OCEANIA AND TERRORISM:

Some Linkages with the Wider Region and the Necessary Responses

Jim Rolfe

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Oceania and Terrorism: Some Linkages with the Wider Region and the Necessary Responses

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Abstract

Terrorism is not a current threat within Oceania. Despite that, the region has problems that may facilitate terrorist activities. The region has a number of countries in which governance is not strong, and there is ample evidence of transnational criminal activities. Poor governance opens gaps in which terrorism organisations can operate. Transnational criminal activities, in the form of people smuggling, money-laundering and the drug trade for example, generate money which may be used to finance terrorist activities and, even if they are purely criminal, they develop infrastructures which can be used by terrorist organisations.

Oceania needs to address these issues, and states, from outside the region need to assist Oceania in its responses. It is important for Oceania because, unchecked, terrorist groups could set up their operations in the region. It is important for external states because Oceania could act as a form of 'safe haven' for terrorist groups –not through acts of commission, but by sins of omission. Oceania itself needs to coordinate its national anti-crime activities more closely, and consider merging individual and duplicated national functions into regional ones. External states can be most helpful in assisting in regional and national capacity building.

About the Author

Jim Rolfe is Associate Professor of International Relations at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, Honolulu, Hawaii. Before that he taught International Relations at Victoria University of Wellington, and was Deputy Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand. Earlier in his career, Dr Rolfe worked as a Policy Advisor in the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet and before that he served in the New Zealand Army. His most recent work (co-edited with Eric Shibuya) is *Security in Transition* and will be published soon. He is currently researching on issues of institutions and multilateralism in the Asia-Pacific region.

Comment from the Executive Director, CSS:NZ

Professor Jim Rolfe provides a timely warning that one cannot ignore Oceania in the calculus of regional security. His message is of significance to all in the region and one that merits close study by those engaged in the management of our common well-being. This Working Paper is offered to scholars, officials and politicians to stimulate the study and inclusion of Oceania in the broader strategy of neutralising the pernicious scourge of terrorism in the Asia-Pacific.

Peter Cozens
Executive Director
Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand

Introduction

The post-September 2001 war on terrorism is perhaps the defining event of recent times in terms of how it has given common cause to states with otherwise quite divergent interests.[1] The common cause has led states to begin to cooperate (even if often for narrow national ends rather than for any notion of common good) to make terrorism both ineffective as a tactic and unviable as a strategy. This cooperation has transcended political, economic and ideological differences as states join together to fight a non-state (indeed, in many cases anti-state) phenomenon.

Cooperation on this issue occurs because distinctions between domestic and international manifestations of terrorism are often artificial. Even the most domestic of terrorist organisations, is likely either to gain sustenance (in the form of resources or knowledge) from other terrorist and terrorist support groups, or to give assistance to other groups. Cooperation though, normally occurs between states that have something to offer each other. The underlying assumption seems to be that if a state cannot bring something of direct value to the table (information, a reaction force, a direct solution to a terrorist threat) cooperation is either not necessary or not worthwhile. This attitude is a mistake as it is often the states with the fewest resources and with the least to bring to the table that provide, indirectly at least, the greatest threat.

In this paper I argue that we need to consider the benefits of cooperation more widely. I use Oceania (the South Pacific region, not a region in which terrorism is a problem) as a case study to show how other issues within that region, specifically those of governance and transnational crime, could lead to support for international terrorist activities in other regions and thus how it behoves the world community to bring Oceania into the growing web of international cooperation.[2] The thesis underlying this paper is that although Oceania is not necessarily an important factor in world affairs, the international community needs to take account of Oceania and its ability to combat terrorism and activities which could support terrorism.

Oceania[3]

Oceania (broadly, the island state members of the Pacific Islands Forum), is one of the more remote and least accessible regions in the world. Its defining characteristics include those of "islandness" and (except for Papua New Guinea) "smallness".[4] The two concepts are closely linked. There are no land borders other than that between Papua New Guinea (a part of Oceania) and the Indonesian province of Papua (not part of Oceania). There are close ocean borders with Indonesia and the Philippines. The region is not heavily urbanized, but in some urban areas there are population densities as high as anywhere in the world.[5]

Oceania is vast, extending from north of the equator to the Antarctic Circle, and it is hugely diverse in its political life, its economic capabilities and its ethnic and cultural groupings. Despite the region's inaccessibility it is not isolated from the issues that engage the rest of the world and the regional states are actively engaged, to the level of their capabilities, in international and regional forums. The Pacific Islands Forum itself has developed a wide-ranging set of cooperative institutions and, as well, there are well-institutionalised and mature sets of meetings between, for example, Pacific Chiefs of Police, law officers and immigration agencies. The issue in Oceania is not one of cooperation but one of a regional lack of resources.

