. Army War College Library catalogue, U.S. Army Heritage Collection catalogue and U.S. Combined Arms Research Library catalogue online, 23 September 2007.

<sup>171</sup> Author's personal correspondence with Dr. Leonard Wong, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, 24 April 2007. In the interest of clarity it must be noted that Leonard Wong was not making a disparaging remark about his colleagues in Fort Benning, merely that their business was in the here-and-now, not the distant past.

Staff at the Singapore Command and Staff College cannot recall *Infantry Brigadier* being part of the curriculum.<sup>172</sup> Despite fighting alongside the Kiwis in the desert war and the frequent reference by Kip to their troops, the Indian Defence Services Staff College has no copy currently or any record of having one in the past.<sup>173</sup> The South African Army College has a copy but it is “merely utilised as a source document...The SA Army College however appreciates the enquiry since it has highlighted the book once again for purposes of a case study”.<sup>174</sup> Correspondence with Australian Defence College personnel dug up one digger who owned a copy which he had read during his staff college days, but doubted whether it had been anything like a standard text since the early 1980s and indicated that he did not know anybody else from that ‘vintage’ who had read it. He doubted whether it had had much of a show on the curriculum before then either. Enquiries with the ADC library staff elicited that there are two old copies of *Infantry Brigadier* in the library holdings but that the work is not on any current reading lists and has not been for a long, long time.<sup>175</sup>

Canadian Forces College Paul Foot sheds some little light on the matter. “I am quite sure that the book has not been used for Canadian Staff College purposes for a very long time - I am not an army historian but I do have a general hold on these matters. I would think that the place to ask would be the Royal Military College Sandhurst in the UK - there regimental and individual testimonies are far more used than the more campaign-oriented work at the Operational level that characterizes most staff courses today. Similarly, the emphasis on Joint operations tends to place the emphasis on the points of connection between services, not so much on how one or more actually perform in a particular battle”.<sup>176</sup> Clearly, outside the serene grounds of Sandhurst, home from home of great military historians like Sir John Keegan and New Zealand’s Christopher Pugsley, many modern staff colleges see little use for the instruction of modern war via historical texts. But what of our own? Can we take the study of *Infantry Brigadier* in the modern New Zealand Army for granted?

Six well-worn and well-read copies of *Infantry Brigadier* sit on the shelves of the Command and Staff College library in Trentham Camp, Upper Hutt. These copies are used by New Zealand Defence Force officers on a variety of levels. First, and on a quite fundamental level, the book is simply recommended reading “for everyone in the Army, officers, soldiers and civilians”.<sup>177</sup> The Army’s *Professional Reading List*, now in its fifth edition, lists *Infantry Brigadier* as “compulsory reading”, describing it as “one of the best personal accounts of World War 2, describing the wartime experiences of...a man who holds a special place in the New Zealand Army”.<sup>178</sup>

Secondly, Kip is studied through the Army’s Professional Military Education programme run in conjunction with Massey University’s Centre for Defence Studies. At undergraduate level the paper 149.100 *Fundamentals of Command* has Glyn Harper and Joel Hayward’s *Born to Lead?* as required reading. Chapter eight focuses on Kippenberger. At postgraduate level, paper 149.704 Command Studies includes a component on Kippenberger with Harper’s biography as recommended reading. Between both these papers up to ten students each year choose to complete assignments on Kip, making him the most popular New Zealand military commander

---

<sup>172</sup> Email correspondence between author and Lim Seng Hock, SCSC, 3 May 2007.

<sup>173</sup> Email correspondence between author and Indian Defence Services Staff College, 21 May 2007.

<sup>174</sup> Email correspondence between author and Colonel Jan J. Wessels, SADC, 14 May 2007.

<sup>175</sup> Email correspondence with Commander Peter Kelly and colleagues, Australian Defence College, 24 April 2007.

<sup>176</sup> Email correspondence with Paul Foot, Canadian Forces College, Toronto and Geneva Centre for Security Policy, 23 April 2007.

<sup>177</sup> Jerry Mateparae, “Foreword”, in Lindsay Amner., *Professional Reading List*, 5<sup>th</sup> edition, Wellington, 2006, p.3.

<sup>178</sup> Amner, *Professional Reading List*, p.10.

to study.<sup>179</sup> It should be safe to assume that most of those who take time to study Kip do so with the help of his primary written legacy.

*Infantry Brigadier* is a cracking read. It is full of the humanity and inhumanity of war. It is a rich historical text and, unlike many military autobiographies, is a valuable, reliable, reference document for historians. Unfortunately, it would appear that, outside of New Zealand, modern staff colleges see little need for it, and maybe that's as should be. It would be sad if, through lack of availability, or lack of awareness, young soldiers, particularly those from armies used to being the smaller partners in coalition warfare, fail to read this military classic. Harper's biography is a great complement, but no substitute for a read in the original<sup>180</sup>.

---

<sup>179</sup> Information in this paragraph from email correspondence with Dr. Piers Reid, Centre for Defence Studies, Massey University, 29 October 2007. Dr. Reid, former Chief of General Staff of the New Zealand Army, recalls a conversation he had with an Israeli Defence Force officer who told him that *Infantry Brigadier* was "highly recommended" reading at the Israeli Staff College. The author, in the course of this research, has made a number of enquiries to Jerusalem to ascertain the IDF use of Kippenberger. To date these enquiries have fielded no result.

<sup>180</sup> A search of my two regional libraries, Upper and Lower Hutt Cities, finds, reassuringly that both *Infantry Brigadier* and Harper's biography are on the shelves and being read.

## Chapter Six

### “My Hobby of Soldiering”<sup>181</sup>

“Examples from history make everything clear and furnish the best description of proof in the empirical sciences. This applies with more force to the Art of War than to any other”.<sup>182</sup>

### Kippenberger the historian

There is something curious about *Infantry Brigadier*. For all that it was written by “a devout student of military history”,<sup>183</sup> it is a work curiously devoid of history, military or otherwise. Despite treading in the footsteps of Leonidas, Hannibal, Saladin, Ceur de Lion et al, Kip’s book is very much of the here and now, the job at hand. It may be, as has been suggested to me, that the book was designed to be just that, a contemporary account of a Kiwi infantry commander tackling the task at hand. Kip himself regarded it as “a fairly representative authoritative statement of the New Zealand point of view”.<sup>184</sup> But surely a man as obviously immersed in history as he was would bring some of it with him to the sole book he writes?

Kippenberger spent late May and early June 1942 in northern Syria. His account of his time in the area is largely uneventful, 5 Brigade under Kip relieving George Clifton’s 6 Brigade on the strategically important, though relatively calm, Turkish-Syrian border. *Infantry Brigadier* refers little to the history of the place and, to modern readers, his slightly innocent description of Kurds as “the cruellest-looking people I ever saw” seems crass and his rather comedic account of bumbling through a feast with local Sheiks while holding up a pair of burst underpants gives us the impression of just another buff cove from the colonies, thirsting for Speights, spoiling for a fight with Jerry and not too sure of the locals.<sup>185</sup> He gives concise and accurate analysis of the local terrain all viewed with a tactical eye to the possible battles ahead. All this is in the present though. The area has ancient sights to while some time away at, but the job at hand is what concerns the man, and that is the account of Aleppo we get. This is curious.

Nestled between some favourite books in the Kippenberger Collection is a copy of *The Crusades* by T.A. Archer and C.L. Kingsford published in 1894. Inside the cover in that fluid hand we find the inscription, “Brig. H.K. Kippenberger 5 NZ Inf Bde Aleppo June 1942”. As usual he notes the price, in this case 50 dirham. The book is not annotated and there is little evidence of the attention he gave it. However it is significant that Kip bought this book, and more particularly *where* he bought it, for Aleppo is one of the great strategic cities of the ancient world, at a crossroad on the trade routes from India, Mesopotamia, Damascus and ultimately Egypt, a city coveted and fought over by Hittite, Assyrian, Persian, Greek, Roman and Arab until Ottoman rule and European conquest in Kip’s time. His place as just another temporary occupier in a long and distinguished lineage should not have been lost on the historian from Rangiora. So here he is, reading a favoured topic, on the very ground it occurred, as part of a later conquering army in a long and illustrious line and yet turn to the same period recounted in *Infantry Brigadier* and he gives us...nothing. A scant reference to some temple sight-seeing and little else. Most curious for a historian it might be thought.

---

<sup>181</sup> Kippenberger, *Infantry Brigadier*, p. 96.

<sup>182</sup> Clausewitz quoted in Bird, *The Direction of War: A Study and Illustration of Strategy*, p.V.

<sup>183</sup> Howard Kippenberger letter to Basil Liddell Hart, 19 December 1956. LH 4/38, LHCMA.

<sup>184</sup> Howard Kippenberger letter to Basil Liddell Hart, 19 December 1956. LH 4/38, LHCMA.

<sup>185</sup> Kippenberger, *Infantry Brigadier*, pp.116-123.

But a historian he certainly was and we might have to reconcile it to the division of Kip's public and private personas that he was capable of, that he chose to keep the reflective historian out of the limelight *Infantry Brigadier* gave this man of arms. While Kippenberger was certainly "renowned for his knowledge of military history",<sup>186</sup> and the surviving volumes of his collection certainly indicate this narrow focus, his study was much greater than the military dimensions to history, though he certainly saw the study of war as a most serious endeavour indeed. He agreed with Cyril Falls that, "there are... not many positive services which the historian can do for the state, and in a wider sense the world, higher than that of tracing the cause of wars, describing the means by which they were fought, ascertaining the reasons which led to victory on one side or the other, describing the effects and estimating the conditions likely to produce future wars and in which they would be fought".<sup>187</sup> Certainly *Infantry Brigadier* on its own makes a good dash at this aim.

### The enduring lessons of the Crusades

Professor of History at the University of Minnesota in the 1920s, August Krey noted the, "common practice for master historians to initiate their apprentices into the study of European history through the accounts of the First Crusade".<sup>188</sup> Lacking the formal training of a historian, Kip nonetheless received great instruction from the foremost historians of the age, through his close reading of their great works. In his collection are classic treatments of the period by Charles Oman, W.B. Stevenson and others. All are pointedly annotated, key passages highlighted and constant cross-referencing to other works in the collection. An example of his eye for history can be seen in Stevenson's *The Crusaders in the East*. A reference to the Crusader Battle of Harran has Kip scribble in the margin, "Carrhae where Crassus was beaten 11 ½ centuries earlier".<sup>189</sup> He would find himself briefly near Carrhae during his sojourn in Syria.

The crusades were a great interest, part of his apprenticeship, and considering the site of his contribution to the allied war effort, a telling indicator of how his geopolitical and historical interests intertwined. Culturally he saw "the importance of the movement as a phase in the development of European civilisation",<sup>190</sup> quite in contrast to the largely negative image the era provokes today in the popular Western imagination. He also understood the 'big picture' with regard to the crusading movement recognising that, "together they form a continuous stream for the better part of the 12<sup>th</sup> and 13<sup>th</sup> Centuries. The numbering of a selected few obscures this fact". The strategic versus the symbolic dimensions of the crusades did not escape his attention either. While the capital of the Crusader states was, "Jerusalem, the Holy City...the Northern states, Edessa...and Antioch were politically far more important. They bore the brunt of Moslem attack and their failure involved the failure of all".<sup>191</sup> The conquest of this region has long held the key to an open passage to Egypt and Mesopotamia and demands rigorous defence. These can include either strong fortifications or a deliberate policy of letting nature assist with her own formidable defensive works. Kip noted when stationed in the area in early 1942 that the Turks preferred the latter. "Our role was...to impose as much delay as possible on any invasion by the Germans through Turkey...Possibly, if the Turks invited us, there would have been an advance into Turkey, but this would have been difficult as their roads had been deliberately allowed to fall

---

<sup>186</sup> Bassett and King, *Tomorrow Comes The Song: A Life of Peter Fraser*, p.300.

<sup>187</sup> Cyril Falls, *The Place of War in History: An Inaugural Lecture Delivered Before the University of Oxford 22<sup>nd</sup> November 1946*, Oxford, 1947, HL p.10. KC, QEIIAM.

<sup>188</sup> August C. Krey, *The First Crusade: The Accounts of Eyewitnesses and Participants*, Princeton, 1921, HL p.3. KC, QEIIAM.

<sup>189</sup> W.B. Stevenson, *The Crusaders in the East: A Brief History of the Wars of Islam with the Latins in Syria During the 12<sup>th</sup> and 13<sup>th</sup> Centuries*, Cambridge, 1907, KN p.77. KC, QEIIAM.

<sup>190</sup> Krey, *The First Crusade*, Tick p.2. KC, QEIIAM.

<sup>191</sup> Stevenson, *The Crusaders in the East*, HL p.3. KC, QEIIAM.

into disrepair and they had done nothing to clear up malarial areas".<sup>192</sup> The land was a mixed bag for any potential defender, there being "very good defensive country North-West of Aleppo but not a single possible position in a wide belt to the north".<sup>193</sup> Like the other defenders down the centuries Kip figured that there was only one likely invasion route of Syria and it was here in the old Crusader lands.

Kippenberger recognised the historical strategic importance of the Middle East and the parallels with the contemporary political environment. "From the strategical, as distinguished from the political or commercial, the crusades had two main objects. The first was to relieve the pressure of the Turks on Constantinople...the second was to conquer the Holy Land and restore its shrines to the custody of Christendom".<sup>194</sup> His understanding through Stevenson was even clearer. "The First Crusade had one aspect in the mind of Alexius (the Byzantine Emperor), another in the heart of the Pope. There is a third aspect which comes nearer than the others to the true character of the crusade as estimated by its actual results. It was a joint expedition for the conquest and partition of Syria".<sup>195</sup> The parallels with Kip's time and our own are illuminating. The crusades were about strategic defence, protection of trade routes and control of natural resources.