Oceania has its share of tensions. A number of the states are completely unstable, to the extent that they might be described as failed or failing states. Notable amongst these are Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands. They form part of what some commentators have called an "arc of instability" to Australia's north and to Southeast Asia's east and southeast.[6] Other states are clients of one or other of the regional powers and have an, at times, uneasy relationship with that power.

Because of its remoteness, the small size and poverty of most of the states in it, and the way that most conflict is confined within state borders, the region receives relatively little

scholarly or policy attention. Australia and New Zealand have active relationships with all countries in the region, Japan has an aid programme which is regionally significant but not large in Japanese terms, while the United States is primarily interested in the Micronesian states in the Compact of Free Association through which the US provides funding assistance and has control of the various states' security policies.[7] Southeast Asian states individually and ASEAN collectively have few links with Oceania.[8]

Although Oceania is not presently an area of specific concern in terms of international terrorism, many of Oceania's problems are of a kind that could, if not attended to, contribute to terrorism in other areas either directly or through support activities. Specifically:

- Oceania is poor; there is a pool of people prepared to do anything to sustain themselves.

- Oceania is religiously and ethnically diverse; there are animosities between groups that mean that people may be able to be recruited to act against those groups. Parts of Oceania have a history of violence being used against groups in a way that could be called 'terroristic'.

- Oceania is not completely cut-off from the wider Asia-Pacific region; indeed because of the lack of interest in the region people may be able to move through it more easily than they could through other regions.

- Oceania as a region does not have a developed infrastructure capable of determining terrorist threats or coordinating action against them.

- Oceania has generally weak governance at both the political and administrative levels.

For all these reasons Oceania is a region that needs attention. It is important because it could be the subject of terrorist activity and it is important because it could be the platform for terrorist activity in surrounding states.

In the recent past, distance and relative geographic isolation might have given some protection to the region itself and to the region's neighbours. Today, better transport and communications systems and less than restrictive border controls mean that people, including criminal groups, are able to interact with and within the region and, potentially, exploit states or use them as safe havens or transit points. As the world strengthens efforts to combat organised crime and terrorism there is likely to be a displacement of such activity to areas that have not made similar efforts. Oceania, therefore, needs to keep in step with the rest of the world or else it "risks becoming a weak link in the global effort against such groups and it may become at risk itself as a focus for such activities. The Pacific could become vulnerable to the activities of these criminal groups".[9]

The Issues: Some Snapshots

Until recently it was possible to assert that, as a region and ignoring some country specific problems, "non-traditional issues, especially relating to the environment and natural resources", were the issues that could affect security.[10] Although that assertion was made in counterpoint to any fears of conventional military insecurity, today more 'traditional' issues are clearly relevant. The breakdown in governance, leading to widespread corruption and violence in many if not most states in the region means that the region is susceptible to the activities of transnational criminal organisations and that, in turn, means that it could be susceptible to the activities of terrorist groups, either directly or as part of their global infrastructure.

Terrorism itself is not a major regional issue. Conditions in parts of Papua New Guinea and Solomon Islands are such that a description of terrorism could be applicable, but there seems to be no groups operating with terrorism as their prime tactic. In Papua New Guinea, for example, "general lawlessness in the Southern Highlands Province" had led to anarchy and a risk of terrorist activity.[11] The most extreme manifestation of this is likely to be, perhaps, an attempt to take over a foreign aircraft.

Also, the worries of terrorism inspired by religious fundamentalism do not appear to be a regional issue. There is a small Islamic community in some of the countries, most notably Fiji.