Syria in history was larger than the modern state we refer to today and included Lebanon, Israel, much of Jordan and large tracts of Mesopotamia or modern day Iraq. The strategic importance of the region has long been noted. Stevenson pointed out that, "The crusader action against Kilic Arslan of Rum (Seljuk Turk leader) in 1092-1107 delayed Turkish invasion of Europe by 3 ½ centuries".<sup>196</sup> In later times the Commonwealth defence of the Middle East protected the Empire from the interests of both Germany and, arguably, the Soviet Union. Kippenberger himself spelled out the importance of the Middle East during the Compulsory Military Training campaign of 1949. "Before the years of victory (in WWII) there had been years of defeat and endurance and the long swaying struggle to hold the vital Middle East...In the Battle of Britain and in the Middle East it was decided that the war with Germany need not be lost...It is very possible that the approaches to Australia and New Zealand may have again to be held in that ancient battleground".<sup>197</sup>

He also felt that the eventual failure of the Crusades had lessons to offer today. He noted that the Crusader conquests' "division into four princedoms or petty states was a serious hindrance to their success"<sup>198</sup> and that their "downfall was not caused by any extraordinary corruption but the fatality of disunity that delivered them to watchful enemies".<sup>199</sup> These internal causes, principally the antagonism between the Latin states chief military support the Knights Templar and the Hospitallers, can be seen as analogous to the antagonism between the armour and infantry in the desert up until Alamein or, on a higher plane, the antagonism between the French and British in the face of their common German enemy in WWII. Whatever interpretation we put on the lessons, there are pertinent ones to be drawn nonetheless.

---

<sup>192</sup> Kippenberger, *Infantry Brigadier*, p.117.

<sup>193</sup> Kippenberger, *Infantry Brigadier*, p.118.

<sup>194</sup> Charles Oman, *The History of the Art of War in the Middle Ages Volume One: A.D. 378-1278*, London, 1924, HL p.233. KC, QEIIAM.

<sup>195</sup> Stevenson, *The Crusaders in the East*, HL & UL p.9. KC, QEIIAM.

<sup>196</sup> Stevenson, *The Crusaders in the East*, HL p.21. KC, QEIIAM.

<sup>197</sup> Kippenberger, 'Where is New Zealand to be Defended?', pp.3-4 in, *To Preserve Our Security: The Case for Compulsory Military Training*, p.4; pamphlet in KC, QEIIAM.

<sup>198</sup> Krey, *The First Crusade*, HL p.13. KC, QEIIAM.

<sup>199</sup> Krey, *The First Crusade*, HL pp.16-17. KC, QEIIAM.

## Chapter Seven

“He Shot Them All with His Revolver in a Most Efficient Fashion”<sup>200</sup>

### Grand strategy

Strategy is a vital contemplation in times of peace involving, as Kip understood, “the direction or management of war”.<sup>201</sup> Kip certainly concurred with many thinkers from Socrates onward who saw strategy analogous to business, certainly foreshadowing the current vogue for strategic management’s interest in military theory. “It would be better instead of comparing it [war] to any art, to liken it to business competition which is also a conflict of human interests and activities”.<sup>202</sup> The ‘peace strategy’ of any government should concern adequate management of the nation’s resources “so that they may be capable of being exploited not only to the greatest possible extent, but also at the time when they will be most useful, should the necessity for protecting national interests involve the nation in war”.<sup>203</sup> The preparation for war falls into three categories – political; moral and material; and military. Kippenberger highlighted five primary material strategies for government in peacetime.<sup>204</sup>

- Success in war depends on the use of technology. Government should take steps to ensure that adequate supplies of essential fuel and minerals for their manufacture and employment are secured in times of peace for use in times of war.
- The health and education of the nation is essential for the successful prosecution of war and should be promoted by the government by legislative means.
- National resilience during war is dependent on the ongoing growth of commercial prosperity in times of peace.
- Peacetime levels of taxation must be balanced between the need, on one hand, of the government to raise adequate funds to maintain an effective war fighting capability and, on the other, the people to enjoy the fruits of their labours and business to have adequate surplus for investment and dividend.
- The securing of loan assurances on good economic terms in peacetime for use, if necessary, in time of war.

At home he recognised that it was not an anathema to democracy, rather means necessary for its preservation, to curtail some freedoms during wartime. These included;

- Regulation of the price and distribution of food.
- Measures for the state to requisition private assets.
- Regulation of the press.
- Regulation of trade and communication with enemy and neutral countries including measures to counter espionage. This might include special treatment of aliens living in home territories.

On top of these Kippenberger thought economic warfare, such as the blockade of shipping to enemy ports, devaluation of enemy currencies and domination of neutral markets, was an important weapon in war, best prepared in times of peace.<sup>205</sup> Ever aware of historical analogy he had noted the positive results of the British commerce destroying tactics in the war of 1689-1697

---

<sup>200</sup> Kippenberger, *Infantry Brigadier*, p.158.

<sup>201</sup> Bird, *The Direction of War: A Study and Illustration of Strategy*, UL p.30.

<sup>202</sup> Aston, *The Study of War for Statesmen and Citizens*, HL p.8.

<sup>203</sup> Bird, *The Direction of War: A Study and Illustration of Strategy*, pp.30-1.

<sup>204</sup> Bird, *The Direction of War: A Study and Illustration of Strategy*, UL and number pp.32-33 and paraphrased by author. KC, QEIIAM.

<sup>205</sup> Bird, *The Direction of War: A Study and Illustration of Strategy*, UL and number pp.32-33 and paraphrased by author. KC, QEIIAM.

with France,<sup>206</sup> concluding its efficacy as a tactic though its often counterproductive effects as a strategy. The German U-boat campaign of the Great War is a case in point, "It is enough to point out the fact that unrestrained use of the power of command at sea may defeat the very object of the operations; and instead of weakening the enemy, strengthen him."<sup>207</sup> The danger of neutrals, especially powerful ones, intervening in a war because their citizens are suffering in attacks between combatants, whether through the bombing of cities or the sinking of ships,<sup>208</sup> is a strategic consideration that should always govern tactical expedencies.

Timeless in his relevance, Thucydides remarked that wars have "great causes and little occasions". In other words, while the momentum toward war is caused by great and important forces of nature, it is often actually triggered by relatively trivial matters. The assassination of the Archduke Ferdinand on the eve of the Great War is a case in point. While of an incident of great import to the Austrian royal family, never mind Ferdinand himself, on the scale of what was to happen, the killing of this middle aged aristocrat by a "nineteen-year-old consumptive"<sup>209</sup> was small beer. Yet...

Under the title, "General World Unrest: Eight Main Causes", Kippenberger laid out the strategic issues shaping the post-WWII world. They show a fair and balanced appreciation of the strategic forces shaping the world of the period.

"World unrest since the recent war has been due to a variety of causes amongst which are:

1. Widespread national poverty particularly in Europe.
2. A general demand for self-determination on the part of hitherto dependent areas such as India, the Philippines, Burma, Indonesia etc.
3. The temporary recession of the British Commonwealth as one of the most powerful world forces.
4. The emergence of the United States of America as the greatest world economic power, and the virtual disappearance of the isolationist policy and non-intervention tactics of that country.
5. The progress of aviation with a military bias and of directed unmanned missiles.
6. The development of atomic weapons with a somewhat hysterical misconception in the lay mind of their effectiveness, their use as precision instruments, and their ease of production.
7. A general feeling of insecurity not diminished by active military operations all over the globe, in such places as Palestine, China, Indonesia, various South American Republics, Greece, Iraq, India and Pakistan.
8. A wide-spread but rather vague fear of the "Communist-bogey".<sup>210</sup>

With some minor alterations, the substitution of Islamic for Communist for example, the same list could easily be published today and, in point seven, the continued concern over Palestine, Iraq and Pakistan after an interval of sixty years puts some perspective on the longevity of some conflicts. This is analogous to strategy writ large!

---

<sup>206</sup> Mahan, *The Influence of Seapower Upon History, 1660-1783*, HL p. 196. KC, QEIIAM.

<sup>207</sup> Aston, *The Study of War for Statesmen and Citizens*, HL p.49. KC, QEIIAM.

<sup>208</sup> Aston, *The Study of War for Statesmen and Citizens*, HL p.64. KC, QEIIAM.

<sup>209</sup> Strachan, *The First World War*, p.10.

<sup>210</sup> Joint Defence Action Committee, *General Summary of the World Situation with particular reference to Communist activities and the need for Universal Compulsory Military Service*, Wellington, 1949. IA77, Box 7, *Compulsory Military Training*, Archives New Zealand.

Once war was underway Kip understood that the prime threat to war strategy was the “failure to maintain objectives”.<sup>211</sup> These objectives or ends were many and varied but for the commander in the field, the Strategos, they were clear; “For the essence of war is not to take this point or that, but to destroy, or at least weaken, the military strength of the enemy”.<sup>212</sup> Ever the student of Napoleon, Kip believed war had some unchanging principles that stood firm even when much else about war changed. “The principles of war are the same as those of a siege. Fire must be concentrated on one point and as soon as the breach is made, the equilibrium is broken and the rest is nothing”.<sup>213</sup>

## Morale

A key text in Kippenberger’s military education is Marshal Foch’s 1903 *Principles of War*. Translated into English by Hillaire Belloc<sup>214</sup> in 1918, the work took on a new authority after Foch’s successful accession to supreme allied command in 1917. *Principles*, developed from Foch’s lectures to the French Staff College, has at its heart a belief in the primacy of morale as a decisive factor in war. “A battle won is a battle in which one will not confess oneself beaten”<sup>215</sup> he opined. Kip, who bought the work in 1926, largely concurred, noting that this was the “basis of Frederick’s confidence at Rossbach and his losses at Kunersdorf” and the improbable British victory at Albuera during the Peninsular War.<sup>216</sup> Quoting Prussian Field Marshall Baron Von der Goltz, Foch believed “it is not so necessary to annihilate the enemy combatants as to annihilate their courage. Victory is ours as soon as the enemy has been brought to believe that his cause is lost...an enemy is not to be reduced to impotence by means of complete individual annihilation, but by destroying his hope in victory”. Kippenberger, not fully convinced of the totality of the thesis, noted that Grant had both shattered enemy morale *and* annihilated their army in the 1864-5 campaigns of the U.S. Civil War.<sup>217</sup> General Macdonald’s action in the Battle of Wagram, as recorded by Foch, provides an interesting parallel in Kip’s experience at Miteiriya Ridge during Second Alamein.<sup>218</sup> “The result was secured not by physical means – these were all to the advantage of the vanquished – it was achieved by a purely moral action which alone brought about a decision and a complete decision”.<sup>219</sup>

If Kippenberger was to sum up the principle essence of combat it might be in his simple phrase, “fire and movement”.<sup>220</sup> To both Foch and Kip, an enlightened commander must possess a theory of fire, knowing its effects and combining fire with movement, manoeuvre and the discipline of the men under his command. A disciplined “chain of command”<sup>221</sup> was vital for a commander to successfully transmit orders and direct action. An absence of the “will to conquer” on the commander’s part was fatal, regardless of the bravery of the men underneath him. Foch notes that the battles around Metz during August 1870 (Mars-la-Tour, Gravelotte and Noiseville), show “an army fighting bravely but a chief not desiring to secure victory”.<sup>222</sup> Kip did note exceptions to this rule, the battle at Shaiba in the Mesopotamian campaign 1915 for one,<sup>223</sup> where battle was

---

<sup>211</sup>Stevenson, *The Crusaders in the East*, KN p.45. KC, QEIIAM.

<sup>212</sup> Taylor, *Rumours of Wars*, UL p.38. KC, QEIIAM.

<sup>213</sup> Major General C.W. Robinson, *Wars of the 19<sup>th</sup> Century*, London, 1914, HL p. 23. KC, QEIIAM.

<sup>214</sup> Among many other great things the author of the famous colonialist jingle, “Whatever happens, we have got, the Maxim Gun and they have not”.

<sup>215</sup> Foch, *The Principles of War*, HL p.286. KC, QEIIAM.

<sup>216</sup> Foch, *The Principles of War*, KN p.286. KC, QEIIAM

<sup>217</sup> Foch, *The Principles of War*, HL & KN p.287. KC, QEIIAM

<sup>218</sup> Kippenberger, *Infantry Brigadier*, pp. 230-231.

<sup>219</sup> Foch, *The Principles of War*, HL p.296. KC, QEIIAM

<sup>220</sup> Foch, *The Principles of War*, KN p.199. KC, QEIIAM

<sup>221</sup> Foch, *The Principles of War*, KN p.293. KC, QEIIAM

<sup>222</sup> Foch, *The Principles of War*, HL p.291. KC, QEIIAM.

<sup>223</sup> Foch, *The Principles of War*, KN p.296. KC, QEIIAM.

won by the privates not the generals. Foch termed this the “anonymous battle”, reflecting perhaps more his subscription to the great captain theory of war than the reality of battle.

Kip recognised a link between youth and generalship. Battlefield command is a young man’s game, not so much because of the mental exertions involved, but the purely physical ones. Lieutenant Colonel Nick Vaux was 46 when he commanded 42 Commando, Royal Marines during the Falklands War. Despite being an accomplished athlete he found the physical demands of combat taxing for a man of his age. “For the first time in this war I began to worry about my physical endurance...I seemed drained of energy following our gallop along the track, which had proved quite arduous. Perhaps it wasn’t too surprising, because the attack had now been going on for ten hours and, like most people, I had had several jarring falls in the dark on the way down”.<sup>224</sup> This is a prime example of the “forward control” style of command favoured in WWII by commanders like Guderian, Rommel, Montgomery<sup>225</sup> and both Freyberg and Kippenberger in the New Zealand Division. This style of command, the norm since the end of WWII, has the leaders not only sharing the risks and hardships of their soldiers but, more importantly, being seen to be doing so. The “tenacity and resolution” of a commander in the face of great danger is a mightily inspiring thing to a common soldier.<sup>226</sup> All of this suits the younger commander.