In February 2003, a Muslim cleric was expelled from Fiji under "tougher new guidelines [for residence]" which apparently related to the enforcement of work visas.[12] There were rumours in Fiji that the deported man had some US$30,000 in his house, raising fears that he was being used as a conduit for money-laundering or terrorist financing. No evidence to support this has been released.

More important are the conditions that may support terrorism. A number of states in the region have become unstable to the extent that they must be described as failed or failing. Such states may provide opportunities for terrorist groups to seek shelter. The most important issue is that of governance. Melanesia is suffering from a "deteriorating security environment".[13] There is little confidence in the ability of the 'disciplined forces' to investigate crime – whether domestic or inter and transnational. This means that drug trafficking, human smuggling and money-laundering are all actual or potential activities in the region. The networks that establish and maintain these activities could as easily be terrorist as criminal (that is, they could be motivated by political ends rather than or as well as financial).

Oceania is a transit point for drug smugglers. In Fiji police seized more than 300kgs of heroin in October 2000, and also in 2000 some 20kg of cocaine were washed up on shore on an island in the Federated States of Micronesia.[14] In November 2001, Tongan police discovered some 100kgs of cocaine in a freighter bound for Australia. Although drug use is not widespread in Oceania, as these examples show, there are indications that the region is being used for drug transit. At the moment the indications are that most drugs are destined for Australia, Canada or New Zealand, with the possibility that they also go to the United States. The problem is, however, that once drug routes and a handling infrastructure is established the countries of destination can change. The International Narcotics Control Board (a UN agency) notes that "the Pacific Islands are being increasingly targeted".[15] Police in the Pacific countries have few resources and only limited training in dealing with the issues. Only Fiji and Tonga (as well as Australia and New Zealand) of the regional states are signatories to all the treaties dealing with the international control of drugs. A number of countries are not signatories to any.[16]

People smuggling is also endemic in Oceania and the routes developed by smuggling groups can be as easily used for terrorists as for illegal immigrants. There are well-developed links in the Pacific between East Asia, South Asia and the Middle East and Australia, New Zealand and US.[17] Southern China has been a source of illegal immigrants into the region and an Asian organised crime syndicate is responsible for people smuggling and drug running. The syndicate has used Pacific island nations, such as Fiji and Tonga, as bases for its operations. "Evidence suggests the gang sent members to Pacific island nations up to a decade ago to set up legitimate businesses which could be used to cover criminal enterprise".[18] The Micronesian states are targeted for entry into the United States and to East Asia, Papua New Guinea for entry into Australia and Polynesian states for entry into New Zealand. Not only could terrorist groups use these routes, but also the money generated (once laundered) may as easily be used to finance such groups as to be merely the profit of criminal enterprise. It is not the source of the activity, then, that is the problem: it is the networks themselves, established and potentially open to the highest bidder.

The various illegal activities generate significant amounts of money, some of which is used to finance terrorism and all of which has been 'laundered'.[19] Money-laundering is a major issue. In 1999 the wider Asia-Pacific region was estimated to generate some US$150 billion annually in laundered money from a variety of sources.[20] Oceania, whilst not by any means the largest component of this is nonetheless an integral component of the whole money-laundering system. Many of the countries in the region act as offshore financial centres, some without any controls on the financial transactions occurring within them and thus with an implication that they are involved in money-laundering activities. Nauru, subject to sanctions by the international Financial Action Task Force for its lack of controls, is reportedly home to some 450 shell banking countries of which one third is said to be of Middle Eastern origin. An estimated $400 million passes through these accounts each year.[21] Other Pacific nations too have been investigated, including Cook Islands, Republic of the Marshall Islands and Niue, although those states have subsequently introduced legislation and instituted controls over

the activities of these organisations. Internet gambling, another means of laundering money, is estimated to generate nearly $1.5 million a month in the Pacific islands region, representing "a major new business trend and another potential vulnerability for money-laundering and financial crime in those jurisdictions".[22]

As well as the clearly illegal activities and those on the borders of illegality, there are specific state activities that could aid terrorists. Mostly, these relate to attempts to raise money. Access to citizenship and its associated papers needs to be tightly controlled as citizens and permanent residents of some states have easy access into others. But such access is not necessarily well controlled in several regional countries (for some countries, passports have been handled by agents in Asia rather than by national authorities),[23] primarily because the sale of 'citizenship' is lucrative. In 2002 the revelation that "foreign nationals had been given PNG passports through an alleged scam involving certain officials in the Foreign Affairs Department" brought the issue home.[24] In Tonga, passport sales were said to have earned more than US$20 million before being halted because of what critics said was the diminishing international credibility of the passports. Tongan-born citizens began encountering difficulty at passport controls in countries that became suspicious of Asians travelling on them.[25] Kiribati, Vanuatu, Tuvalu, Republic of the Marshall Islands, and Nauru have also been involved in selling their passports to wealthy foreigners. Money was also the motivation for several states to open their shipping registers to all-comers.[26]

The wider worry must be that eventually a criminal group with sufficient money could, in effect, buy one of these countries and operate it for its own benefit – which could also be to the benefit of a terrorist group.[27] Corruption of the kind that would allow this is probably not yet an issue in the region, but there are signs that corruption is rampant and growing. Papua New Guinea, Fiji, Solomon Islands, Samoa, Vanuatu, and Nauru are all closely linked with corrupt practices involving extra-regional interests which in several of the countries have led to economic collapse and consequent vulnerability to economic manipulation.[28]

These issues are just a snapshot of the region and its concerns. All the issues raise policy implications not just for Oceania but also for its neighbours. Some of these have been addressed by the region and by individual states, some have not.

Terrorism and Transnational Crime

There is an internationally accepted link between terrorism and the problems of transnational crime.[29] Within the Asia-Pacific Region, the track two CSCAP (Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific) process has discussed this and a draft CSCAP Memorandum has been produced.[30] The draft Memorandum clearly links terrorism with transnational crime because "the terrorist activity is in itself a criminal activity … [and because] the terrorist groups commit other transnational crimes …". This linkage between transnational crime and terrorism is particularly useful in the way it reminds us that terrorist groups need support and funding and that such support may come indirectly as well as directly. The CSCAP Memorandum also encourages member countries to form links between the sub-regions of the Asia-Pacific and to support "the development of assistance packages to poorly resourced jurisdictions". Both of those recommendations are central to this paper.

Policy Implications

Clearly there are many manifestations of transnational crime in Oceania. Equally clearly, there is a link between transnational crime and terrorism. The third link in the chain, that between events in Oceania and in other parts of the world, is potential but equally clear: Oceania could act as a base or staging point for international terrorists and it could act as a source of resources for international terrorists.

The problems within Oceania are of both omission and commission. That is, states in some areas are not doing enough for a variety of reasons, and in other areas are doing things that, whilst probably profitable in the short term at least, do not assist regional security. This is a problem for the countries themselves and also for the region's neighbours, because problems

in one country leave gaps in the international security barriers that can be exploited to the detriment of other countries and regions. That reason alone is sufficient for the international community to demand action in some areas; as it already has in the area of financial transactions.

For those pragmatic reasons events in Oceania should be of direct interest to countries in neighbouring regions, especially in East Asia, Australia and North America. Why is this important for the wider region? Because Oceania lacks the resources to solve its own problems and if it doesn't solve its own problems those problems could become a problem for the rest of the region. The region needs to develop processes for cooperation to combat transnational crime and it needs assistance, especially where it is weak as in the development of common procedures and in the application of technology.

There is a second reason why the region must take action against the issues discussed above. That is, it is mandatory as a matter of international law. In 2001 the United Nations, through a Security Council Resolution, noted the "close connection between international terrorism and transnational organised crime, illicit drugs, money-laundering … [and] emphasises the need to coordinate efforts … in order to strengthen a global response to this serious challenge and threat to international security".[31] As well, the resolution required all states to act against terrorist funding, against the movement of terrorists and against support for, and supporters of, terrorist groups within their jurisdictions. It also required states to cooperate through information exchanges and in other ways, and required states to become parties as soon as possible to the relevant international protocols relating to terrorism.

For both pragmatic and principled reasons, then, we need as a region to deal with transnational crime. That means that we have to ensure that individual states are both capable and willing to do so. We need to deal with the problems of poor state governance where that exists because it leaves gaps in the international security shield, and we need to convince states that some actions, although legal, are detrimental to regional security. Terrorist actions are not (yet) a significant problem in Oceania itself and combating terrorist groups themselves may be given a lower priority.