Noting that age appeared to be a factor in incompetent leadership, Dr. Norman Dixon noted that “old men are more cautious than young men, and less able to make quick decisions than those whose arteries have not begun to harden”.<sup>227</sup> Kip noted a prime example of strong youthful leadership at the Battle of Saalfeld in October 1806 when “a distinguished set of general officers”<sup>228</sup> engaged the Prussian army prior to the decisive Battles of Jena and Auerstedt. They were Napoleon’s Chief of Staff General Victor, 40 years old, Divisional Commander Suchet, 34, Brigadier Claparède, 32, Brigadier Reille, 31. The ages of these officers would not have been lost on Kippenberger. He himself was concerned in 1939 that his age would see him passed over for command for a younger man. “My tour in command of a Territorial battalion...was nearly ended and at forty-two I might have been thought too old”.<sup>229</sup> He would not have been unfamiliar either with the notion that Great War generals, especially the French, were of advanced years and thus, to some thinking, too set in their ways to be able to flexibly adapt to the new conditions that war threw up. In 1914 Joffre was 62, Foch 63 and both Petain and Nivelle a sprightly 58.<sup>230</sup> While there certainly have been examples in history of clear correlations between advanced age and incompetent leadership, Crimea and the 1841 First Afghan War spring to mind, the Great War notion of “lions led by donkeys”<sup>231</sup> has been comprehensively challenged of late. Gordon Corrigan in *Mud, Blood and Poppycock* is one historian who has shown up the ‘donkeys’ thesis’ as wanting, clearly laying out that while the Great War commanders were old, they were not *excessively* so and the huge losses on the Western Front were due to a multitude of interacting factors, incompetent leadership being the least influential of these.<sup>232</sup>

The maintenance of morale in his men, particularly when they are far from home and in regions where sickness and conditions are poor is historically a paramount role of the commander. Kippenberger noted the negative effect of dispirit on the Latin campaign during the long siege of

---

<sup>224</sup> Nicholas Vaux quoted in Connelly, *On War and Leadership*, p.254.

<sup>225</sup> John Keegan and Richard Holmes, *Soldiers: A History of Men in Battle*, London, 1985, pp.218-219.

<sup>226</sup> Keegan and Holmes, *Soldiers: A History of Men in Battle*, p.219.

<sup>227</sup> Dixon, *On The Psychology of Military Incompetence*, p.221.

<sup>228</sup> Foch, *The Principles of War*, KN p.301. KC, QEIIAM.

<sup>229</sup> Kippenberger, *Infantry Brigadier*, p.1.

<sup>230</sup> Ages compiled from biographies in Martin Windrow and Francis K. Mason, *The Wordsworth Dictionary of Military Biography*, Hertfordshire, 1997.

<sup>231</sup> See for e.g. Alan Clark, *The Donkeys*, London, 1961.

<sup>232</sup> Corrigan, *Mud, Blood and Poppycock: Britain and the First World War*

Tyre in 1112,<sup>233</sup> this in a region in which he was to serve. He constantly assessed the mental and physical condition of his men. "I had been round that morning and had been hurt to see their haggard faces and drawn, strained appearances".<sup>234</sup> There are many ways to boost morale. In the desert Kip thought highly of the rejuvenating power of a good wash and as documented in *Infantry Brigadier*, took every opportunity to send the men into a river or the sea to wash away the dust and grime. Brigade sports were a favoured morale booster, something Kip had noted prior to the war. "I can imagine no greater raiser of morale than a loud speaker giving out the results of football or racing at home after a long days march".<sup>235</sup> Man's ability to quickly bounce back after an ordeal like battle has been long understood by commanders. "It had been a great pleasure to see how quickly and greatly the men benefited from their leave. They came in dusty and dirty and tired and also thoroughly dehydrated. They had baths and clean clothes, as much beer as they could drink, and complete freedom, and they returned with their faces filled out, their eyes bright, and their old jaunty, confident air".<sup>236</sup>

---

<sup>233</sup> Stevenson, *The Crusaders in the East*, HL pp.61-2.

<sup>234</sup> Kippenberger, *Infantry Brigadier*, p.218.

<sup>235</sup> Aston, *The Study of War for Statesmen and Citizens*, HL p.145.

<sup>236</sup> Kippenberger, *Infantry Brigadier*, p.221.

## Chapter Eight

### “Odd Things Always Go Wrong in the Preparation for a Battle”<sup>237</sup>

“Every day I feel more and more in need of an atlas, as the knowledge of geography in its minute details is essential to a true military education”.<sup>238</sup>

Lieutenant General William Tecumseh Sherman

### The geography of battle

As a scholar of the American Civil War, Kip may well have been familiar with Sherman’s comment, and undoubtedly agreed, for the geography of battle is a key feature of his military education. For the soldier, physical terrain is everything; the theatre of battle, the ally to rely upon, the foe to be beaten, the parcher of throat, the quencher of thirst. Grasping the special qualities of terrain can decide the battle for a general and understanding that same terrain is the key for a historian’s later understanding of that same battle.<sup>239</sup>

The evolution of strategy as a topic of military study above the purely tactical is contemporary to, and arguably a bi-product of, the development of the modern triangulated map in the late 18<sup>th</sup> Century. Prior to this period, the age of master strategist Napoleon, war was conducted geographically largely through the intuition of the general.<sup>240</sup> While Alexander, Caesar et al clearly had great spatial awareness, the maps of the period were rudimentary to say the least, and probably played little part in the business of war. By the time the first theorist of strategy proper, Adam von Buelow, was writing in the 1790s the first triangulated (and therefore accurate) map of a large country, France, had been completed<sup>241</sup> and, through the efforts of Napoleon’s topographical bureau, the rest of Western Europe was to follow.<sup>242</sup> Maps made strategy. This newly defined study of the 18<sup>th</sup> Century, soon to reach an early apogee with the writings of Jomini and Clausewitz, became “the art of conducting war not by means of *coup d’oeil* from behind a horse’s ears but in an office on the surface of a map”.<sup>243</sup> By Kip’s day, the study of war through the study of maps was thoroughly ingrained in strategic practice. As attested, many of the volumes in the Kippenberger Collection are a cartographic treasure-trove of beautifully reproduced campaign maps, intricately folded into the body of the book until the eager reader needs to fix on that spur, river bend or strategic hillock, and the maps fold out, the tableau of battle there for the eye. War by map reached its apex/nadir in the Great War, when, especially on the Western Front, the warlords plotted their battles on paper, devoid of knowledge of the actual conditions on the ground. The storm of steel of total war had given man the ability for the first time to dramatically change the landscape. The ridge on the general’s map was now a man-made mud swamp, a new geography of war.<sup>244</sup>

Kippenberger’s understanding of the strategic complexity that terrain creates can be summed up by reference to a little annotation in *Caesar’s Commentaries*. In an early passage Caesar mentions sending scouts out to ascertain the nature of a mountain at the foot of which a Gallic army is

---

<sup>237</sup> Kippenberger, *Infantry Brigadier*, p.164.

<sup>238</sup> William Tecumseh Sherman quoted in Michael Stephenson (ed.), *Battlegrounds: Geography and the History of Warfare*, Washington D.C., 2003, p.11.

<sup>239</sup> Robert Crowley, “Introduction”, pp.6-9 in, Stephenson (ed.), *Battlegrounds*, p.6.

<sup>240</sup> Van Creveld, *The Art of War: War and Military Thought*, pp.98-100.

<sup>241</sup> Van Creveld, *The Art of War: War and Military Thought*, pp.99-100.

<sup>242</sup> Stephenson (ed.), *Battleground*, p.8.

<sup>243</sup> Van Creveld, *The Art of War: War and Military Thought*, p.100.

<sup>244</sup> One of the early mistakes in the Gallipoli campaign was cartographic. The British War Office supplied General Ian Hamilton with an inaccurate tourist map of the peninsula to plan his campaign. No wonder his men encountered unexpected ravines or steeper than indicated ridges to traverse. Stephenson (ed.), *Battlegrounds*, p.9.

camped under. Caesar directs the scouts to bring him back information on the nature of the mountain and the conditions of ascent “on every side”.<sup>245</sup> Kip’s sole note in this historic volume indicates an understanding of one of the key principles of geostrategic thinking; consider the lay of the land from every vantage point before committing to action. The battlefields of the past are littered with the dead cohorts of generals who thought this or that hill, forest or desert at their back to be impenetrable.

## Major Generals Kippenberger and Bird

A lot can be gauged about Kip’s strategic thinking through a study of W.D. Bird’s *The Direction of War*. Major-General Sir Wilkinson D. Bird is neglected by historians of military thought. Basil Liddell Hart ignores him<sup>246</sup> in both his memoirs and in his analysis of military thought in *Strategy*. Montgomery of Alamein, who would surely have been familiar with Bird during the inter-war years, fails to mention him in *A History of Warfare*. He remains anonymous today, failing to make the pages of Martin Van Creveld’s *The Art of War* or any other modern study of military theory consulted for this research. This is not altogether surprising for the reputation of the commanders of the professional British standing army pre-1914 have been buried in the graves of its decimated ranks and the shattered reputations of the Great War generals. Add to this the mischievous revisionism of a Liddell Hart, the iconoclastic innovations of the next conflagration and the dawning of the age of nuclear strategy and it is little wonder that a large body of British military theorising, from the end of the Franco-Prussian war to the beginning of the Second World War is today ignored and largely forgotten. However, from a bookcase frozen in time, a strategist re-emerges.

While a search shows no works by W.D. Bird currently in print,<sup>247</sup> in the early decades of the 20<sup>th</sup> century W.D. Bird, (1869-1943), was a noted author on strategic and tactical studies. Kippenberger himself referred to Bird as “a recognised authority on strategy”.<sup>248</sup> From a military family, Bird was educated at RMC Sandhurst, joining the Queen’s Royal Surrey Regiment in 1888. With the British Empire at its apex, there was no shortage of ‘small war’ conflict for Bird to learn his art through. He took part in the Niger campaign of 1897, India’s North-West Frontier operations in 1897 and 1898 and the South African War from 1899-1902. In the latter war’s battle to relieve Mafeking, Bird was seriously wounded, receiving the DSO for his actions.<sup>249</sup> It was as Chief Instructor of the School of Musketry from 1903-1905 that he began to write military theory. His *Rifle-calibre Machine Gun Tactics* was published in 1904 from a lecture given to the Aldershot Military Society. The ‘ominous’ Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5<sup>250</sup> provided Bird with the opportunity to ruminate on *Impressions of Some of the Manchurian Battlefields* and *An Account of the Battle of Liao-Yang* (both 1909). *Lectures on the Strategy of the Franco-Prussian War* (1909) was followed by *A Précis of Strategy* in 1910 and *Lectures on the Strategy of the Russo-Japanese War* in 1911. Bird’s writing culminated in his collected thoughts on military theory, and the work that

---

<sup>245</sup> Julius Caesar, *Caesar’s Commentaries*, UL p.15. KC, QEIIAM.

<sup>246</sup> Liddell Hart’s omission of Bird is interesting. Files in The Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives in King’s College London show that they corresponded between 1933 and 1934 (LH 1/74) and in 1931 had a substantial discussion on the war in France in 1914 (LH 11/1931/25). Further it strikes one as odd that within the small circle of British military theorists of the 1920s, Bird could publish a successful enough work on strategy to warrant a second edition in the same year Liddell Hart publishes his own formative theory on strategy (see Liddell Hart, Basil, *Memoirs Volume One*, London, 1965, pp.138-142) and yet not warrant a mention as a theorist in subsequent histories of British thought penned by Basil Liddell Hart.

<sup>247</sup> A search conducted Amazon.com on 19 August 2007 using all possible permutations of his name only brought up used copies of his works for sale, all editions printed prior to 1925 and only available through antiquarian sellers in lots of one or two.

<sup>248</sup> Winston Churchill, *The World Crisis 1916-1918*, London, 1927, KN frontispiece. KC, QEIIAM.

<sup>249</sup> The Queen’s Royal Surrey Regimental Association, *Major General Sir Wilkinson D Bird KBE CB CMG DSO 1929-1939*, [online] <http://www.queensroyalsurreys.org.uk/colonels/037.html>; accessed 13 May 2007.

<sup>250</sup> Montgomery of Alamein, *A History of Warfare*, pp.455-458.

concerns us here, *The Direction of War: A Study of Strategy*, published in 1925 and purchased by H.K. Kippenberger on the 19<sup>th</sup> of April 1926 for the princely sum of twenty-seven shillings and six pence <sup>251</sup> or some NZ\$708.90 in today's money.<sup>252</sup>

There are some interesting parallels in both men's careers. While the rank, knighthood and medal tally are obvious, there are others of deeper interest. Both men were similarly scarred by war; Bird lost a leg in France in 1915, Kippenberger two feet and much of a leg in Italy 1944. Both gave time post-injury to military benevolence; Bird was Lieutenant Governor of the Royal Hospital, Chelsea from 1918-1923,<sup>253</sup> Kip as head of the New Zealand P.O.W. Repatriation Unit from 1944-1946.<sup>254</sup> Moreover, both concerned themselves with military history, Bird as author and lecture circuit speaker in the 1920s and 1930s until his death in 1943 and Kip as New Zealand Official Historian from 1946 until his death in 1957.

Kippenberger learned much from Bird, amply testified in the copious notes and underlining that mark his copy of *The Direction of War*. Kip summed up his geographic principles in two pages wedged into W.D. Bird's *The Direction of War*. The sheets are entitled "Space" and "Influence of Obstacles",<sup>255</sup> and, while undated, Kip's study and purchasing regime of the period indicate that they were written between the books purchase in April 1926 and his increasing commitments to the Territorials in the early 1930s.

## Space and obstacles

In *Influence of Obstacles* Kip illustrates the effect natural barriers have on strategy. "Rivers, mountains, lakes, forests, marshes, deserts. Being as a rule crossed by but few passages they restrict and delay...the movements of one or both armies". Napoleon noted that, of the common frontier barriers, mountain ranges and deserts are the most serious obstacles with rivers only obstacles of the third order.<sup>256</sup> Kip certainly concurred with the French Emperor on mountains noting that they were "perhaps the most serious obstacle", though his list of riverine obstacles suggests that while they might be of the 'third order' in terms of insurmountability, they are in the first order in commonality. As John Keegan has pointed out, almost 70% of the planet's dry land is either "too high, too cold, or too waterless for the conduct of military activities".<sup>257</sup> That is why Belgium has been the "cockpit of Europe" and Switzerland has not.