Cooperating Against Terrorism

Terrorism is often transnational in nature. We see this generally as domestic terrorist groups typically receive support from outside their country of operations (for example, through 'charitable' donations from abroad) and as groups establish themselves in one country and operate in another. The transnational nature of the crime makes international cooperation in principle and in practice essential because:

- Without cooperation there will almost inevitably be gaps in national defences for terrorists to exploit.

- Countries are more likely to be able to protect themselves against the consequences (direct or indirect) of terrorist activity if they gain the synergies of cooperation than if they do not.

- More abstractly, most countries within the region endorse to some extent at least the concept of an 'international civil society'; by one definition the "condition of living in a civilized political community" in which, at the international as well as the domestic level, there are "…institutions, norms, practices including not only public international law but transnational law as well".[32] Terrorism attacks that kind of world and if, to some extent at least, we want that world then we must be prepared to work at it and to cooperate to achieve it.

The forms that cooperation against terrorism could take range widely according to the aspect of terrorism that is being fought and the capabilities of the countries concerned. Cooperation could include direct military support to attack terrorist refuges, through assistance in training government organisations in effective anti-terrorist procedures and operations, the development of standardised procedures within a region, and the sharing of information between countries and agencies.

There are several arenas within which cooperation can occur. Terrorists and terrorist groups can be targeted directly, as many countries have been doing with greater or lesser success for many years. Terrorist infrastructure support networks can be attacked, as is beginning to happen in many countries. The social environment which supports or acquiesces to terrorism can be attacked. Peripheral activities (normally criminal) not in themselves terroristic but which support terrorist activities may be closed down.

There is considerable cooperative activity within the Asia-Pacific region. Regional forums now make counter-terrorism cooperation a centre-point of their proceedings and there is a web of sub-regional and bilateral terrorism cooperative relationships developing.[33] Oceania has addressed the issue of terrorism in the past, and cooperation already occurs to some extent. As long ago as 1987 the South Pacific Forum (now the Pacific Islands Forum) agreed that "a regional approach to terrorism was appropriate to counter this emerging threat".[34] More practically, perhaps, the South Pacific Chiefs of Police have been meeting in an annual conference since 1970. That conference includes observers from a wide range of agencies including the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, the United States Drug Enforcement Agency, the US Federal Bureau of Investigation, the South Pacific Islands Criminal Intelligence network, the Pacific Islands Law Officers Meeting, the Pacific Islands Immigration Directors Conference and the Oceania Customs Organisation. Between them, these agencies have a good understanding of the range of the problem. In 2002 the Conference noted that "transnational crime remains a major problem for the region" and agreed that individual agencies should "cooperate more fully".[35]

The links between transnational crime and terrorism and the actions required to combat both were also highlighted in April 2002 at a regional workshop on terrorism co-hosted by the Pacific Islands Forum, the United States, Australia and New Zealand at which the delegates "agreed to provide information on the assistance required to implement UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1273 [sic, 1373], the Special Financial Action Task Force (FATF) recommendations and the 12 key international instruments aimed at combating terrorism".[36] At this meeting also, the host states and other institutions such as the Commonwealth Secretariat, agreed to give support to the Forum states by, for example, developing draft legislation which would give national effect to international counter-terrorism instruments.

At the regional political level also, the rhetoric of cooperation is strong. In 1992 the Honiara Declaration on Law Enforcement Cooperation was agreed by the Forum leadership and in 2002 the Nasonini Declaration on Regional Security was adopted.[37] The levels of rhetoric, though, are higher than the levels of action. The Nasonini Declaration noted that "while some progress had been made in the implementation of the Honiara Declaration, further urgent action was required of some member states". With no great sense of urgency, the Forum Regional Security Committee was tasked to "review the regional implementation of UNSCR 1373, the FATF Special Recommendations and the Honiara Declaration and report back to the Forum at next year's meeting on these subjects".[38] In following up the 2002 Forum's recommendations, the Secretary-General has asked member states to "identify weaknesses in their legislation and ensure enactment of necessary legislative provisions to combat money-laundering, people-trafficking and transnational crimes in the Pacific" and to report back to the 2003 Forum meeting.[39]

Between them, these statements show both the extent of the problem in terms of implementing what is necessary and the way forward. Firstly, the problem exists in the sense of urgency (or its lack) and the will or the capacity of member governments to understand the extent to which they may or may not be meeting international requirements, to introduce legislation and to work with each other in a practical rather than a rhetorical sense. Secondly, the way forward lies in a combination of encouragement and harassment from countries that may be affected by the gaps in Oceania's defences against transnational crime and possible terrorist activities.