---

<sup>251</sup> Bird, *The Direction of War: A Study and Illustration of Strategy*, KC, QEIIAM.

<sup>252</sup> Calculated using average earnings comparison tools on <http://www.measuringworth.com> and converted from Pounds Sterling to New Zealand dollars using the cash selling exchange rate found on [http://www.bnz.co.nz/Rates\\_and\\_Fees/1.1184.20-189-513.00.html](http://www.bnz.co.nz/Rates_and_Fees/1.1184.20-189-513.00.html) on 19 August 2007.

<sup>253</sup> The Queen's Royal Surrey Regimental Association, *Major General Sir Wilkinson D Bird KBE CB CMG DSO 1929-1939*, [online] <http://www.queensroyalsurreys.org.uk/colonels/037.html>; accessed 13 May 2007.


<sup>254</sup> Harper, *Kippenberger*, pp.270-1.

<sup>255</sup> It is typical of the collection's care that until April 2007 the original pages were left loosely wedged into the book potentially open to loss, damage or worse. The originals have now been preserved and replaced with copies. *Space* is found between pgs. 236-7 and *Obstacles* between pgs. 272-3 of Bird, *The Direction of War: A Study and Illustration of Strategy*, KC, QEIIAM.

<sup>256</sup> Napoleon Bonaparte, *Military Maxims of Napoleon Bonaparte*, pp.401-441, in "Roots of Strategy", T.R. Phillips (ed.), Pennsylvania, 1985, p.407.

<sup>257</sup> Keegan quoted in Stephenson (ed.), *Battlegrounds*, p.7.

Figure 8.1: Space<sup>258</sup>



<sup>258</sup> Photograph, Emmet McElhatton, 2007, of Space sheet from, KC, QEIIAM.

Figure 8.2: The Influence of Obstacles<sup>259</sup>

Influence of Obstacles

Rivers, mountains, lakes, forests, marshes, deserts,  
 Being as a rule crossed by but few passages, they  
 restrict & delay on even expedited, the movements of  
 one or both armies.

Neutral territory  
 Sea - equivalent to an unfordable river  
 Enclaved areas - hedgerows of Eastern England

Restriction of movement by obstacles.

Mountains perhaps most serious obstacles

Mountains: 1. Separation of Cuzco & Arequipa in 1809 by Sierra Guadalupe  
 while French had fairly good communications along Tagua Valley.

Rivers: 1. Rivers restricted movements of Allies in Champagne  
 in 1814 & gave Napoleon opportunity of beating them in detail

2. Marshes of Wyle prevented Granby from joining  
 Napoleon at Waterloo.

3. Wide estuary & marshy valley of Somme made British  
 lateral communications difficult after they had been  
 forced back nearly to Arras in 1918.

4. Tigris both limited Maude's operations in 1914 & assisted  
 to maintain his army

5. Allenby used Jordan as an obstacle against which to  
 drive the Turks in 1918.

Deserts: 1. Deserts between Souabim & Bebera forced Waterbury to  
 choose longer Nile route to Khartoum in 1884

2. Desert & swamp retarded movements of both sides  
 in Mesopotamia 1914-17 & Palestine 1916-17.

Forests: 1. Russians could not conquer Caucasus until in 1845  
 they cleared the forests.

<sup>259</sup> Photograph, Emmet McElhatton, 2007, of *The Influence of Obstacles* sheet from, KC, QEIIAM.

Kip thought of five examples that illustrated the strategic use of rivers.

- Rivers restricted movements of allies in Champagne in 1814 and gave Napoleon [the] opportunity of beating them in detail.
- Marshes of Dyle prevented Grouchy from joining Napoleon at Waterloo.
- Wide estuary and marshy valley of the Somme made British lateral communications difficult after they had been forced back to Amiens in 1918.
- Tigris both limited Maude's operations in 1917 and assisted to maintain his army.
- Allenby used Jordan [river] as an obstacle against which to drive the Turks in 1918.

These five simple examples selected by Kippenberger show the mixed blessings that rivers provide commanders for they can be both highways and barriers. On one hand they provide commanders with efficient arteries for logistical manoeuvre on the other they provide a defender with a formidable line of defence. The Delphic gift rivers provide has been illustrated by Martin Van Creveld; "It has been claimed that Spain failed to conquer the Northern Netherlands because there were too many rivers; on their side, the Dutch made no headway in Belgium because there were not enough of them".<sup>260</sup>

Paradoxically, history shows that it is often easier to attack across a wider river the most vulnerable point in such an attack, the launch, being further away from the defender the wider the river is.<sup>261</sup> In four out of the five cases cited by Kip, the Tigris being the exception, the rivers in question are all relatively minor in geographic terms, but all notable in strategic terms, well attested by their respective grim histories. Kip's Tigris example shows Maude tied to the river to keep his army supplied, but that very supply enabling him to remain in the field. In the case of the Jordan, as Kip would have understood from the New Zealand Mounted Rifle Brigade's participation in Allenby's campaign, the commander must understand the different characteristics a river presents depending on the season. As one participant in the campaign noted, "In normal times swimming the Jordan is quite a simple matter, for at no point is it very wide – indeed there are many places which are fordable...there is only one period in the whole year when crossing the Jordan is really difficult...during the rainy season...the river becomes flooded and swollen to twice its normal size".<sup>262</sup> It was during this period that Allenby chose his attack.

Kippenberger's command of war was forged in the desert, terrain that has bedevilled commanders since the beginning of time. For a start, desert does not have "a single face", as likely to be a rocky, arid feature filled landscape as the soft-sand drift dunes of the popular imagination.<sup>263</sup> Apart from the terrain, the heat and the flies and scorpions which torment the soldier, there is the problem of supply. In normally habitable areas the commander can count on being able at least to secure, through trade or force, some supplies of local foodstuff for his men. In the desert the commander has not "the slightest hope of finding anything useful but camel dung".<sup>264</sup> For his strategic lessons in desert affected warfare Kip selected two examples from memory.

- Deserts between Suakin and Berber forced Wolseley to chose longer Nile route to Khartoum in 1884.
- Desert and swamp restricted movements of both sides in Mesopotamia 1914-17 and Palestine 1916-17.

---

<sup>260</sup> Martin Van Creveld, *Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton*, Cambridge, 1977, p.12.

<sup>261</sup> Stephenson (ed.), *Battlegrounds*, p.51.

<sup>262</sup> Vivian Gilbert, *The Romance of the Last Crusade: With Allenby to Jerusalem*, London, 1924, p.190.

<sup>263</sup> Stephenson (ed.), *Battlegrounds*, p.181.

<sup>264</sup> Van Creveld, *Supplying War*, p.182.

In *Infantry Brigadier* he gives a typical account of the perils of taking the desert for granted, of not taking the cautious approach as above.

“We could return to Aleppo, sixty miles by good road and thence by the main road, 180 miles to Baalbek, or we could travel across the desert direct, about 130 miles...I looked at the map: there was nothing to show that the going would be difficult...It was...intolerably hot, and, about half-way we ran into a knot of little villages and could find no way round. There were innumerable watercourses with narrow crossings and we got entangled among these on narrow tracks and causeways, at many places too narrow for our vehicles. We laboured for hours in the stifling heat”.<sup>265</sup>

They emerged safely after some tense moments for their commander. The desert, as Kippenberger shows in *Infantry Brigadier*, requires a special kind of strategic vision. Kip understood this well.

In *Space*, Kip first lists four campaigns where the use of space was vital to the successful attainment of objectives by one of the combatants. In Kip’s words they were;

- Spanish 1808-14
- Boers 1899-1902
- Japanese 1904-5 (deciding cause)
- Germans 1914-18

Kip elaborates; “Number, direction and quality of roads, railways and other means of communication exercise very important effect and every strategical plan must be based on the use that can be made of them”. This consideration of the factors which either facilitate or obstruct manoeuvre is an inherently Jominian consideration.<sup>266</sup> Kip gives seven examples that illustrate his point;

- Napoleon’s skilful use in 1814 of direction of roads in Champagne.
- Disadvantage to Russian 1914-17 of undeveloped state of their communications.
- Protection to Egypt of Sinai Desert 1915-16.
- British successful ultimately in Mesopotamia 1916-18 owing to their success in developing communications.
- Large railway [...] accommodation along Belgian frontier indicated probability of German invasion of Belgium in 1914.
- Want of good communications in Peninsula 1808-14 greatly assisted both sides in forecasting enemy’s intentions from preliminary movements.
- Direction and quality of railways was advantage to Boers 1899 to 1900 although successfully dealt with by Roberts.

Each of these examples is an illustration of commanders thinking in strategic, as opposed to tactical, space. In the strategic era the intelligent use of space and lines of communication commensurate to the quantity of force available to the commander is decisive to the aim of bending the enemy to one’s own will.

---

<sup>265</sup> Kippenberger, *Infantry Brigadier*, p.123.

<sup>266</sup> Van Creveld, *The Art of War: War and Military Thought*, pp.106-7.

## Strategy and future war

As mentioned in Chapter Three, Kip, through his study had an eye for geostrategy. An example of his thinking can be seen when Mahan refers to a minor spat between Britain and Spain over ownership of the Falkland Islands. Mahan states that, "It is not material to state the nature of either claim to what was then but a collection of barren islands, destitute of military as well as natural advantages".<sup>267</sup> Maybe so in the age of sail, but in the steam age a global fleet needed friendly ports to call at to refuel. As Kip noted simply, "coaling station now...Battle off it...1914. Sinking of Spee's squadron by Sturdee".<sup>268</sup> The Falkland Islands were a part of the Imperial defence network in 1914. In the early months of the war the Pacific was enlivened by the exploits of Count von Spee's East Asiatic Squadron which was free to harass Commonwealth shipping and the many small British outposts scattered throughout the Southern Ocean. Admiral Spee eventually steamed around the Cape, being fatally intercepted by Admiral Sturdee off the "destitute" Falklands.<sup>269</sup> But for different decisions by Spee, New Zealand may well have learned the lessons of sea power the hard way in 1914, something Kip recognised. In closer times those same islands have provided new military lessons for a future generation.

While sea power was his first interest and land power his profession, like all good military students of the time he kept a keen interest in developments with air power. Another apparent gap in the Kippenberger Collection is the 1921 work by Italian General Douhet, *The Command of the Air*, that "captured the imagination of strategic thinkers"<sup>270</sup> on its release. For once this omission is not surprising for Douhet seems a theorist much lauded after the event than during his time when there were many other air theorists to compete with.<sup>271</sup> For one it is not clear when his famous work was actually translated into English. Sir Timothy Garden, himself an aeronaut of note, says it was in 1923, two years after its Italian debut<sup>272</sup> while Professor Richard Overy says it was not translated until 1941.<sup>273</sup> Martin Van Creveld probably has the grip of it stating, "though it took time to be translated, a survey of the interwar military literature shows that its leading ideas were widely studied and debated".<sup>274</sup> As has been seen with Clausewitz, Kip was most probably familiar with Douhet second-hand, and, when an English translation finally became widely available, many of Douhet's ideas had been proven overcooked at best.

Despite the best efforts of Liddell Hart to convince us otherwise, the British military establishment in the 1920s was mindful of the new potentialities of combining land and air power that tanks and aeroplanes provided. As Kip recorded, Major General Ironside, who Norman Dixon at least credits for being an early supporter of J.F.C. Fuller,<sup>275</sup> was adamant that, "unless we are ready to solve this problem satisfactorily, unless we are ready to make use of all the scientific and mechanical developments, we are merely encouraging attack from some ambitious and more efficient nation".<sup>276</sup> With regard to air power, first there was the question of its capability. "Enemy aircraft may in another war prove as great a danger to our shipping as did submarines in the last".<sup>277</sup> In some ways this came true, witness Pearl Harbour or the fall of Singapore, but

---

<sup>267</sup> Mahan, *The Influence of Seapower Upon History 1660-1783*, HL p.335. KC, QEIIAM

<sup>268</sup> Mahan, *The Influence of Seapower Upon History 1660-1783*, KN p.335. KC, QEIIAM

<sup>269</sup> Strachan, *The First World War*, pp.71-80.

<sup>270</sup> Timothy Garden, "Air Power: Theory and Practice", pp.137-157 in Baylis, Wirtz, Cohen and Gray (eds.), *Strategy in the Contemporary World: An Introduction to Strategic Studies*, p.143.

<sup>271</sup> Richard Overy, "Air Warfare", pp.262-279 in, Charles Townshend, (ed.), *The Oxford History of Modern War*, Oxford, 2000, p.266.

<sup>272</sup> Garden, "Air Power: Theory and Practice", pp.137-157 in Baylis, Wirtz, Cohen and Gray (eds.), *Strategy in the Contemporary World: An Introduction to Strategic Studies*, p.143.

<sup>273</sup> Overy, "Air Warfare", pp.262-279 in Townshend (ed.), *The Oxford History of Modern War*, p.270.

<sup>274</sup> Van Creveld, *The Art of War: War and Military Thought*, p.163.

<sup>275</sup> Dixon, *On The Psychology of Military Incompetence*, pp.162-3.

<sup>276</sup> Aston, *The Study of War for Statesmen and Citizens*, HL p.155. KC, QEIIAM.

<sup>277</sup> Aston, *The Study of War for Statesmen and Citizens*, HL p.155. KC, QEIIAM.

mainly through the power of the aircraft carrier and the creation of maritime air power. While Kip thought that future air bombardment of the Empire was likely with much greater payloads dropped than in WWI<sup>278</sup> he was probably as surprised as every other thinker to see that one of Douhet's central ideas – that civilian morale would quickly collapse under intense aerial bombardment – was not only untrue, but that it would take the truly cataclysmic payload of an atomic bomb to bring a rallied nation to its knees.

Then to the question of combined arms. "The biggest problem of all, how best to combine the potentialities of all three [services] in another great war, how to draw the most value from, say, the resisting power of an army, the mobility of a navy and the striking power of an air force".<sup>279</sup> The British Army had duly noted the potential evolution from the South African War which saw combined cavalry, artillery and infantry operating effectively (in the end) to the type of joint service operations poorly tried in WWI (Gallipoli for example) but with inherent potential through the new airborne cavalry/artillery of the RAF. The great problem was not whether to use the new air power, that was a given, it was *how* to use planes and in what form, strategic bombers say or ground support fighters, that was the big question of the day. A strategic question Kippenberger noted was typical of the time; "An army cannot proceed to occupy enemy territory until it has disposed of the hostile army. A navy cannot effectively control sea communications until it has disposed of the enemy Navy. Will an air force have to follow the same principle and dispose of the enemy air force before it can proceed to attack the enemy vital centres? The answer is that it will not".<sup>280</sup> These sorts of questions dogged all sides and while some early air theorists might have seen their ideas, or parts of their ideas, proven correct in retrospect, it took the whole Second World War, across many theatres, to give us any sort of idea of what air power was capable of. Modern strategic literature is full of analysis of Vietnam, Afghanistan, Kosovo, Six-Day War, Gulf I & II et al and the ongoing debate about how to use air power effectively. "Air fighting is in its nature indecisive. We can hardly ever hope to destroy an enemy's air force, we can never ensure a permanent command of the air, all that we can do is to obtain a local and temporary superiority".<sup>281</sup> The Israeli action in 1967 proves this wrong. Bosnia and Iraq indicate that in eras of asymmetric warfare it may not matter.

---

<sup>278</sup> Aston, *The Study of War for Statesmen and Citizens*, HL p.162. KC, QEIIAM

<sup>279</sup> Aston, *The Study of War for Statesmen and Citizens*, HL p.171. KC, QEIIAM

<sup>280</sup> Aston, *The Study of War for Statesmen and Citizens*, p.158. KC, QEIIAM

<sup>281</sup> Aston, *The Study of War for Statesmen and Citizens*, HL p.159. KC, QEIIAM

## Chapter Nine

### Liddell Hart's Fantasy<sup>282</sup>

"Battle is the final objective of armies and man is the fundamental instrument in battle. Nothing can be wisely prescribed in an army...without exact knowledge of the fundamental instrument, man, and his state of mind, his morale, at the instant of combat".

Colonel Ardant du Picq, 1868

In the nearly eighty years since he mulled over other *Reputations*, military theorist and historian Basil Liddell Hart's own scholarly cachet is entrenched in an academic no man's land, stranded between forgiving admirers who shrug off his many flaws and implacable foes who see in their sights only a highly fallible, egotistical fraud.<sup>283</sup> And his foes *do* have much to aim at. Morally his vocal espousal of German appeasement during the inter-war period and his self-serving and dishonest elevation of his own legacy in the memoirs of Nazi generals like Guderian and Rommel leave a sense of, at best, imprudence.<sup>284</sup> Theoretically he is notable for his "uncompromising antipathy" towards and, possibly, wilful misrepresentation of Clausewitz and, more invidiously, he also stands accused of perfidiously manipulating history to support his theories, particularly that of "the indirect approach".<sup>285</sup> It is his dogged promulgation of this theory and the 'great captains' he championed as practitioners of it, that interests us here, lying at the heart of a spat between Liddell Hart and both Kippenberger and his Official Histories colleague W.E. Murphy, highlighting the mental gulf between the two military history camps we can dub 'official historians' and 'historical strategists'.<sup>286</sup>

For all his faults, and they can be hard to reconcile, Basil Liddell Hart has still much of importance to give us. His military histories are erudite yet accessible works, written in sparkling prose and rich in insight. His key theories provide a valuable perspective from which we can examine the abstract nature of war.<sup>287</sup> His theory of "the indirect approach" is his most famous, its resilience lending itself to analysis of contemporary conflict, notably shown in the aftermath of the First Gulf War.<sup>288</sup> His thesis is this;

"Throughout the ages, effective results in war have been rarely attained unless the approach has had such indirectness as to ensure the opponents unreadiness to meet it. The indirectness has usually been physical, and always psychological. In strategy, the longest way around is often the shortest way home".<sup>289</sup>

This notion of the primacy of the psychological dimension of strategy is as old as war, finding one of its oldest and still most succinct proponents in Sun Tzu. Liddell Hart sought proof of this

---

<sup>282</sup> A version of this chapter appeared as 'Liddell Hart's Fantasy: A Clash of Official Historians and a Historical Strategist', in *New Zealand Journal of Defence Studies*, November 2007, pp.23-29.

<sup>283</sup> For a notably damaging critique see John Mearsheimer, *Liddell Hart and the Weight of History*, New York, 1988.

<sup>284</sup> See Alaric Searle, "A Very Special Relationship: Basil Liddell Hart, Wehrmacht Generals and the Debate on West German Rearmament 1945-1953", pp.327-357 in *War in History*, Vol. 3, 1998.

<sup>285</sup> Albert Castel, "Liddell Hart's "Sherman": Propaganda as History", pp.405-426 in *Journal of Military History*, Vol. 67, no. 2, April 2003.

<sup>286</sup> Dennis E. Showalter, "Military History", pp.204-7 in *The Osprey Companion to Military History*, Robert Cowley and Geoffrey Parker (eds.), London, 1996, p.206.

<sup>287</sup> Lord, "Liddell Hart and the Napoleonic Fallacy", pp.57-63

<sup>288</sup> See e.g. James Shumaker, *Operation Desert Storm and the Theories of B.H. Liddell Hart*, National War College, Washington D.C., 1991. <http://stinet.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA437398&Location=U2&doc=GefTRDoc.pdf>; accessed 10 June 2007.

<sup>289</sup> Basil Liddell Hart, *Strategy*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, New York, 1991, p.5.

primacy in every conflict, and argued that the key to a decisive battle was a great captain pursuing the indirect approach. For contemporary examples he lavished attention on the generalship of Heinz Guderian and, particularly, Erwin Rommel.

The war in the Western Desert from 1940-43 still exerts a great pull on the popular imagination. It was one where British Imperial forces largely fought alone and so has a consciousness free of the overbearing American presence of later campaigns. Tactically it has a purity not seen elsewhere. "It was fought like a polo game on an empty arena...movement was almost as free as that of a fleet...there were neither towns nor villages to provide shelter or obstacles...no civilian population to get in the way of the battle".<sup>290</sup> Given her crucial role in the campaign, it is no surprise that much of New Zealand's official history focus would be on the men and battles in Egypt and Libya. Given the complex and fluid course of the war, it is no surprise that it elicited the attention of historical strategists like Liddell Hart.

In January 1954 Liddell Hart wrote and circulated for discussion a paper on Rommel's 24 November 1941 counterstroke during Operation Crusader. While the paper itself has gone to ground we can clearly gauge its premise through Liddell Hart's subsequent writing and primarily from the substantive response and counter-response it provoked.<sup>291</sup>

Liddell Hart believed that Rommel's counterstroke during 'Crusader' was a "deep exploiting thrust" at speed to the Egyptian frontier designed to create "shocks of surprise...in such rapid succession as to demoralise opposition...forestall or paralyse countermoves...creating a continuously spreading collapse" i.e. a move with primarily psychological aims and to establish a "strategic barrage...astride his opponents rear". The paper's aim was, in light of the successful German use of such an approach during the war, to examine a case where the approach had not worked, understanding why it had not and learning from insights gained for the benefit of conducting future conflicts. Interestingly, he believed a key factor in the failure of Rommel's move was the New Zealand Division's forward push to Tobruk having a counterbalancing psychological effect and "nullifying Rommel's aim".<sup>292</sup>

The paper reached New Zealand and was read by Kip and W. E. Murphy in the War History Branch of the Department of Internal Affairs. Their response was a detailed six-page joint critique sent to British official historian Brigadier Harry Latham on 3 March 1954 along with an eye-catching covering letter from Kippenberger. Both pieces were forwarded by Latham to the English historian. While the joint paper generally sticks to perceptions and interpretations of fact surrounding the battle and would probably have done little more than raise some spirited discussion, Kip's covering letter would seem almost calculated to offend and antagonise the paper's author. It may be that Kip never imagined the covering letter would be read by Liddell Hart. If that is the case, a somewhat naive side to Kippenberger's character emerges. Regardless, his missive disparages Liddell Hart's ideas so tactlessly and carelessly as to lay its author wide open to counterattack.

"Harry [Latham]...your correspondence with Liddell Hart was most interesting. I enclose...some notes on his **fantasy** prepared by Murphy and myself...I think he quite misunderstands the battle". Kip's letter is further peppered with condescending remarks. "Not a tittle of evidence"... "there is not anything very deep in this"... "nonsense"... "just another blow in the air". No, in Kip's opinion there was nothing unusual or particularly interesting in Rommel's actions that day

---

<sup>290</sup> Correlli Barnett, *The Desert Generals*, London, 1960, p.21.

<sup>291</sup> All documents relating to this chapter are from file LH 4/38, LHCMA and quoted with Trustee permission.

<sup>292</sup> Basil Liddell Hart, *Notes on Kippenberger's Comments 3.3.54 on my paper "A Strategic Puzzle"*, 25 July 1954, pp.5-6. LH 4/38, LHCMA.

or, “to my mind anything to show that he acted other than according to his usual practice, that is from day to day and hour to hour, according to the situation as it appeared to him and always with a view to destroying his enemy on the field”.<sup>293</sup>

Fantasy! The tribulations creative military thinkers faced during the inter-war period are well-known and we have little time to elaborate on them here. Needless to say British defence innovators like Fuller, Hobart or Liddell Hart found their ideas widely disparaged in military circles and subjected to similar language and worse, though, as we have already seen, Liddell Hart was not averse to running down the efforts of others.<sup>294</sup> The approach to Liddell Hart’s musings are all the stranger from a student of history like Kip, one who had only recently commented, “it has been said that at the Somme in 1916 British tactical doctrines reached their lowest depths, and it seemed to me that...Crusader...was fought with an equally total disregard of what one had understood to be the principles of war”.<sup>295</sup> Yet to dismiss attempts to understand as fantasy? Kip’s dismissive approach is all the odder considering his later assertion, “I...have read, usually with respectful agreement, everything that you have published that I know of and possess most of your works”.<sup>296</sup>

Liddell Hart was furious. At the end of July 1954 after “checking their numerous and often-confused points”,<sup>297</sup> Liddell Hart sent his counter-response<sup>298</sup> to Latham. “Kippenberger starts by describing the paper as my ‘fantasy’ and says that it quite ‘misunderstands the battle’. But my paper does not deal with the battle, but with the strategical-psychological background. It is very evident that he misunderstands this, and thus the real questions I was mooted and discussing...it was drafted after long and detailed discussion over a period of years with the principal witnesses available about Rommel’s intentions and actions – checking the sparse documentary records with their evidence and vice versa” [underlined in the original]. For six pages he picked point-by-point through the Kiwi argument which, he thought, showed nothing more than “an astonishingly careless disregard for the facts – or an ominous tendency to varnish them”. Working to his *coup de grace* he reiterated the core argument of his original paper and its lesson that Rommel’s psychological blow was in part counterbalanced by the unexpected forward thrust of the New Zealand Division. “The New Zealand historians have evidently misunderstood its trend, and missed the keypoint. It is a pity that they should exert themselves to obscure such a significant lesson – and most ironical that they should discredit such a testimony to the vital effect achieved by the action of the New Zealand Division”.<sup>299</sup> An action as Liddell Hart knew Kip played some part in.

The English historian was not content to avenge the perceived slight by demolishing the argument; he needed to land a blow to the reputation of its author. “If Kippenberger had spent ‘forty years in the wilderness’ of history, he would be less inclined to place so much reliance on documentary evidence – especially on the wording of brief battle reports and diaries written by busy and overtired staff officers and their recollection of hasty ‘saddle-orders’. It is astonishing

---

<sup>293</sup> Howard Kippenberger *Crusader* letter to H.B. Latham, 3 Mar 1954, LH 4/38 LHCMA. Emphasis by author.

<sup>294</sup> See Dixon, *On the Psychology of Military Incompetence*, pp.110-22.

<sup>295</sup> Kippenberger, *Infantry Brigadier*, pp.81-2.

<sup>296</sup> Howard Kippenberger letter to Basil Liddell Hart, 19<sup>th</sup> December 1956. LH 4/38, LHCMA. If this is the case it lends weight to my earlier comments that many of the military history volumes from Kip’s collection have been lost between his death and the Kippenberger Collection moving to its current home in the Army Museum, Waiouru. Liddell Hart’s *Memoirs* list some twenty-nine books written prior to 1956. There are only five Liddell Hart works in the Kippenberger Collection in Waiouru.

<sup>297</sup> Basil Liddell Hart letter to H.B. Latham, 30 July 1954. LH 4/38, LHCMA.

<sup>298</sup> Basil Liddell Hart, *Notes on Kippenberger’s Comments 3.3.54 on my paper “A Strategic Puzzle”*, 25 July 1954, LH 4/38, LHCMA.

<sup>299</sup> Basil Liddell Hart, *Notes on Kippenberger’s Comments 3.3.54 on my paper “A Strategic Puzzle”*, 25 July 1954. pp.1-6. LH 4/38, LHCMA.

that anyone who has had personal experience of battle conditions should, when he turns his hand to history, be inclined to build so much on such fragmentary evidence – like some fanciful archaeologists of a past generation. K's comments show all the characteristics of a fine fighting soldier who is out of his depth – they are repeatedly put in a way that one has long learned to recognise as the mark of inexperience".<sup>300</sup>

It seems that Latham, probably with an eye to diplomacy, buried Liddell Hart's riposte for it was not to reach New Zealand for another few years. In late 1956, Liddell Hart and Kippenberger, finally made direct contact and corresponded cordially, mainly on official history proofing matters, until Kip's death in May 1957. Realising that Kippenberger had not read his 1954 riposte and, the letters hint, keen to see his scholarly blow belatedly hit its mark, Liddell Hart forwarded a copy to New Zealand on 14 April 1957. Between Kippenberger's last brief letter to Liddell Hart on 23 April and Kip's death on 5 May the paper arrived. Kippenberger did not reply and we may never know how he felt about its contents, but from what we have said of the man so far we can safely assume his honour would have been deeply hurt. Is it possible that the stress this attack on Kip's professional integrity might have provoked, combined with all the other strains in his life, may have contributed to the onset of the attack that killed him?