Regional governments by themselves seem unlikely to move quickly to fill the gaps. Many of them do not have the capacity, others are too corrupt and still others are preoccupied with other internal problems. That means that countries outside the region need to both assist and encourage the national governments.

There are practical steps relating to participation in the international war against terrorism and specifically to enhance regional coordination, intensify measures against the financing of terrorism and improve border control that can be and should be taken quickly. These suggestions are separate from and additional to the need to address the breakdown in governance in a number of states in Oceania. Measures should include:[40]

- Accession to all relevant international terrorism conventions and the consequent introduction of national measures to implement them.[41]

- Intelligence sharing and the coordination of intelligence analysis.

- Greater coordination between national police forces, perhaps to the extent of following the example of the European Union which may introduce 'European' arrest warrants.

- Harmonisation of national legislation to ensure that gaps that would allow terrorist groups to shelter in any one country do not exist.

- The introduction of national legislation to criminalize terrorist funding and money-laundering.

- The establishment of financial intelligence units in each state (as Fiji is planning to do) or, perhaps more realistically, a central unit operated by the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat.

- Training of personnel in the techniques for identifying and combating money-laundering.

- Full cooperation by all states with international financial institutions.

- Introduction of advanced security features in identity and travel documents to protect against forgery and to allow computer matching of data.

- Ensure passport stop lists are maintained to track individuals who should receive close attention when they travel.

- Computerise all points of entry to monitor the arrival and departure of individuals.

- Monitoring the national implementation of these and other measures to ensure national compliance.

- Training law enforcement and security officials in the techniques of counter and anti-terrorist operations and procedures.

Many of these actions are presently beyond the capacity of individual states. In the legal arena alone, it is almost a commonplace of the region that the small island states "can not afford the range and number of legal and related experts which a sovereign nation needs to keep up with an ever more complex and inter-related world".[42] This is equally true in most other areas of state activity.

There are two approaches to solve that. The first is for external states to recognise that it is in their own interests to assist the Pacific Island Countries in implementing these and other measures through capacity-building initiatives. Some work is already being done and other programmes have been announced. Australia, New Zealand and the United States are the significant donors in this respect. Australia is allocating up to A$150,000 to help the region strengthen its defences against terrorism under the Nasonini Declaration on Regional Security.[43] Australia's 2003 Foreign Policy White Paper contained strong words on assistance to the South Pacific.[44] Development assistance is aimed at strengthening legal systems, police forces, border controls and customs operations. The United States and New Zealand have both agreed to assist Papua New Guinea in ensuring aircraft security.[45] New Zealand is providing a legal drafter to assist in the preparation of model counter-terrorism legislation for Forum Countries.[46]

East Asia, and more specifically Southeast Asia, does not seem to work with the South Pacific region as closely as Australia, New Zealand and the United States do. This is a gap in the defences for both sub-regions. It is a gap for ASEAN because the gaps within Oceania could be used by terrorist groups as an access to East Asia and it is a gap for Oceania because East Asia

is a source of some transnational crime that does affect the region. Closer links could help each sub-region.

ASEAN states collectively and individually have examined the issues for some time and have developed a body of expertise that could be useful to the Forum countries. An immediate practical step could be for ASEAN – Pacific Island Forum talks to be convened to determine the areas in which greater cooperation could occur, at either the sub region to sub region or country-to-country level (intelligence sharing for example). Also, areas in which ASEAN could provide assistance to Pacific Island Countries (participation in or training through the Malaysian-based Southeast Asia Regional Centre for Counter-Terrorism or the Indonesian Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation, for example) should be discussed.