Making contact with W.E. Murphy in late 1957, Liddell Hart fished for a response. "I was very sad at hearing of Kippenberger's death ... Having only got into direct contact with him so recently as last year...I felt all the more regret. Did he pass on to you the notes which I sent him...14 April?"<sup>301</sup> Murphy's reply conveys the atmosphere Liddell Hart's material was received in. "I...was preparing a rejoinder when Sir Howard...was suddenly stricken. After he died I made out another...reply, covering the personal remarks which he would not have allowed me to answer...it was a bit hot and on second thoughts I did not send it".<sup>302</sup> The following day Murphy sent his notes with a long letter bringing closure to the Rommel debate between the men. "Here are my notes on yours of 25 July 1954, resurrected as I promised yesterday. They helped to fill in the blank and miserable days after Kip died when I was not in good form".<sup>303</sup> Beside this elegiac opening Liddell Hart closes the matter with a simple scribble; "End".

Liddell Hart's criticism of Kippenberger had the intended effect in New Zealand but, with Kip's recent passing, on the wrong man. "Anyone who knew Sir Howard well would recognise this for what it is – a gross, if unintentional, libel. The intention was of course just to be rude."<sup>304</sup> but the weapon turns out to be a boomerang. [Kip] had studied military history for nearly fifty years; it was a passion with him. In this time he built up an almost incomparable library and became...an authority on the campaigns of Napoleon and the...Civil War...and, in fact acquired more than a passing knowledge of every war recorded in English or French...there can be few men of any country or era who were so readily able to find historical parallels to actual battle situations, even in the heat of battle. Very few could have put their reading to better use on the battlefield in solving problems, gaining objectives and minimising cost without losing time".<sup>305</sup> Murphy evidently believed that Kip could *think dynamically in time and space*.

---

<sup>300</sup> Basil Liddell Hart, *Notes on Kippenberger's Comments 3.3.54 on my paper "A Strategic Puzzle"*, 25 July 1954. pp.1-6. LH 4/38, LHCMA.

<sup>301</sup> Basil Liddell Hart letter to W.E. Murphy, 11 November 1957, LH 4/38, LHCMA.

<sup>302</sup> W.E. Murphy aerogramme to Liddell Hart, 19 November 1957, LH 4/38, LHCMA.

<sup>303</sup> W.E. Murphy letter to Basil Liddell Hart, 20 November 1957, LH 4/38, LHCMA.

<sup>304</sup> Liddell Hart annotates his copy of the letter '!'. A simple explanation of Murphy's outrage is that he may not have read Kippenberger's original letter in full and thus had no empathy for Liddell Hart's somewhat understandable response.

<sup>305</sup> W.E. Murphy, *Notes on the Liddell Hart Notes of 25/7/54 regarding "A Strategic Puzzle"*, 10 May 1957. LH 4/38, LHCMA.

## Kip the Scholar

Throughout this paper is information on Kippenberger's scholarship. It must be said though that the difficulty with regarding Kip is that, as Murphy acknowledges, his published work was "fragmentary".<sup>306</sup> There are many jewels in the hands of private researchers or hidden in archives that have yet to emerge and round out this great New Zealand soldier. In coming years we may have further biographies to complement Glyn Harper's fine, but lonely, volume of biography. Until then we can only judge Kip the historian through the library as annotated, a selection of political pamphlets and brief historical articles, his work on the official histories and his sole book, *Infantry Brigadier*.

The work marshalling the official history project should be testament enough. It was an impressive undertaking in scope and in the eventual sheer volume of material it created and saved for posterity. Whether it is good history is another question. Ronald Walker, himself author of the volume *Alam Halfa and Alamein*, commented in 1969, "the results in quantity are commendable...in quality...the results are somewhat uneven".<sup>307</sup> Liddell Hart himself was somewhat disdainful of official histories. His own experience working on the WWI British histories led him to conclude, "official history is a contradiction in terms – the word official tends to qualify and often cancels out the word history".<sup>308</sup> He believed it difficult for anyone to write objectively under both government control and about the actions of professional colleagues, many of whom were likely to be still alive. Harper's biography alone lists numerous examples where Kip has later pulled punches or altered 'the facts' for reasons of loyalty, comradeship or political expediency. Kip was aware of the conflict between accuracy and loyalty and certainly gave it much consideration, in private at least. In his copy of A.J.P. Taylor's *Rumours of Wars* he underlined a particularly apt passage on "the official historian" and the difficulty of writing official modern histories while working in a government department where friendship, loyalties, political favours all interfere with good history.<sup>309</sup> The need to balance fairness – be considerate of the imperfection of a man's action under extreme duress - with accuracy – the responsibility to give as 'true' an account of what occurred without favour – was not lost to Kip, or most probably, many other official historians then or since. The real issue, he noted, was that, "the official histories, whether or not they possess demerits, put on record a series of great events once and for all, never to be replaced, as the sole and inevitable source to which every student of the future must go for his information on that subject".<sup>310</sup> An awareness of the human predilection for writing history to create or maintain reputations was quite evident to him from his private reading. Marshal Foch's memoirs contain a note explaining the slimness of the chapter covering the years 1915-16 saying that the Marshal was too busy at the time to write up his diary hence the memoir gap. Kip writes; "18 pages for 1915 + 1916! When Foch made his most serious mistakes and most important miscalculations. II Ypres Artois II Artois III. Not surprising that he didn't like the task of writing these 2 years".<sup>311</sup>

Much of the debate between Liddell Hart., Kip and Murphy can be seen in many ways as debates between different schools of history. Dennis Showalter has described official historians as ones who "tended to become enmeshed in war's nuts and bolts; battles, commanders, weapons and logistics", while the school of the historical strategists put "data at the service of theory. Should

---

<sup>306</sup> W.E. Murphy aerogramme to Liddell Hart, 19<sup>th</sup> Nov 1957, LH 4/38, LHCMA.

<sup>307</sup> Ronald Walker, "The New Zealand Second World War History Project," pp.173-181 in, *Military Affairs*, Vol. 32, no. 4, Feb 1969, p.173.

<sup>308</sup> Basil Liddell Hart, "Responsibility- and Judgment in Historical Writing" in, *Military Affairs*, Vol. 25, no. 1, Spring 1959, p.35.

<sup>309</sup> Taylor, *Rumours of Wars*, UL p.7.

<sup>310</sup> Taylor, *Rumours of Wars*, UL pp.14-15.

<sup>311</sup> Ferdinand Foch, *The Memoirs of Marshal Foch*, Col. T. Bentley Molt (trans.), Surrey, 1931, KN p.231.

the fit be imperfect, fact usually went to the wall”.<sup>312</sup> Murphy particularly is adamant that debate should stick to “the facts of the campaign”.<sup>313</sup> E. H. Carr in his famous lecture *What is History?* spent profitable time musing on the “fetishism of facts” common to 19<sup>th</sup> Century British historians. “It used to be said that facts speak for themselves. This is...untrue. The facts speak only when the historian calls on them: it is he who decides to which facts to give the floor, and in what order or context...a fact is like a sack – it won’t stand up until you’ve put something in it”.<sup>314</sup> Much of the Kip/Liddell Hart debate is a sack race then – one team has an army of sacks at the starting line, the other has only one sack, and it is up and running towards the finish line. The historical minutiae of the debate is for someone else some other time. What interests this student is what the correspondence shows us of the men themselves and their differing approaches to history and strategy.

That said, at its heart, the argument is not a disagreement about facts, but something much more emotive. Both parties have opposing opinions about Rommel’s quality as a military commander, a debate that still evokes passionate comment today. Liddell Hart’s position was simple. He believed Rommel was a military genius, one of the great captains of history.<sup>315</sup> Both Kippenberger and Murphy vehemently disagreed. They believed the general who emerges from *The Rommel Papers* to be “a fictitious character”, a self-serving construct of Liddell Hart. The real Rommel was “no superman” and his actions during Crusader further proof of the “shallowness of his strategic thinking and his wilful disregard of planning based on any more secure foundation than intuition”.<sup>316</sup>

Like Liddell Hart, Rommel’s posthumous cachet has declined in recent years, and many historians tend now to concur with Murphy and Kippenberger. Len Deighton sums him up as “not one of the war’s great generals”, but a “daring, and in every way exceptional, divisional commander”, promoted above his abilities leaving no check on his deeply flawed approach to maintaining an army in the field.<sup>317</sup> While there certainly is ample grist to prime the Rommel doubters’ mill, the indisputable truth, supported by all manner of contemporary evidence, is that Rommel effected a powerful psychological presence on his enemy, proof enough surely of his credentials as a great commander. Kippenberger himself was possibly unable to objectively view Rommel after the war having spent so much energy demystifying him during it. “An unduly high opinion of Rommel was prevalent and I more than once checked officers sharply for speaking of him as one of the masters of war. People opposed to these masters usually get beaten and it is unwise to believe your enemy is a god of battles”.<sup>318</sup>

This chapter’s brief account of a long exchange can only touch the surface of the exchange between a famous strategist, a diligent historian and a revered New Zealand General. It is a debate that shows the differing approaches to the writing of history by Showalter’s official historians and historical strategists. More importantly it highlights the primacy of the psychological dimension of war and how the enemy’s spirit can be regarded as dangerous, long after his physical presence has passed.

“What set out to be a brief covering note has stretched into a long rigmarole, aimed, I suppose, at shaking your astonishing conviction that Rommel was one of the Great Captains of history. I

---

<sup>312</sup> Dennis E. Showalter, “Military History”, pp.204-7 in, *The Osprey Companion to Military History*, Cowley and Parker (eds.), p.206.

<sup>313</sup> W.E. Murphy, *Notes on the Liddell Hart Notes of 25/7/54 regarding “A Strategic Puzzle”*, 10 May 1957. LH 4/38.

<sup>314</sup> E.H. Carr, *What is History?* London, 1964, p.11.

<sup>315</sup> See Basil Liddell Hart, *Introduction*, pp.xiii-xxi, in *The Rommel Papers*, London, 1953.

<sup>316</sup> W.E. Murphy letter to Basil Liddell Hart, 20 November 1957, p.3. LH 4/38, LHCMA.

<sup>317</sup> Len Deighton, *Blood, Tears and Folly: An Objective Look at World War II*, London, 1995, pp.301-17.

<sup>318</sup> Kippenberger, *Infantry Brigadier*, p.115.

don't imagine that I have succeeded. If you must glorify him facts are not likely to daunt you...But enough of this. I am looking forward to seeing your galleys, though I hope they are not as stimulating as your two studies which prompted this dissertation – if they are I shall never finish commenting on them. With best wishes for Christmas...W.E. Murphy".<sup>319</sup>

---

<sup>319</sup> W.E. Murphy letter to Liddell Hart, 20 November 1957, p.3. LH 4/38, LHCMA.

## Conclusion

### “Three Fierce Thunderous Cheers”<sup>320</sup>

There is a passage in a favoured book of Kip’s that struck him enough to copy out by hand onto the jacket of another work. To modern eyes it is a piece of nearly purple prose, very much the product of its time and so immediately recognisable as the work of its author. Its sentiment seems gauche and naïve to the cynical and iconoclastic mores of our time. However, it is a beautiful passage and one that rings of fundamental truths and timeless certainties. Men and women of an age, those of ‘the greatest generation’ may recognise its truth. Valiant hearts like Howard Karl Kippenberger could see both the genius and the tragedy of man in it, and see the mirror of themselves there too.

“But nothing daunted the valiant heart of man. Son of the Stone Age, vanquisher of nature with all her trials and monsters, he met the awful and self-inflicted agony with new reserves of fortitude. Freed in the main by his intelligence from mediaeval fears, he marched to death with sombre dignity. His nervous system was found in the Twentieth Century capable of enduring physical and moral stresses before which the simpler natures of primeval times would have collapsed. Again and again to the hideous bombardment, again and again from the hospital to the front, again and again to the hungry submarines, he strode unflinching. And withal, as an individual, preserved through these torments the glories of a reasonable and compassionate mind”.

Winston Churchill, *The World Crisis 1911-1914*.<sup>321</sup>

In Kippenberger’s rehabilitation file there is a slim folder with a letter from the Wellington District Rehabilitation Officer addressed to the Managing Director of the Carpet Import Company in Christchurch. It is worth quoting in full.

Dear Sir  
Returned Serviceman: HK Kippenberger, 15 Woodmancote Rd,  
Khandallah. Service Number 7128.

The above named who served overseas for six years three months and was seriously injured in action, being now a double amputee, has made application to this department for the urgent release of 30 sq. yds. of No 704 Fawn Mottled Feltex.

At present he is occupying a flat which has concrete floors and it is essential, with his disability, that he obtain the Feltex in the immediate future. The proposed retailer is Hurdley’s Ltd, 256 Lambton Quay, Wellington.

Yours...<sup>322</sup>

---

<sup>320</sup> Kippenberger, *Infantry Brigadier*, p. 225.

<sup>321</sup> Cited from KC, QEIIAM and see p 9 for picture of inscription in the original.

<sup>322</sup> *H.K. Kippenberger Rehabilitation File*, file AADK, W3729 Box 911/7128, Archives New Zealand.

More than anything else I have read in my research, this letter invokes both a disquieting sense of subtle horror – the amputee hobbling on cold grey concrete – and that sombre dignity Churchill spoke of – the stoic old warrior waiting calmly in line for the little scrap of comfort to make his foxhole that little more bearable. Here is Kippenberger, beginning the last ten years of his life, indomitable in the face of the coming battles, the struggles mainly with pain, but with other lesser enemies too.

Carl von Clausewitz ruminated much on the idea of military genius devoting a chapter to the notion in Book One of *On War*.<sup>323</sup> Clausewitz came from a highly militarized society, the Prussia of the 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> Centuries perhaps having the martial spirit woven into the fabric of its society more completely than any Western nation since the age of Rome or Sparta. He recognized this and commented on the effect the relative militarization of a society had on the propagation of military genius.

“If every soldier needed some degree of military genius our armies would be very weak, for the term refers to a special cast of mental or moral powers which can rarely occur in an army when a society has to employ its abilities in many different areas. The smaller the range of activities of a nation and the more the military factor dominates, the greater will be the incidence of military genius. This however is true only of its distribution, not of its quality. The latter depends on the general intellectual development of a given society. In any primitive, warlike race, the warrior spirit is far more common than among civilized peoples. It is possessed by almost every warrior: but in civilized societies only necessity will stimulate it in the people as a whole, since they lack the natural disposition for it”.<sup>324</sup>

New Zealand’s Army is today a blend of two great martial spirits, the British and the Māori. That said, while Kiwis are a hardy race, the circumstances of geography have left it, happily, without a natural disposition to war. That is not to say we’re not good at it, the pound for pound performance of an adequately trained and resourced New Zealander compared with any friend or foe in the wars of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century speaks for itself. We will rise to the occasion, but it is not really in our nature, it’s only because of necessity that we draw steel.

Howard Kippenberger was a civilised man who, because of a necessity foretold, trained his mental and moral powers and shaped them toward the prosecution of war. He was not a genius - few men are - but he was quite remarkable as a reading of Glyn Harper’s biography or *Infantry Brigadier* or even this paper illustrates. He spent large sums of money and expended a huge amount of time actively studying war until the time came to wage it for his country. When that time came he was ready.

This exercise started with a number of propositions to test. First, that Kippenberger was a strategic thinker, one who had the capacity to think dynamically in time and space. It has been illustrated that Kip thought spatially. His geographic and geostrategic sensibilities, those concepts of *outer space*, have been observed. His mastery of *inner space*, the realm of morale of the indomitable spirit has been noted. Kip has been seen travel through time, his mind noting lessons from the past and applying them to the present, his vision of the future propelled by morals from the past. W.E. Murphy’s endorsement of Kip’s ability to put his reading to “use on the battlefield

---

<sup>323</sup> Clausewitz, “Chapter Three: On Military Genius”, pp.100-114 in, *On War*, Howard and Paret (trans.)

<sup>324</sup> Clausewitz, *On War*, Howard and Paret (trans.), p.100.

in solving problems, gaining objectives and minimising cost without losing time”<sup>325</sup> has underpinned these observations. And finally there is the dynamic thought, Kip’s ability to join the dots to form a picture, create mental connections, visualize and understand the strategic environment.

The U.S. Army War College’s strategic trio, the *Strategist as Leader*, the *Strategist as Practitioner* and the *Strategist as Theorist* provided a framework to consider strategic thinking within. It was noted that the strategist as leader “provides the vision, inspiration, organisational skills, direction and personal impetus necessary to enable others to act in a focused and coherent manner”. Surely inspirational leadership has been seen throughout this study? The strategist as practitioner “thoroughly comprehends the levels of strategy and their relationships and develops strategy. He translated broad policy guidance into integrated strategies that lead to policy success”. Kip’s WWII record and his guidance of the CMT referendum campaign are one guide, his musings about world affairs another. The truth is here that few New Zealand commanders in history have been in any position to be a practitioner of strategy in war, this role held by others of more standing in our coalitions. The notion of Kip as a strategic practitioner can only be judged on potentials. Through the somewhat pointless, though immensely enjoyable, exercise of alternative history speculation, it might not seem too indulgent to believe that, given the opportunity, Kip may have developed into a practitioner of note. Speculation it remains. Finally there is the strategist as theorist, one who “develops theoretical concepts through study and thought and teaches and mentors others”.<sup>326</sup>

We have spent most of our ruminations discussing the theory of war and Kip’s conception of it. This has been some labour for, despite clearly having a great aptitude for writing and a holistic grasp of military history and strategic theory, he unfortunately left no substantial work on the subject behind for us to judge. This is a shame because, using *Infantry Brigadier* as a signal, it can be argued that he would have written some very good history - racy, authoritative, pugnacious, humorous; all the things that make *Infantry Brigadier* and most of the best contemporary historians I referred to for this paper so readable. While the New Zealand Official Histories project that Kip devoted the last decade of his life to is a worthy one, on reflection, I personally believe that it robbed us of something, that it drew him into a place of minutiae and fact and officiousness – a dull place – and, added to his sickness and pain, drained some life from him. I may well be wrong, but I can not help but think that, were it not for that huge consuming project, the success of *Infantry Brigadier* would have spurred our man onto other books and articles. Then there may have been something more concrete to judge him by. No matter. We make do with the material at hand and, I think, all things considered, we must find in Kip’s favour as a strategic theorist.

This paper began by stating that Major General Sir Howard Kippenberger was a romantic realist, a benign nationalist and a strategic thinker. The reflective and nationalistic side to Kippenberger has, I hope, taken more shape in these pages and, so too, Kippenberger the strategist. The final judgement is yours.

---

<sup>325</sup> W.E. Murphy, *Notes on the Liddell Hart Notes of 25/7/54 regarding “A Strategic Puzzle”*, 10 May 1957. LH 4/38, LHCMA.

<sup>326</sup> Yarger, *Strategic Theory for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century: The Little Book on Big Strategy*, p.3.

## Appendix

Figure A1: Ray Grover's Kippenberger Collection Subject Guide<sup>327</sup>

Subject	Titles
World War I (including NZ)	100+
World War II	30+
Biographies of Generals (particularly British)	22
Study of war generally, its nature, character etc.	17
Wellington and Peninsular War	16
Napoleon	12
Histories (generally voluminous) of European wars generally	11
United States Civil War	11
French armies and wars	10
Royal Navy admirals	10
Crimea and later Russo/Turk	10
British army in India, Egypt, Sudan, Africa etc.	10
Naval warfare generally	7
Russo/Japanese war	6
British army generally to WWI	6
Roman war, history and biography	6
Winston Churchill	5
German armies and wars	4
Air war (mainly WWI)	4
Total	297+

Figure A2 Infantry Brigadier Sales 1950-1969<sup>328</sup>

Year	UK	USA	Rest World	Australia	Canada	Total	Royalties
1950	2110	177	3527	-	-	5814	£574 13s 4d
1951	6	20	1062	-	-	1076	£84 14s 8d
1952	6	-	42	-	-	48	£4 5s 8d
1953	63	15	533	-	-	611	£63 3s 9d
1954	49	2	186	-	-	237	£26 16s 3d
1955	233	4	159	-	-	396	£58 19s 5d
1956	144	11	125	-	-	280	£39 15s -
1957	55	4	118	-	-	177	£21 15s -
1958	18	4	186	-	-	208	£21 3s 9d
1962	133	-	971	5	101	1210	£50
1963	31	1	96	2	-	130	£7
1964	42	1	76	6	-	125	£7
1965	46	3	102	-	-	151	£8
1966	42	10	61	6	-	119	£6
1967	35	-	91	-	-	126	£7
1968	76	33	7	2	3	121	£5
1969	24	-	14	3	-	41	£2
Total	3113	285	7356	24	104	10870	

<sup>327</sup> Grover, *Kippenberger Collection: Analysis and Policy*, p.2.

<sup>328</sup> *Infantry Brigadier* publication file, OP1301/9591, Oxford University Press Archives.

## Bibliography

### Primary Sources

Joint Defence Action Committee, *General Summary of the World Situation with particular reference to Communist activities and the need for Universal Compulsory Military Service*, Wellington, 1949. IA77, Box 7, Compulsory Military Training, Archives New Zealand.

Kippenberger, H.K., assorted annotations to books and pamphlets in his personal collection, 1911-1957, in the Kippenberger Collection, Queen Elizabeth II Army Museum, Waiouru.

Kippenberger, H.K., 'Where is New Zealand to be Defended?', *To Preserve Our Security: The Case for Compulsory Military Training*, Joint Defence Action Committee, Wellington, April 1949, pp.3-4; pamphlet in the Kippenberger Collection, Queen Elizabeth II Army Museum, Waiouru.

Grover, Ray, *Kippenberger Collection: Analysis and Policy*, 15 December 1994, unpublished study for Queen Elizabeth II Army Museum archivists.

Stewart, William Downie, 'War Service – Dominion Man-Power: Conscription or Confusion – Which?' *Otago Daily Times*, 3 October 1939 reprinted by The Otago Farmers' Union Mutual Fire Insurance Association. In IA77, Box 7, Compulsory Military Training, Archives New Zealand.

### Archives

H.K. Kippenberger Rehabilitation File, File AADK, W3729 Box 911/7128, Archives New Zealand.

IA77, Box 6, Communist Party 1948-1950, Archives New Zealand.

IA77, Box 7, Compulsory Military Training, Archives New Zealand.

*Infantry Brigadier* file, OP1301/9591, Oxford University Press Archives.

LH 4/38, Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, King's College London.

LH 15/6/5/11, Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, King's College London.

### Books

Adair, John, *Effective Strategic Leadership*, London, 2003.

Amner, Major Lindsay, *Professional Reading List*, 5<sup>th</sup> edition, Wellington, 2006.

Anon, 'Sir Howard K. Kippenberger: The Gift for Leadership', *The Times*, 6<sup>th</sup> May 1957, LH 15/6/5/11, Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, Kings College London.

Ardant du Picq, Colonel Charles, 'Battle Studies: Ancient and Modern Battle', Col. John Greely (ed.), and Major Robert Cotton (trans.), 1921, pp.9-300 in *Roots of Strategy: Book Two*, Pennsylvania, 1987.

Asprey, Robert B., *The German High Command at War: Hindenburg and Ludendorff and the First World War*, London, 1991.

Barber, Laurie, *Red Coat to Jungle Green: New Zealand's Army in Peace and War*, Lower Hutt, 1984.

- Barnett, Corelli, *The Desert Generals*, London, 1960.
- Bassett, Michael and Michael King, *Tomorrow Comes The Song: A Life of Peter Fraser*, Auckland, 2000.
- Baylis, John, James Wirtz, Eliot Cohen and Colin S. Gray (eds.), *Strategy in the Contemporary World: An Introduction to Strategic Studies*, Oxford, 2002.
- Bird, W.D., *The Direction of War: A Study and Illustration of Strategy*, Cambridge, 1925.
- Burch, Betty Brand (ed.), *Dictatorship and Totalitarianism: Selected Readings*, New Jersey, 1964.
- Burdon, R.M., *The New Dominion: A Social and Political History of New Zealand Between the Wars*, Wellington, 1965.
- Carlyle, Thomas, *On Heroes, Hero-worship and the Heroic in History*, London, 1872.
- Carr, E.H., *What is History?* London, 1964.
- Churchill, Winston, *The World Crisis 1916-1918*, London, 1927.
- Churchill, Winston, *The War Speeches of Winston S. Churchill*, Vol. 1, Charles Eade (ed.), London, 1969
- Clausewitz, Carl von, *On War*, Michael Howard and Peter Paret (trans.), Princeton, New Jersey, 1984.
- Connelly, Owen, *On War and Leadership: The Words of Combat Commanders from Frederick the Great to Norman Schwarzkopf*, Princeton, New Jersey, 2002.
- Corrigan, Gordon, *Mud, Blood and Poppycock: Britain and the First World War*, London, 2003.
- Coulombis, Theodore A. and James H. Wolfe, *Introduction to International Relations: Power and Justice*, 4th edition, New Jersey, 1990.
- Creveld, Martin Van, *Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton*, Cambridge, 1977.
- Creveld, Martin Van, *The Art of War: War and Military Thought*, London, 2000.
- Deighton, Len, *Blood, Tears and Folly: An Objective Look at World War II*, London, 1995.
- Dixon, Norman F., *On The Psychology of Military Incompetence*, London, 1979.
- Duggan, William, *Coup D'Œil: Strategic Intuition in Army Planning*, Carlisle, November 2005.
- Falkenhayn, Erich von, *General Headquarters 1914-1916 and Its Critical Decisions*, London, 1920.
- Falls, Cyril, *The Place of War in History: An Inaugural Lecture Delivered Before the University of Oxford 22<sup>nd</sup> November 1946*, Oxford, 1947.

- Foch, Ferdinand, *The Principles of War*, Hilaire Belloc (trans.), London, 1918.
- Foch, Ferdinand, *The Memoirs of Marshal Foch*, Col. T. Bentley Molt (trans.), Surrey, 1931.
- Franks, General Tommy, *American Soldier*, New York, 2004.
- Gilbert, Vivian, *The Romance of the Last Crusade: With Allenby to Jerusalem*, London, 1924.
- Harper, Glyn and Joel Hayward (eds.), *Born to Lead? Portraits of New Zealand Commanders*, Auckland, 2003.
- Harper, Glyn, *Kippenberger: An Inspired New Zealand Commander*, Auckland, 2005.
- Jünger, Ernst, *Storm of Steel*, London, 1929.
- Keegan, John and Richard Holmes, *Soldiers: A History of Men in Battle*, London, 1985
- Kippenberger, Howard, *Infantry Brigadier*, London, 1949
- Krey, August C., *The First Crusade: The Accounts of Eyewitnesses and Participants*, Princeton, New Jersey, 1921.
- Lanning, Lt-Col. Michael Lee, *The Giant Book of Military Leaders: The 100 Most Influential Leaders of All Time*, Sydney, 1996.
- Lee, Martin, *The Beast Reawakens: The Chilling Story of the Rise of the Neo-Nazi Movement*, London, 1997.
- Liddell Hart, Basil (ed.), *The Rommel Papers*, London, 1953.
- Liddell Hart, Basil, *Memoirs: Volume One*, London, 1965.
- Liddell Hart, Basil, *Strategy*, 1954, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, New York, 1991.
- Lifton, Robert Jay and Nicholas Humphrey (eds.), *In a Dark Time: Images for Survival*, Cambridge, Mass., 1984.
- Lynn, John A., *Battle: A History of Combat and Culture*, Cambridge MA, 2003.
- McGibbon, Ian, *Oxford Companion to New Zealand Military History*, Oxford, 2000.
- McKinnon, Malcolm, *Independence and Foreign Policy: New Zealand in the World Since 1935*, Auckland, 1993.
- Magee, Bryan, *The Great Philosophers: An Introduction to Western Philosophy*, Oxford, 1987
- Mahan, Alfred Thayer, *The Influence of Seapower Upon History 1660-1783*, New York, 1957.
- Marix Evans, Martin, *1918: The Year of Victories*, Leicester, 2003.
- Montgomery of Alamein, *A History of Warfare*, London, 1968.