A second approach, extending the support offered by external powers to take account of the lack of capacity held by individual states, would be for regional processes and institutions to be established within Oceania, rather than national ones. For example, rather than national systems being established to maintain passport stop lists, or to analyse intelligence, or to train people, regional processes and centres could be established. Ultimately some form of supra-national authority, perhaps based on the Forum, could be established. This kind of pooling, whether centralised in a single institution or several, would require additional expertise and funding, but by centralising the processes economies of scale would be attained and greater coordination and regional coverage effected.

The argument against regional approaches is that, to some extent at least, this would be an infringement upon national sovereignty; and historically the protection of sovereignty rather than its diminution has motivated regional states. There is no indication that this has changed. However, given that ultimately increased security is the desired end point and if current efforts cannot achieve security then additional approaches need to be considered. Sharing and pooling resources may enhance sovereignty in important areas by strengthening the defences of individual states and of the region.

Supranational laws should be considered, initially enforced locally but eventually by a Pacific Police Force, and supranational institutions under supranational control rather than national should be established. The advantages would be in the way that limited regional resources could be used for the collective good rather than dissipated in ineffective national initiatives. The disadvantage (perceived as much as real) would be in the limitation of national sovereignty, but of course sovereignty has always redefined itself and an argument can be made that the advantages of confederation will outweigh any disadvantages of loss of autonomy.[47]

Conclusions

There are several points of entry for this topic: the transnational nature of much terrorist activity; the link between much transnational crime and terrorism; problems of governance in Oceania leading to an environment in which transnational crime and terrorist support activities can flourish; a lack of resources in Oceania to tackle the issues; and the interests of extra-regional states in ensuring that Oceania is safe, to name but a few. All of these factors point to a need for cooperation within Oceania and for support (both of the carrot and the stick variety) from outside the region. Without cooperation and support Oceania will remain vulnerable to the activities of groups that may or may not be terrorist, but which certainly allow terrorism to flourish.

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End Notes

[1] A formal definition of terrorism is not necessary for the purposes of this paper, and indeed most definitions have problems. The FBI definition is as good as any for my purposes. "Terrorism is the unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives". *(28 Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.) Section 0.85).*

[2] Oceania is the preferred term, rather than 'South Pacific' because parts of the region are north of the Equator.

[3] For the purposes of this paper Oceania does not include Australia and New Zealand, despite the fact that they are physically in and (to a lesser extent) culturally of the region. Those two countries are metropolitan countries with extra-regional linkages of a different order from those of the island states and with sufficient resources to look after themselves. They are, however, susceptible to terror threats and have been the subject of terrorist activity over the years.

[4] Paul Sutton and Anthony Payne: "Lilliput under threat: the security problems of small island and enclave developing states", *Political Studies*, XLI, 1993, pp. 579-93.

[5] Pacific cities such as Suva, Port Vila and Honiara are growing at rates exceeding 6% a year. On the capital islands of many of the atoll nations the population density rivals that of Hong Kong. On Ebeye Island in the Marshall Islands the population density is more than 23,000 per square kilometre. These high and growing population densities are generally fuelled by the movement of unskilled and unemployed people to the urban areas.

[6] See for example the session at the 2001 Melbourne Festival "The Arc of Instability: Australia's Role in the Asia-Pacific", *Alfred Deakin Lectures*, 11 May 2001, http://fedfest.melbournefestival.com.au/PDFs/ 02ArcofInstability.htm, downloaded 13 March 2003.

[7] Recently Australia, New Zealand, and the United States have agreed to work with the island states to enhance their capabilities to counter-terrorism.

[8] With the exception of Indonesia which maintains links with Papua New Guinea over control of the border between the two countries.

[9] Communiqué, *31st South Pacific Chiefs of Police Conference*, Rarotonga, October 2002.

[10] Jim Rolfe: "The Pacific Way: Where "Non-Traditional" is the Norm", *International Negotiation*, 5, 2000, p. 429.

[11] BBC Monitoring: "PNG Security Committee warns on terrorism, Highland 'anarchy'", *The National web site*, 24 October 2002.

[12] Australian Broadcasting Corporation: "Muslims ask questions about expulsion of cleric", *Radio Australia Pacific Beat*, 25 February 2003.

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[24] BBC Monitoring: "Papua New Guinea: MP warns alleged immigration scam opens way for terrorism", *Papua New Guinea Post-Courier web site*, 20 June 2000.

[25] Robert Keith-Reed: "Togan [sic] questions about the lost millions. Huge blow, says the peoples' rep", *Pacific Magazine*, October 2001, http://www.pacificislands.cc/pm102001/, downloaded 13 March 2003.

[26] Tonga, for example, closed its shipping register in 2002 after complaints by "other governments" that "Tonga did not itself follow proper procedures according to law but granted any ship registration submitted, without verification of facts, to get the revenue", (*Pacific Business News*: "Tonga updates exit from registry business", 16 October 2002). In 2003 a ship registered in Tuvalu but operated by North Korean interests was stopped by the Royal Australian Navy and discovered to be carrying some 50kg of heroin (*Associated Press:* "Navy Storms N Korean 'heroin' ship", 21 April 2003).

[27] A hint of this fear may be seen in the comment by New Zealand Minister of Foreign Affairs, Phil Goff, that without prompt and realistic recovery aid to Niue following a devastating hurricane in January 2004 the situation "could leave a vacuum that would allow money-launderers or even terrorists to set up in Niue" (*Dominion* "Niue to get $5m despite viability fears", 21 January 2004). New Zealand media have noted that "It is in the national interest to make sure that the island of Niue is kept out of the hands of those who would pursue activities inimical to the interests of New Zealand" (*National Business Review*, "Time to rethink Niue relationship" 30 January 2004).

[28] Robert Keith-Reid: "Corruption", *Pacific Magazine and Islands Business*, February 2003, http://www.pacificislands.cc/pm22003/pmdefault.cfm?articleid=34, downloaded 26 March 2003.

[29] See for example how ASEAN at www.ASEANsec.org/4964.htm links the issues.

[30] *CSCAP*: "The Relationship Between Terrorism and Transnational Crime", Draft Memorandum No 7, nd, http://www2.vuw.ac.nz/css/docs/cscap_reports/Memo7.html, downloaded 27 February 2003.

[31] *United Nations Security Council*, Resolution 1373 (2001), adopted by the Security Council 28 September 2001.

[32] Editorial, "One Year on and the Commonwealth—Towards an International Civil Society?", *Roundtable, 237*, October 2002, p.582.

[33] There have been recent calls for increased cooperation between APEC, ASEM and G8 members for example. ASEAN and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) have both developed organisational responses to terrorism, and bilateral agreements are becoming more and more common.

[34] *South Pacific Forum Secretariat*, "Eighteenth South Pacific Forum: Forum Communiqué", 30 May 1987. This was after the attempted hijacking of an Air New Zealand aircraft at Nadi, Fiji.

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[38] Ibid.

[39] BBC Monitoring, "Pacific Urged to Unite Against Crime Facilitating Terrorism", *Radio Australia*, 3 February 2003.

[40] The following suggestions are derived and adapted from a number of sources, most importantly from Kathryn Sturman: "The AU Plan on Terrorism: Joining the global war or leading an African Battle", *African Security Review*, 11 (4), 2002, p. 105.

[41] There are 12 such conventions dating from 1963. Details are at: http://untreaty.un.org/English/Terrorism.asp. Few states in Oceania are parties to most of the treaties.

[42] Crocombe: "Enhancing Pacific Security".

[43] Pacific Islands Report, "Australia Joins Anti-Terrorism Effort in Pacific", *Pacific Islands News Association*, Suva, 24 December 2002, http://pidp.eastwestcenter.org/pireport/2002/December/12-24-14.htm, downloaded 25 February 2003.

[44] Australian Government, "Advancing the National Interest", *Australian Foreign and Trade Policy White Paper*, Canberra, 12 February 2003.

[45] BBC Monitoring, "USA, New Zealand offer Papua New Guinea counter-terrorism assistance", *Papua New Guinea Post-Courier*, web site, 12 December 2002.

[46] New Zealand Government, "New Zealand Expertise to Help Draft PI Counter-Terrorism Legislation", *Media Release*, 26 February 2003.

[47] For more discussion see Jim Rolfe: "Surviving in a Sea of Troubles", Eric Shibuya and Jim Rolfe, eds., *Security in Oceania in the 21st Century*, Honolulu: Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, 2003, pp. 231-246.

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