- Mearsheimer, John, *Liddell Hart and the Weight of History*, New York, 1988.
- Oman, Charles, *The History of the Art of War in the Middle Ages Volume One: A.D. 378-1278*, London, 1924.
- Paxton, Robert O., *The Anatomy of Fascism*, London, 2004.
- Phillips, T.R. (ed.), *Roots of Strategy: Book One*, Pennsylvania, 1985.
- Plato, *The Republic*, Desmond Lee (trans.), London, 1974.
- Prestage, Edgar, *Chivalry: A Series of Studies to Illustrate its Historical Significance and Civilising Influence*, London, 1928.
- Robinson, Major General C.W., *Wars of the 19<sup>th</sup> Century*, London, 1914.
- Sawyer, Ralph D., *The Essence of War: Leadership and Strategy from the Chinese Military Classics*, Boulder, 2004.
- Showalter, Dennis E., 'Military History', in *The Osprey Companion to Military History*, Robert Cowley and Geoffrey Parker (eds), London, 1996, pp.204-7.
- Singleton-Gates, Peter, *General Lord Freyberg V.C.: An Unofficial Biography*, London, 1962.
- Siegfried, André, *Democracy in New Zealand*, E.V. Burns (trans.), London, 1914.
- Stephenson, Michael (ed.), *Battlegrounds: Geography and the History of Warfare*, Washington D.C., 2003.
- Stevenson, W.B., *The Crusaders in the East: A Brief History of the Wars of Islam with the Latins in Syria During the 12<sup>th</sup> and 13<sup>th</sup> Centuries*, Cambridge, 1907.
- Strachan, Hew, *The First World War*, New York, 2004.
- Sutch, W.B., *The Quest for Security in New Zealand 1840 to 1966*, London, 1966
- Taylor, A.J.P., *Rumours of Wars*, London, 1952.
- Townshend, Charles (ed.), *The Oxford History of Modern War*, Oxford, 2000.
- Watson, Peter, *Ideas: A History from Fire to Freud*, London, 2006.
- Windrow, Martin and Francis K. Mason, *The Wordsworth Dictionary of Military Biography*, Hertfordshire, 1997.
- Wing, R. L., *The Art of Strategy: A Translation of The Art of War*, London, 1997.
- Wright, Matthew, *Freyberg's War: The Man, the Legend and Reality*, Auckland, 2005.
- Yarger, Harry R., *Strategic Theory for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century: The Little Book on Big Strategy*, Carlisle, February 2006.

### **Journal, magazine articles, newspaper clippings and websites**

Atwater, J. Brian and Paul H. Pittman, 'Facilitating Systemic Thinking in Business Classes', *Decision Sciences: Journal of Innovative Education*, Vol.4, Issue 2, July 2006, pp.273-292.

Bourne, John, 'Sir George Grey Aston', in *Lions Led by Donkeys*, available from <http://www.firstworldwar.bham.ac.uk/donkey/aston.htm>; accessed 1 July 2007.

Castel, Albert, 'Liddell Hart's "Sherman": Propaganda as History', *Journal of Military History*, Vol. 67, no.2, April 2003, pp.405-426.

Ebery, P.K., 'Infantry Brigadier: Book Review', *Australian Defence Force Journal*, Issue 169, 2005, pp.82-3. <http://www.defence.gov.au/publications/dfj/adfj169.pdf>; accessed 1 April 2007.

Echevarria, Antulio J., 'General Staff Historian Hugo Freiherr von Freytag-Loringhoven and the Dialectics of German Military Thought', *The Journal of Military History*, Vol. 60, no.3, July 1996, pp.471-494

Grady, Don, 'Top soldier among groper fanatics', *The Nelson Mail*, 10 March 1998, p.9

Liddell Hart, B.H., 'Responsibility and Judgement in Historical Writing', *Military Affairs*, Vol. 25, no.1, Spring 1959, p.35.

Lord, David, 'Liddell Hart and the Napoleonic Fallacy', *RUSI Journal*, April 1997, pp.57-63

Matthews, Sidney T., 'Infantry Brigadier by Major General Sir Howard Kippenberger', *Military Affairs*, Vol. 13, no.3, Fall 1949, pp.182-183.

McElhatton, Emmet, 'Liddell Hart's Fantasy: A Clash of Official Historians and a Historical Strategist', *New Zealand Journal of Defence Studies*, November 2007, pp.23-29.

Odom, Thomas P., 'America's Cultural First Battles: Understanding the Influence of Culture on War', *Small Wars Journal*, Vol. 9, September 2007, pp.21-29; available from <http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/swjvol9.pdf>; accessed 1 October 2007.

The Queen's Royal Surrey Regimental Association, 'Major General Sir Wilkinson D Bird KBE CB CMG DSO 1929-1939', <http://www.queensroyalsurreys.org.uk/colonels/037.html>; accessed 13 May 2007.

Searle, Alaric, 'A Very Special Relationship: Basil Liddell Hart, Wehrmacht Generals and the Debate on West German Rearmament 1945-1953', *War in History*, Vol. 3, 1998, pp.327-357.

Shumaker, James, 'Operation Desert Storm and the Theories of B.H. Liddell Hart', *National War College*, Washington D.C., 1991, <http://stinet.dtic.mil/cgibin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA437398&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf>; accessed 10 June 2007.

Traynor, Ian, 'Russia accused of unleashing cyberwar to disable Estonia', *The Guardian*, 17 May 2007, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/russia/article/0,,2081438,00.html>; accessed 1 August 2007.

Walker, Ronald, 'The New Zealand Second World War History Project', *Military Affairs*, Vol. 32, no.4, February 1969, pp.173-181.

## **CSS:NZ Mission Statement**

The Centre for Strategic Studies provides a focal point for research and discussion of New Zealand's strategic security environment.

The Centre will develop independent views and opinions based on quality research and analysis that ensures the Centre enjoys and deserves a high standing in New Zealand and beyond.

The Centre's focus will be the Asia-Pacific region. It will address matters of national security and defence, conflict resolution, and arms control and disarmament. It will also examine the strategic implications of political, economic, social and industrial issues, as well as global issues such as human rights, the environment and sustainable development.

The Centre will draw support from relevant departments of government, from the universities, the private sector, the media, and from individuals in developing an understanding of strategic issues. It will aim to provide a constructive input into policy development and foster informed public discussions of strategic issues.

The Centre will interact with similar institutions and particularly in the Asia-Pacific region to ensure that the work of the Centre represents a worthwhile New Zealand contribution to the security dialogue in the Asia-Pacific region.

## List of Publications

### Books

#### CAPACITY BUILDING FOR MARITIME SECURITY COOPERATION IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC

*Edited by Peter Cozens and Joanna Mossop* – NZ\$20.00

(First published 2005; ISBN 0-475-20110-8; Paperback, 180p. Available through the CSS)

#### ENGAGING OCEANIA WITH PACIFIC ASIA

*Edited by Peter Cozens* – NZ\$20.00

First Published 2004; ISBN 0-475-20108-6; Paperback, 130p. Available through the CSS)

#### PEACE ON BOUGAINVILLE: TRUCE MONITORING GROUP

Gudapela Nius Bilong Peace

*Edited by Rebecca Adams* - \$29.95

(First published 2001; ISBN 0-86473-408-51995; Paperback, 192p.

Distributed by Random House and available through all good bookshops)

#### NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH ASIA AND THE FUTURE OF GLOBAL ARMS CONTROL: INTERNATIONAL, REGIONAL AND NEW ZEALAND PERSPECTIVES

*Edited by Rouben Azizian* - \$25.00

(First published 2001; ISBN 0-475-20111-6; Paperback, 331p. Available through the CSS)

#### NON-INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC

*Edited by David Dickens and Guy Wilson-Roberts* - \$20.00

(First published 2000; ISBN 0-475-20113-2; Paperback, 112p. Available through the CSS)

#### AN ASIA-PACIFIC SECURITY CRISIS? NEW CHALLENGES TO REGIONAL STABILITY

*Edited by Guy Wilson-Roberts* - \$25.00

(First published 1999; ISBN 0-475-20109-4; Paperback, 212p. Available through the CSS)

#### STRATEGIC AND ECONOMIC DYNAMICS OF NORTHEAST ASIA: GLOBAL, REGIONAL AND NEW ZEALAND PERSPECTIVES

*Edited by Rouben Azizian* - \$20.00

(First published 1999; ISBN 0-908689-60-8; Paperback, 155p. Available through the CSS)

#### A FALSE SENSE OF SECURITY: THE FORCE STRUCTURE OF THE NEW ZEALAND ARMY 1946-1978

*Edited by Damien Marc Fenton* - \$20.00

(First published 1998; ISBN 0-475-20103-5; Paperback, 240p. Available through the CSS)

#### NO BETTER ALTERNATIVE:

#### TOWARDS COMPREHENSIVE AND COOPERATIVE SECURITY IN THE ASIA PACIFIC

*Edited by David Dickens* - \$15.00

(First published 1997; ISBN 0-475-20101-9; Paperback, 170p. Available through the CSS)

A MARITIME NATION: NEW ZEALAND'S MARITIME ENVIRONMENT AND SECURITY

*Edited by Peter Cozens* - \$20.00

(First published 1996; ISBN 0-475-20100-0; Paperback, 233p. Available through the CSS)

UNRESOLVED FUTURES: COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC

*Edited by Jim Rolfe* - \$15.00

(First published 1995; ISBN 0-473-03566-9; Paperback, 120p. Available through the CSS)

\*\*\*\*\*

**Working Papers**

- 1/95 Will Japan Go Nuclear? Myth and Reality - *Matake Kamiya*
- 2/95 New Zealand and ASEAN: Current and Future Outlook - *Terence O'Brien*
- 3/95 Clearing the Fields: New Zealand and Anti-Personnel Landmines - *Mary Wareham*
- 4/95 Anachronistic Past or Positive Future: New Zealand and the Five Power Defence Arrangements - *Jim Rolfe*
- 5/97 Antarctica: View from a Gateway - *Stuart Prior*
- 6/97 The United Nations: Legacy and Reform - *Terence O'Brien*
- 7/97 For Mutual Benefit: The Japan-US Security Treaty: From a Japanese Perspective - *Daizo Sakurada*
- 8/97 More than Bombs and Border Tension: India and Regional Security - *David Dickens*
- 9/97 Japan and North Korea: An Assessment and Some Policy Approaches - *Ambassador Tetsuya Endo*
- 10/97 New Zealand's Security: Alliance and Other Military Relationships - *Jim Rolfe*
- 11/98 Lessening the Desire for War: The ASEAN Regional Forum and Making of Asia-Pacific Security - *David Dickens*
- 12/98 Indonesia After Soeharto: Civil or Military Rule? - *Andrew Renton-Green*
- 13/99 Inquiry Into Defence Beyond 2000: An Independent Review of the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Select Committee's Interim Report - *David Dickens*
- 14/99 The Revolution in Military Affairs: A New Zealand View, Part I - *David Dickens*
- 15/00 The Context and Risk of Organised Illegal Immigration to New Zealand: An Exploration in Policy Relevant Research - *Greg Talcott*
- 16/00 Russia In Asia: Unwelcome Intruder or Accommodative Player? - *Rouben Azizian*
- 17/01 China's Security Strategy Towards Japan: Perceptions, Policies and Prospects - *Jian Yang*
- 18/04 Terrorism and Conflict Resolution - *Ian Macduff*

- 19/04 Oceania and Terrorism: Some Linkages with the Wider Region and the Necessary Responses – *Jim Rolfe*
- 20/05 Pacific and Security Management by New Zealand and Australia: Towards a New Paradigm – *Stephen Hoadley*
- 21/05 Globalisation, Sovereignty and the Transformation of New Zealand Foreign Policy – *Robert G. Patman*

\*\*\*\*\*

### **Discussion Papers**

- 1/99 A Review of Risk in Defence Equipment Selection  
*Basil McMillan*
- 2/99 Piracy: The Context for New Zealand and its Defence Force  
*Basil McMillan*
- 3/99 Letting Ordinary Kiwis in on Defence  
*David Dickens*
- 4/03 The Road to Sovereignty in the Pacific: A Framework for Pacific Island Development Policy – *Holiday Powell*
- 5/08 The Occupation is the Problem: Palestinian History, Politics and the Prospect for Peace  
*Hanlie Booysen*

\*\*\*\*\*

### **Strategic Briefing Papers**

#### Volume 1: December 1999

- Part 1 New Zealand Defence Spending
- Part 2 South Pacific – Strategic Challenges
- Part 3 The End of the Suharto Era
- Part 4 Theatre Missile Defence (TMD) in the Asia-Pacific

#### Volume 2: February 2000

- Part 1 Strategic and Military Lessons from East Timor
- Part 2 The F16: Capabilities and Costs
- Part 3 F16: International Implications of Cancellation
- Part 4 MOX Shipments, New Zealand, and Nuclear Arms Control

#### Volume 3: June 2000

- Part 1 Humanitarian Intervention: Definitions and Criteria
- Part 2 Piracy in Southeast Asia
- Part 3 The Korea Summit: Runways, Reunions and Reconciliation
- Part 4 A Nuclear Weapons Convention: A Role for New Zealand?

Volume 4: November 2000

Part 1 Reflections on New Zealand's Defence Policy Framework and Australia's Green Paper

Part 2 Australia and New Zealand: The Defence Policy Gulf

Part 3 Strategic Trends in the Asia-Pacific

Part 4 Maritime Surveillance

Volume 5: May 2003

Part 1 Characterising U.S. Foreign Policy

Internet editions of these Papers are available on CSS Website at <http://www.vuw.ac.nz/css/>

